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Abstract
The thesis explores the patterns and evolution of income polarization, income strati-
fication, and social polarization in post-Apartheid South Africa. It uses data from a
survey conducted at the end of Apartheid, and data from two post-Apartheid surveys
to understand the socio-economic transformation the country has undergone since the
end of Apartheid.
At the dawn of democracy in 1994, South Africa implemented many reforms to redress
the effects of Apartheid. Two decades after the fall of Apartheid, the country is still
battling against the social and economic hierarchies bestowed during the period of
Apartheid. Black/African people, for example, still constitute at least 90% of the poor,
unemployment hovers around 25% (with Blacks/African having 32% unemployment
rate), and inequality is unchanged. There are also concerns of increasing intolerance
to diversity as well as plummeting levels of social cohesion in the country. Therefore,
if these disparities are not properly understood and addressed, disintegration could
emerge as the future threat. Thus, our goal in this thesis is to examine the impact
of political transition, which was followed by the enactment of a number of reforms,
on the appearance (or disappearance) of economic distances and differences across
population groups. This investigation is carried out through the perspective of income
polarization and income stratification literature.
Chapter 2 presents the analysis of the concepts of bi-polarization and polarization on
the distribution of income in South Africa between 1993 and 2014-2015. Applying
the non-parametric relative distribution approach and the summary measures of bi-
polarization and polarization, the chapter finds that, from 1993 to 2008, as inequality
rises, both notions of polarization also increase, but at a much higher rate such that the
distribution becomes perfectly bi-polar. During the period between 2008 to 2014, the
level of bi-polarization falls below its 1993 level. Given the axiomatised link between
bi-polarization and the size of the middle class, the results point to an increase in
the size of the middle class in South African since the fall of apartheid. Lastly, the
chapter finds that the distribution of government transfers and that of remittances have
a depolarizing effect, while the distribution of labour income and of capital income
have a tendency to erect poles on the national income distribution.
ii
Chapter 3 attempts, on the basis of Analysis of Gini, to provide the extent to which
the income distributions of racial groups are hierarchically ordered along the national
income distribution. Hierarchically ordering of income distributions assumes conver-
gence, or lack of it, of incomes and of education across the racial groups. Therefore,
first the chapter presents the rate of convergence of education and of income across
the racial groups to serve as a backdrop in the analysis of overlapping of distribution
of income across the racial group. The chapter finds that the income distribution of
Whites overlaps less with that of the overall population and that of other racial groups,
and changes in the distribution of labour income, and of capital income are likely to
increase the degree of income stratification (or reduce degree overlapping of income
distributions).
Chapter 4 tries to demonstrate how social gaps across racial groups have evolved in
post-Apartheid South Africa. To operationalize a measure of social gaps, we use the
degree to which one feels identified and thus defends the interest of his racial group.
This is referred to as a degree of radicalism. Through a series of regressions, the
chapter shows how the degree of radicalism decreases with household wealth, level of
education, employment, and satisfaction with life. Using the distribution of radicalism
to quantify alienation, the chapter shows a fall in the scores of social polarization,
which is largely driven by a fall in between-group polarization. Given that within-
group polarization rises concurrently with a fall in between-group polarization, this
implies a trade-off between internal heterogeneity and external homogeneity.
In short, the thesis advances our understanding of the normatively undesirable issue of
distances and differences across groups and highlights the often neglected, yet indis-
pensable, dimensions of an income distribution.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview of the thesis
This thesis investigates whether South Africa’s ascendancy to democracy has been ac-
companied by a reduction in economic and social distances across groups. The forma-
tion of groups and existence of distances among groups in a society create perceptions
of socio-economic exclusion, which hamper the effectiveness of public policies. Thus,
differences across groups may be linked to socio-economic mobility and may also be
a cause of social conflicts. More specifically, marked distances among groups in an
income distribution is a matter of social concern, independent of their effects on other
variables. The implication of such income distances is that income is acquired un-
evenly in the society. Thus an understanding of these social and economic distances is
instrumental in reaching other social objectives, and in making a society more egalit-
arian.
Despite the instrumental role that a reduction of the distances across groups plays, few
studies focus on the factors that underlie the formation of groups. While the literature
on inequality (an indicator of differences in a society) is abundant, empirical studies
that systematically investigate other dimensions, like polarization and stratification,
are currently lacking, and therefore little is known about these concepts. We postu-
late that a thorough analysis of the income distribution in developing countries must
include a measurement of differences across groups and how different components of
total income interact to change the distances across the groups. This thesis makes a
contribution in this regard by advancing our understanding of the concepts of polariz-
ation and stratification. That is, it evaluates the evolution of the extent of polarization
(formation of economic and social groups), and the extent of income stratification (in-
tegration of groups into the mainstream economy). In doing so, it also focuses on the
moderating influence of socio-economic transformation policies on polarization and
stratification. More precisely, it investigates how the distribution of different compon-
ents of total income (like labour earnings, capital income, and government transfers)
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impact the clustering of incomes and the overlapping of income distributions of differ-
ent groups.
The thesis uses survey data from the 1993 survey, Project for Statistics on Living Stand-
ards and Development (PSLSD), and data from the 2008, 2012 and 2014-2015 waves
of the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS), in South Africa to investigate income
polarization, income stratification, and social polarization. Existing research in South
Africa has largely been on poverty and inequality, thus little is known about either
the relative fortunes or economic assimilation of different groups in South Africa in
the post-Apartheid era. Two decades after the fall of Apartheid, the social and eco-
nomic inequalities stemming from Apartheid are still so endemic that some scholars
ponder the role of post-Apartheid policies in perpetuating them. That is, some indi-
viduals from previously disadvantaged groups have benefited economically from the
post-Apartheid South African economy. An issue that emerges, therefore, is whether
members of all groups undergo the same integration process. Researchers also debate
the notions of equity that should guide public policy in the country. Our study provides
an in-depth discussion of polarization and stratification to provide new perspectives on
these debates.
1.2 Background and Motivation
Apartheid in South Africa divided people into four racial groups (Africans/Blacks,
Coloureds, Whites, and Indians) and kept them apart by law. During Apartheid, edu-
cation of Africans/Blacks (hereafter referred to as Blacks) was governed by the Bantu
Education Act and was inferior to education provided to Whites. Similarly, education
opportunities for Coloureds and Indians were poor, compared to that of Whites. Also
during the period of Apartheid, certain occupations were reserved for Whites, and non-
whites’ wages and job opportunities were limited. The numerous laws of Apartheid
called for separate development by segregating jobs, forcing different racial groups to
live separately, and be educated separately. In short, Apartheid was geared towards
channelling wealth, opportunity, and prosperity towards the White minority by creat-
ing a racially stratified system in terms of education, incomes, and residential places.
These and many other Apartheid laws segmented the labour market and together acted
to bring about labour market earnings differentials (Sherer, 2000).
At the end of Apartheid, South Africa introduced policies and enacted a number of
laws to abolish racial discrimination and segregation. The emphasis of these policies
2
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was to even out opportunities among racial groups. The primary focus was to create
an African elite, cultivate a sense of national unity, and enhance overlapping of social
identities (Seekings, 2008). For example, policies were introduced to level education
funding and increase access to educational opportunities for all. The policy of affirm-
ative action and the promotion of people from previously disadvantaged groups was
also introduced. These policies and reforms could reduce earnings differences caused
by the inferior Bantu education system and labour market practices that meant blacks
(Africans, Coloureds, and Indians) earned much less than Whites. Other equalisation
policies targeted the expansion of the non-white entrepreneurial base and thetransfer of
share equity to be representative of the racial demographics of the country. The expan-
sion of black entrepreneurial and business-owning classes increased economic integ-
ration by promoting and expanding their share of productive property. Other policies
included improving access to basic services, such as water and electricity, and an in-
crease in the coverage of state grants.
These policies, in parallel with other development goals, such as fostering tolerance for
diversity, are likely to narrow the social and economic distances across racial groups in
the country. From this backdrop, we ask whether the distances across groups have nar-
rowed in the post-Apartheid era. That is, given the societal changes, economic growth,
and changes in inter-race relations, has the clustering of incomes reduced, in both ab-
solute and relative terms. Thus, this thesis presents the analysis of the effects of the
post-Apartheid initiatives on the evolution of relative fortunes across racial groups.
There is a large and growing body of literature on the effects of these de-racialisation
policies (see, among others, Leibbrandt, Finn and Woolard (2012); Leibbrandt and
Levinsohn (2014); Leibbrandt, Wegner and Finn (2011)). While no attempt is made
to offer a detailed review of the numerous and intriguing issues these studies raise, a
quick glimpse highlights the puzzling formation and persistence of inequities, even as
individuals in these groups and social environments evolve. In a nutshell, two decades
after the end of Apartheid, South Africa is still battling against the social and economic
hierarchies created by Apartheid. For instance, Black people still constitute 90% of the
poor and aggregate inequality has remained unchanged, though it now reflects higher
intra-racial and lesser inter-racial components (Leibbrandt et al., 2011). While the
general consensus is that the increase in state grants has succeeded in moving Black
people out of poverty into the middle income classes, the persistent income inequality
is usually credited to labour market earnings differentials (Leibbrandt et al., 2012;
Schiel, Leibbrandt & Lam, 2014).
For some scholars, these de-racialisation policies only reformed the Apartheid era dis-
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tributional regime, and only a select few benefited, while the rest remained confined
to poverty (Seekings & Nattrass, 2008). More precisely, Seekings and Nattrass (2008)
point out that some black South Africans have benefited from the changes and gained
social and economic mobility, while the majority of formerly disadvantaged people
still face poverty, unemployment, and social exclusion. As a consequence, there is
rising within-group inequality and somewhat stagnant between-group inequality. Us-
ing data from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) to explore the evolution skills
within the South African workforce over the last 20 years (from 1994 to 2014), Stat-
istics South Africa (StatsSA) reports that less skills development of Blacks takes place
relative to that of Whites. This means the process of economic integration in South
Africa is quite slow. The proposition, in this case, is that affirmative action policies
marginally changed the racial composition of higher paying occupations.
Most of the studies focus on poverty and inequality. This has left unexplained the
extent to which people in previously disadvantaged groups have been assimilated into
the mainstream economy. Economic assimilation, which is the rate of convergence
in incomes between the groups, can be an important indicator of economic mobility.
This is especially true in countries undergoing socio-economic transformations like
South Africa. And social assimilation, which is defined as the commonality of values,
commitments, and social relations among groups and individuals, has the potential to
strengthen social cohesion.
To get a clearer picture of the economic integration of blacks (Africans, Coloureds,
and Indians), this thesis argues that the focus should be on polarization of income,
stratification of racial groups’ income distribution, and social polarization. A study of
these three concepts will offer insight into the transformation the country has under-
gone, and determine whether social and economic distances across groups narrowed
or widened in the post-Apartheid era. Our argument is that reversing the imbalances of
Apartheid requires a thorough understanding of the formation of economic and social
groups, economic assimilation of racial groups, and the evolution of social distance
across race groups.
1.3 Objectives and Hypothesis
The question that forms the basis of this thesis is: Has the country’s transition to a
more democratic state been accompanied by a significant reduction in the economic
and social distances across racial groups? The thesis has the following objectives:
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Firstly, this study investigates the extent of income polarization and bi-polarization
in South Africa. Polarization is the formation of either two income groups with the
median as the divide (bi-polarization) or an arbitrary number of income groups (multi-
polar income polarization). These two notions have in common that the society is di-
vided into groups, which may be antagonistic. This investigation, therefore, is relevant
for governments aiming to reduce class warfare and social unrest. It also examines the
relative contribution of the distribution of different income sources to the overall level
of polarization in the country. Our hypotheses are that the expansion of government
transfers is expected to lessen clustering of incomes, while changes in the distribution
of labour earnings and of capital income should create poles in the income distribution.
The hypotheses are premised on the fact that government transfers and remittances are
usually received by people from lower income groups, and tend to move them into the
lower-middle income group. In contrast, labour earnings and capital dividends mostly
accrue to a select few at the top end of the income distribution. This will most likely
bring incomes below and above the median closer together, such that there is a larger
spread around the mean. As the incomes bunch, the distance between the rich and
poor might widen, and there might be local poles such that there are multiple groups
of incomes.
Secondly, the thesis will examine the extent of income stratification (or economic in-
tegration ) of racial groups. Stratification is the hierarchical ordering of the income
distributions of different groups. This ordering of incomes of groups is the first step
to understanding the economic (dis)advantages of (low) high-income groups. For in-
stance, if Whites continue to dominate the high-income group, then the post-Apartheid
policies have not addressed the economic disadvantages of non-whites. An increase in
the degree of overlapping (the inverse of stratification), requires the incomes of blacks
(Blacks, Coloureds, and Indians) to catch up to that of their White counterparts. Thus,
investigating stratification is necessary for addressing socially embedded inequalities
in the country.
In pursuit of this second objective, this thesis also presents an analysis of convergence
with respect to educational attainment and income across the racial groups. The con-
vergence of educational attainment and incomes of non-whites towards those of their
white counterparts is a precondition for economic assimilation. In a complementary
way, it also assesses the effect of changes in the distribution of different income sources
on the extent of stratification of income distributions of racial groups. We conjecture
that changes in government transfers and remittances ought to expand overlapping of
the incomes of Black people, and changes in labour earnings and capital income should
explain overlapping of the incomes of Whites.
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Thirdly, we examine the evolution of social distances among racial groups in South
Africa between 2003 and 2012. From this perspective, income is not the only relev-
ant factor that underpins identity and differences across individuals (Duclos & Taptue,
2015). Clustering is driven by social factors like race, religion, language, and edu-
cation. We use the extent to which respondents express involvement with their racial
group to measure social distance between individuals in different groups (that is, alien-
ation). Assuming an increase in the convergence of educational attainment and income
among Whites and Blacks, we expect social distance across race and the salience of
race to diminish in the post-Apartheid era.
1.4 Motivation for and Contribution of the Thesis
The thesis is composed of three empirical chapters, which differ in terms of questions,
hypothesis and the empirical tools used. The aim of the three chapters is to address
the problem of a divided society. Easterly (2001) finds that homogeneous societies are
more likely to have better socio-economic indicators and less social unrest. Existing
evidence suggests that inequality of opportunities and racial divisions affect socio-
economic mobility, economic integration, and other development outcomes. That is,
when groups have access to substantially different opportunity sets and different living
standards, their society is more susceptible to social disintegration, as social tensions
are likely to emerge.
As a supplement to the measurement of polarization and stratification of incomes, we
also study how the distribution of different components of total income impact on the
changes in these concepts. We argue that this investigation is tantamount to evaluating
the impact of the economic reforms enacted at the dawn of democracy on the economic
distances across groups. To put this into perspective, consider the expansion of state
grants, whose immediate result is to move the recipients into higher income brackets.
This can either increase polarization by creating local poles in the distribution or reduce
it by enlarging the size and composition of the middle class. From the stratification
perspective, it can increase the number of Blacks (or recipients) intersecting in the
range of Whites incomes, thereby lowering (increasing) stratification (overlapping) of
incomes of Whites (by Blacks).
Therefore, a better understanding and effective measurement of these phenomena can
enable the design of public policies which in turn can provide efficiency gains for the
society as a whole.
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There is an abundance of studies focusing on other dimensions of welfare (such as
income inequality and poverty), and much can be learned about the welfare of different
groups from these studies. Despite this, the literature on the patterns of polarization and
stratification in sub-Saharan Africa is scant. There is, therefore, a lack of information
on the formation of poles and ordering of groups in the income distribution. Moreover,
studies on the stratification of incomes of salient groups may not be generalizable to
different settings. More specifically, identity groups are dynamic and usually context-
specific, which means an uneven distribution of circumstances. The thesis contributes
by adding new empirical evidence from South Africa to the literature.
The thesis makes a further contribution by adding to the literature on the middle-class
in the country. Increased income bi-polarization, or clustering of incomes at the ex-
treme ends, such that the rich are getting richer and the poor becoming poorer is linked
to a declining middle-class. The existence of a large middle class is associated with im-
proved and intensified anti-corruption efforts, and it mitigates class warfare and helps
democracy to flourish (Easterly, 2001; Pressman, 2007). For example, a taxonomy of
economic classes in a society can include three wealth categories: the rich (or afflu-
ent), the middle-class, and the poor. A society with few middle-class members will
have wider distances (or larger average income gaps) between the rich and the poor.
Therefore, a poor person is more likely to revolt against the society when the size of
the middle-class is smaller. The reason being, if there is a sizeable middle class, such a
poor person may not be rich, but may expect to achieve a middle-class position. In or-
der to reduce such risks of social instability, it is therefore essential to better understand
bi-polarization.
Equally important to the size of the middle-class is the composition of the middle-
class. One of the goals of the post-Apartheid policies was to create a black African
middle class to ensure diversity within the middle-class. This thesis therefore adds
something of value to the debate in the form of a robust measure of the size of the
middle class. By extension, it will provide evidence of the effectiveness of the post-
Apartheid policies.
Our study makes its third contribution to literature by documenting proximate causes
of economic distances across groups. Analyses of clustering of incomes from both
polarization and stratification perspectives usually involve computing and contrasting
summary measures. Therefore, by incorporating the effects of the distribution of dif-
ferent income sources, our study allows for a thorough empirical analysis of the clus-
tering of incomes. That is, we attempt to model the drivers of clustering, which should
advance our understanding of the factors behind the formation of groups.
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While there is nascent research aiming to assess the formation of local poles in an in-
come distribution, there are not many studies focusing on formation and disappearance
of social groups. The few available studies, most of which are illustrative examples
of proposed indices, are not generalizable because the partitioning identities, and the
factors used to measure alienation, are context specific in these studies (Apouey, 2007;
Fusco & Silber, 2014; Permanyer, 2012; Permanyer & D’ambrosio, 2015). Therefore,
the fourth contribution of this thesis lies in its development of a measure of social
distance across racial groups. We partition the population by race, then measure the
degree of alienation by the strength with which someone in a racial group compares
themselves with those in other racial groups, and their sense of identity with others
in their racial group. Our measure of alienation across racial groups is drawn from
the literature on the economics of identity (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000, 2005), the polit-
ical economy of hate (Glaeser, 2005), and social identities in social psychology Klan-
dermans (2014). By examining the possible determinants of alienation across racial
groups, the thesis extends our understanding of convergence in social identities.
Lastly, the measurement of social distances across racial groups provides information
about the extent of de-racialisation in South Africa. To put it into perspective, one
of Apartheid’s broad objectives was to maintain racial purity by preventing and lim-
iting inter-racial interactions through racial segregation in residential areas, schools,
universities, and on public transport (Seekings, 2008). The post-Apartheid policies,
therefore, sought to promote social interactions across race and increase tolerance for
diversity. Our study can therefore be seen as an attempt to understand how public
policies have impacted the social and economic positions of individuals. The literature
on South Africa has overlooked these issues, and this is another research gap that this
thesis seeks to fill.
1.5 Summary of the Chapters
Chapter 2 is the first substantive chapter in this thesis and it explores the extent of
income polarization and bi-polarization in post-Apartheid South Africa. First, we show
that, from 1993 to 2008, people moved from lower and upper-middle income groups
into lower-middle and high-income groups. These movements increased income bi-
polarization and multi-polar income polarization in the 19 years between 1993 and
2008. Between 2008 and 2014-2015, the majority of South Africans moved from the
lower income group into the middle-income group, such that polarization of incomes
decreased. Lastly, we show that the distribution of incomes for Blacks has diverged
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the most, which makes Black South Africans highly clustered around local poles in the
national distribution. A similar conclusion is reached with regard to the distribution
of incomes in urban areas, which makes urban residents more susceptible to conflict.
We also find that the distribution of labour earnings and that of capital income have a
tendency to cluster incomes. The distribution of government transfers, in contrast, is
more likely to attenuate the clustering of incomes.
Chapter 3 addresses the question of income convergence, income stratification, and
how the distribution of different income sources affect the degree of income stratifica-
tion. First, we demonstrate that educational attainment only converges at primary and
high school levels, and the average income of all other races has converged to match
that of their White counterparts. These convergence patterns, which are statistically
significant, may increase the extent of overlapping of incomes. The ANOGI approach
confirms that the incomes of Whites are indeed less stratified (or overlap more). A
shift-share micro-simulation shows that changes in labour earnings and in capital in-
comes are behind the reduced income stratification of Whites’ income, while changes
in government transfers largely influence the overlapping of incomes of Blacks.
Chapter 4 focuses on an analysis of social polarization, in order to evaluate the salience
of racial identities in social interactions. We incorporate recent developments in the
measurement of alienation or hostility across groups to argue that there is convergence
in racial identities. Analysing the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) data
for the period 2003 to 2012, we measure racial radicalism as the degree to which an
individual feels identified with a racial group. We find that the degree of racial radic-
alism is influenced by household wealth, level of education, labour market status, and
life satisfaction. Using the racial radicalism variable in the analysis of social polar-
ization reveals that, with lower between-group polarization, within-group polarization
becomes more salient. This could mean a new identity or classifying stratum emerges
alongside race, or replaces race as the defining stratum. On the whole, the degree of
social polarization shows a downward trend, meaning some degree of convergence in
racial identities. This conclusion is robust to using the distribution of racial groups in
different categories of self-reported health status to measure alienation.
We conclude the thesis in chapter 5 with is a brief summary of findings, a discus-
sion of the implications of these results, and some ideas for future research. On the
whole, the results imply that the de-racialisation policies, through their partial effects
on the different components of total income, have succeeded in redressing some of the
socio-economic imbalances of the Apartheid. Nonetheless, our research also shows
that incomes of Blacks are the most polarized and the incomes of Whites are highly
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stratified. Thus, we conclude that economic assimilation of race groups has not been
uniform. The increase of social distance or alienation within-groups amid declining
social polarization suggests a reduction in the social distances across race groups.
From a policy perspective, these results imply that an increase in the share of labour
earnings and capital income in total income of previously disadvantaged groups may
reduce the extent of income polarization and stratification.
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Chapter 2
Analysis of Income Polarization in Post-Apartheid
South Africa
2.1 Introduction
It is a well-established fact that during the last 20 years, income inequality in South
Africa, as captured by the traditional indices such as the Gini Coefficient, has not
decreased. More specifically, recent studies suggest that income inequality has an
intra-race rather than an inter-race character in the post-Apartheid era. At the same
time, Blacks still make up more than 90% of the poor. Are these income disparities
indicating incomes clustering around local poles in the income distribution of a popu-
lation? This chapter attempts to answer this question by making use of techniques for
measuring polarization.
There is an expanding body of literature focusing on the understanding and meas-
urement of polarization of incomes. This literature starts from the seminal work by
Esteban and Ray (1994); Foster and Wolfson (2010/1992); Wolfson (1997). Even
though the measurement of polarization has received a fair amount of attention in de-
veloped nations, little is known about its evolution in developing countries. One reason
for the lacuna in polarization studies in Sub-Saharan Africa is poor (or lack of qual-
ity) data. We therefore expand this literature by investigating patterns and evolution of
income bi-polarization, and (multi-polar) income polarization in the context of South
Africa.
The basic idea of polarization is to capture a divided society that is a threat to social
cohesion and social justice. Polarization also has implications for the equality of op-
portunity and the ability of individuals to move up in a society (Gochoco-Bautista,
Bautista, Maligalig & Sotocinal, 2013). Bi-polarization of incomes corresponds to
the absence of a middle class (Chakravarty, 2015; Duclos & Taptue, 2015). A well
established middle class contributes to the well-being of society (Deutsch, Silber &
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Yalonetzky, 2014). Recent studies have also brought to light the detrimental effects
of (multi-polar) income polarization on health, growth rates, and convergence levels,
and prospects of social mobility (Azzimonti, 2011; Brzezinski, 2013; Esteban & Ray,
2011; Perez & Ramos, 2010). A polarized income distribution may lead to the emer-
gence of social conflict, social unrest, and tension. Therefore, a proper understanding
of the structure and profile of polarization in the distribution of income in a population
is the first step towards the achievement of social equity and cohesion in the society.
South Africa presents an obvious case because notions of inequity are socially em-
bedded in the country’s history. For instance, Adato, Carter and May (2006) argue
that apartheid-era racial segregation policies have created ineffective avenues for up-
ward social mobility. These are evidenced by the poverty traps identified in Woolard
and Klasen (2005), and the inequality traps suggested in Pellicer, Ranchhod, Sarr
and Wegner (2011). Therefore the country is susceptible to social disintegration.
Moreover, the spreading levels of social and township1 unrest reflect the slow pace
of economic mobility. This escalation of protests is an attribute of a polarized soci-
ety. This situation gives further prominence to the need for effective measurement and
continuous monitoring of the extent of income polarization.
The research in this chapter has a two-fold purpose. Firstly, we investigate the extent
of bi-polarization and multi-polar income polarization in the South African income
distribution. The racial segregation policies of Apartheid clearly polarized the country,
and we aim to see how the government’s de-racialisation policies and the transforma-
tion the country has undergone in the post-Apartheid era has changed the South African
income distribution. Secondly, we decompose the polarization patterns by factor com-
ponents and population subgroups. The idea is to figure out whether various income
components (like labour market earnings, government transfers, remittances, etc) tend
to create local means (or clusters) in the overall distribution. It has been pointed out
that labour market income is the main component of total income and the largest driver
of income inequality (Leibbrandt et al., 2012), thus it is important to know if its distri-
bution also leads to the polarization of household income. We further assess how the
income differences between and within groups defined by region (rural vs urban) and
by race contribute to overall income polarization in the country.
The chapter proceeds first by applying a non-parametric relative distribution analysis
to demonstrate that people in the bottom income classes moved into the middle-income
classes, and those in the middle-income category moved to the top end of the distribu-
1Township “is a suburb or city of predominantly black occupation, formerly officially designated for
black occupation by apartheid legislation” (Adapted from Oxford Dictionaries)
12
Un
ive
rsi
ty
of
Ca
pe
To
wn
tion. The summary measures (of polarization and bi-polarization) indicate that these
two movements have narrowed income distances among individuals below and above
the middle. The bunching of incomes (i.e., narrower income distances) signify a coun-
try divided into two income groups that are internally homogeneous. More precisely,
the level of polarization increased between 1993 and 2008 such that there is near per-
fect bi-polarity. This lends support to the view of the former president, Thabo Mbeki,
that the country consists of “Two Nations”. Between 2008 and 2014, there is a decline
in the degree of income polarization in the post Apartheid era, which suggests a growth
in the size and composition of the middle class.
The decompositions reveal an increase in the contribution of the income differences
within the groups and the decline of between-group polarization. Moreover, the in-
come distribution of Black South Africans is the largest contributor to income dif-
ferences within racial groups. The distribution of labour earnings and that of capital
income are found to increase the extent of clustering of incomes, while the distribution
of government transfers and that of remittances are the depolarizing income compon-
ents.
Considering the results in a Bayesian sense, that is, whether they change our prior un-
derstanding of distributional dynamics of per capita income in South Africa, we can ar-
gue that the country is highly polarised. The clustering of incomes around local means
has, however, declined in the post-Apartheid era, which suggests the de-racialisation
policies have a positive effect.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 gives a brief review
of standard concepts and a literature review on income bi-polarization and income po-
larization. In subsection 2.2.3 we discuss the Araar (2008) decomposition techniques.
Section 2.3 discusses the data, clarifies some of the limitations of the study, presents
summary and descriptive statistics, and discusses the relative distribution results. The
main results of the research are presented in Section 2.4 while Section 2.5 summarizes
the findings, concludes the chapter, and offers directions for future research.
2.2 Concepts and Brief Review of the Literature
Polarization refers to the formation (or disappearance) of groups in a society. Polariza-
tion may be derived from properties of traditional inequality measures (see Rodríguez
and Salas (2000); Silber, Deutsch and Hanoka (2007); Zhang and Kanbur (2001)), but
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it is a distinct concept from inequality (Duclos, Esteban & Ray, 2004), or at least it adds
another dimension to the notion of inequality (Yitzhaki, 2010). The primary distinc-
tion, axiomatically at least, between them, rests on the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle,
an elementary property of all inequality measures. According to this principle, income
transfer from the non-poor to the poor must result in a less unequal income distribution,
but one which is more polarized, especially when both individuals are on the same side
of the median.
As an illustration, consider a society divided uniformly into four income levels -
y1,y3,y4,y6. Then assume a redistribution between y1 and y3 and between y4 and y6
which leads to two income levels - y2 and y5 with large population shares. Although
inequality has decreased, society is now clustered at income extremes, and is thus more
polarized. Polarization and inequality do not always move in opposite directions. By
way of an example, assume a society divided evenly across only two income levels -
y2 and y5. Suppose y2 moves to the left to y1, while y5 moves to the right to, say, y6,
then income disparity (or inequality) has increased. Similarly, the two groups have
moved further apart, and therefore polarization has also increased.
The last couple of decades have witnessed substantial theoretical developments in the
measurement of polarization. The literature identifies five different types of polariza-
tion, namely, (multi-polar) income p larization, income bi-polarization, social polar-
ization, socio-economic polarization, and multidimensional polarization. These polar-
ization types mainly differ by how groups are formed or defined, and by the measure-
ment of distances between the groups. Chakravarty (2015); Duclos and Taptue (2015)
provide a thorough description of these polarization categories. In this chapter, we fo-
cus on (multi-polar) income polarization and income bi-polarization, and in chapter 4
we focus on social polarization and socio-economic polarization.
There are at least four approaches to the measurement of polarization of income. The
most common approach computes summary measures of polarization and inequality
and compares the qualitative and quantitative effects of polarization and inequality
indices to see how similar their conclusions are. Alternate approaches make use of
kernel density estimation (as in Jenkins (1995, 1996); Pittau and Zelli (2001, 2006)),
and finite mixture models within countries (as in Flachaire and Nunez (2007); García-
Fernández, Gottlieb and Palacios-González (2013); Massari, Pittau and Zelli (2009)),
and mixture models across countries (see Bianchi (1997); Pittau, Zelli and Johnson
(2010)). Another approach uses the non-parametric relative distribution approach to
measure the degree of income polarization (as in Borraz, González and Rossi (2013);
Clementi, Dabalen, Molini and Schettino (2014); Clementi and Schettino (2013)). The
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relative distribution approach is considered a variant of the kernel densities literature
since it compares densities of two groups.
The present chapter adopts the first approach, which estimates the summary measures
of polarization. In a manner similar to inequality studies, we also consider polarization
by looking at the polarization of income among population sub-groups, and polariza-
tion in the distribution of main components of total income.
This section presents a brief description of income polarization and bi-polarization2.
We begin by exploring the concept of bi-polarization and highlighting notable em-
pirical papers. Second, we explain income polarization and highlight some notable
contributions. We end by synthesizing the literature on these two concepts.
2.2.1 Income Bi-polarization
Income bi-polarization refers to the dispersion of the distribution of income from the
central value towards the extreme points. A bi-polarized income distribution is, thus,
one in which there is a significant number of people who are exceptionally poor but
also a non-negligible class of extremely rich individuals, such that there are fewer indi-
viduals with middle-level incomes. Bi-polarization is thus associated with a tendency
toward bi-modality, or the clustering of formerly middle-level incomes at either the
bottom or top end of the distribution (Wolfson, 1997). An increase in bi-polarization
can further signal a reduction inequality above or below the median income. This im-
plies that the two groups are becoming internally homogeneous (lesser within-group
inequality), or the distance between the average incomes of the two groups has in-
creased (higher between-group inequality).
2.2.1.1 Definition and Measurement of Middle Class
A direct implication of increased bi-polarization is that there is no sizeable middle-
income class.Low levels of bi-polarization correspond to a distribution that is very
concentrated around the median, that is, it shows a large middle class (Duclos & Tap-
tue, 2015). Looking at bi-polarization from this perspective forewarns about the prob-
lem of the “disappearing middle class” in a society. The importance of the middle
2For a detailed review of the literature on polarization, an interested reader should consult Chakravarty
(2010, 2015); Duclos and Taptue (2015)
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class is a well-documented fact (Easterly, 2001; Pressman, 2007). Empirical evid-
ence suggests that socio-economic reforms cannot be sustained over long periods if
the middle-income class does not grow and if those in the middle perceive themselves
as losing as a result of reforms (Birdsall, 2007).
More importantly, measuring the middle class within the ambit of bi-polarization by-
passes the debates surrounding the definition and measurement of middle class. Foster
and Wolfson (2010/1992) explain that measuring the extent of the middle class in a
country involves four steps. First, specifying the space (such as income or population
space) for splitting the distribution. In the income space, an income range is chosen
such that all people whose incomes fall within this range are regarded as middle class.
For instance, we could define the middle class as the population share with incomes
within some interval that includes the median. These intervals, often set in diverse and
ad hoc ways, include 75% to 125%, 60% to 225% and 85% to 115% of the median
income (Foster & Wolfson, 2010/1992; Wolfson, 1997). The population space rather
looks at the income range covered by a given percentage of the population (Chakrav-
arty, 2015). In the second step, we could define the middle (which would be the mean
or median). The third step sets the boundaries of the middle class. Finally, the fourth
step aggregates the chosen middle-class characteristics.
Most studies use an income space to quantify the size of the middle class. For instance,
in a cross-country analysis, Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002) define the middle class as
those living between the mean incomes of Brazil and Italy, whereas Banerjee and Duflo
(2008) define the middle class as those living on between $2 and $10 per day at 1993
PPP. In the context of South Africa, Visagie and Posel (2013) outline the “affluent
middle class” as those with a per capita monthly income of between R1400 to R10000
in 2008 prices. While informative, these definitions and measurement strategies are
incompatible, and often give confusing and misleading results (Foster & Wolfson,
2010/1992). The resultant middle-class groupings then depend on the definition of the
middle, and these studies may measure something other than the extent of the middle
class.
Burger, Steenekamp, Van der Berg and Zoch (2014) provide convincing evidence of
the inconsistencies in these different approaches in the South African context. For their
measure, they use occupation and skills level, vulnerability to poverty, the income po-
larization index of Esteban and Ray (1994), and self-identification into the middle
class. Mindful of the limitations of the income space approach to measurement of the
extent of the middle class, Burger and McAravey (2014) characterise an “empowered
middle class” based on several dimensions, such as having at least 7 years of school-
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ing, access to public services and information, living in a household with a working
adult and living in a household with a stove and refrigerator. Using the vulnerability
approach, Zizzamia, Schotte, Leibbrandt and Ranchhod (2016) show that the South
African middle class has grown, and the share of Black middle-class South Africans
has also increased.
One limitation of these studies is that they have to assume a certain cut-off point to
define the middle class. As a consequence, it is unclear whether the reported increase
is actually a middle class. The bi-polarization approach circumvents the arbitrary cut-
offs by looking at the dispersion of the distribution from the central value. And the
hollowing out of the distribution is interpreted as the decline in the middle class. Non-
etheless, the bi-polarization approach only says that the middle class either increases or
declines, it does not provide the size or the composition of those in the middle class.
2.2.1.2 Measures of Bi-polarization
The literature on bi-polarization has its roots from the seminal work by Foster and
Wolfson (2010/1992) and Wolfson (1994). Foster and Wolfson (2010/1992) define two
innate properties that distinguish bi-polarization from inequality. These are “increas-
ing spread” and “increasing bipolarity”. Increasing spread means an unambiguous
movement of incomes on any side of the median income away from the median. This
not only means the poor are getting poorer and the rich richer, but the two subgroups
are also becoming mor distant from one another such that heterogeneity between
them increases. For example3, in a given distribution, a median preserving income
transformation that makes the rich richer and the poor poorer, will move people away
from the middle, and increase bi-polarization. Alternatively, income transfer from the
poor to the rich will pull both the poor and the rich further from the middle, thereby
increasing bi-polarization.
Increased bi-polarity, in contrast, means clustering of incomes such that individuals
close to the middle move further from it, whereas individuals farther from the median
move towards it. That is, narrowing distances among those below or above the middle,
and increasing homogeneity among the subgroups. The movement of the first group
(those nearer to the middle) increases the spread from the middle, while the movement
of the second group (those further from the middle) reduces those spread. The first
movement is assumed to carry more weight than the second movement, which is why
3This example is adapted from Motiram and Sarma (2014)
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bi-polarization increases. It is important to note that this clustering of incomes would
decrease any inequality measure satisfying the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, which
deems progressive transfers to be equalizing. Most studies that investigate the extent
of bi-polarization take these properties as given (see, among others, Amiel, Cowell
and Ramos (2010); Chakravarty and Majumder (2001); Deutsch et al. (2014); Duclos
and Échevin (2005); Foster and Wolfson (2010/1992); Prieto-Rodríguez, Salas and
Rodríguez (2003); Wang and Tsui (2000); Wolfson (1994)).
Foster and Wolfson (2010/1992) and Wolfson (1994) propose an index of bi-polarization
as twice the area between the Lorenz curve and the tangent to the Lorenz curve at me-
dian income. Formally, the Foster and Wolfson (2010/1992) index, (FW index herein-
after), is defined as:
PFW =
4µ
m
[
1
2
−L(0.5)− G
2
]
(2.2.1)
where µ is the mean; m is the median; L(0.5) is the ordinate of the Lorenz curve at the
50th percentile (that is, the share of income held by the poor half of the population); G
is the Gini coefficient. The larger the term in brackets, the fewer individuals there are
with mid-level incomes and, the greater the bi-polarization. Maximum bi-polarization
occurs when half the population has zero income and the other half has twice the mean.
A convenient feature of the FW index is that it does not need to assume arbitrary cut-
offs to define the middle class.
The bi-polarization literature agrees that zero bi-polarization coincides with the ab-
sence of inequality. There is, however, no consensus over the maximum value of the
bi-polarization. Foster and Wolfson (2010/1992) and Wang and Tsui (2000) argue that
bi-polarization indices are unbounded from above, while Silber et al. (2007) claims
that a maximum (of 1) is achieved when the bottom half has zero income, and the top
half has evenly distributed positive income. Nonetheless, there is an implicit accept-
ance that the score of FW index of 0 implies no polarity and the score of 1 implies
bi-polarity.
There are a variety of extensions on the FW index (see, among others, Deutsch et al.
(2014); Prieto-Rodríguez et al. (2003); Wang and Tsui (2000). For instance, Prieto-
Rodríguez et al. (2003) restates the FW index in terms of incomes below and above
the median, as follows: PFWRS = (G
B−GW )S, where GB is inter-group inequality, GW
is intra-group inequality and S is a measure of income skewness (i.e 2µ/m). From
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this formulation, we clearly see that bi-polarization increases with greater distance
between those with income below the median and those with income above the median
(i.e higher GB). It also increases when people above and below the median income
are more alike (lower GW ). Lastly, polarization may increase when top incomes are
further away from the middle of the distribution (higher S). Thus, income polarization
and inequality may or may not have the same direction, depending on the source of the
inequality.
2.2.2 Income polarization
Income polarization looks at the extent of clustering of incomes around a small num-
ber of arbitrary and distant poles in the distribution of income, wherever the poles may
be. Measurement of multi-polar income polarization can be traced back to Esteban
and Ray (1994). Esteban and Ray (1994) define a polarized society as one charac-
terized by a small number of considerably sized groups, a high degree of homogen-
eity within each group (internal homogeneity) and a strong degree of heterogeneity
between groups (external heterogeneity). This conceptualization is based on an aliena-
tion/identification behavioural framework. Alienation is the degree of hostility felt by
individuals from one group toward individuals belonging to other groups. Alienation
increases with income distances between individuals in those groups. Identification, on
the other hand, refers to income homogeneity within each group. It is usually measured
by group sizes such that a society with many small-sized groups is less homogeneous
than a society with a few big-sized groups. In other words, an alienation/identification
framework postulates that individuals identify with those with similar income levels,
and feel more alienated from an individual the greater the income distance between
their incomes. This means that income polarization increases with both alienation and
identification. The interaction between these two concepts yields hostility between
groups which may, in turn, generate social tensions or sabotage social cohesion.
Based on this framework, Esteban and Ray (1994) develop an index to characterize
the degree of income polarization in a society. Assume that the income distribution
is split into the pre-defined number of income classes - K, each with income equal
to yi. Identification is then an increasing function of the number of individuals in
an income class. And an individual feels more alienated from others as the income
distance between them increases. By imposing some axioms, the Esteban and Ray
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(1994) (ER) indicator takes the following form:
PER = A
K
∑
i=1
K
∑
j=1
pi1+αi pi j|yi− y j| (2.2.2)
where piα and |yi− y j| are respectively identification and alienation components; yi is
the income level, pii is the size of group i in total population, A > 0 is a normalization
constant that has no effect on ordering of distributions and α ∈ (0,1.6). For α = 0 the
ER index corresponds to the Gini index. The greater the value of α , the greater the
divergence from inequality, thus α is the polarization sensitivity parameter. That is,
the higher α gives more weight to homogeneity within the groups.
One of the major limitations of the ER indicator is that the number of income class - K,
is set arbitrarily by the researcher. To overcome this and other drawbacks, several al-
ternatives and modifications of the ER index are proposed in the literature (see Duclos
et al. (2004); Esteban, Gradin and Ray (2007); Gradín (2000)). Particularly relevant
for this chapter is the extension developed by Duclos et al. (2004). They extend the ER
index for continuous distributions by using kernel density functions so that the number
of groups is endogenous. The advantage of this extension of Duclos et al. (2004) is that
it does not assume knowledge of pre-existing groups. This property is most relevant
when the population of one group is also regarded as the population of other groups.
Following the presentation in Duclos and Taptue (2015), the effective antagonism of
an individual with income x towards an individual with income y is a function of the
identification - I = f (x) - and of the alienation - a = |x− y|. The antagonism function
T (I,a) is continuous and increases in a, and is such that T (I,0) = T (0,a) = 0. Polar-
ization is proportional to the sum of all effective antagonisms. The normalized Duclos
et al. (2004) (DER) index is defined as
PDER = A
ˆ ˆ
f (x)1+α f (y)|x− y|dxdy (2.2.3)
Where A= 0.5µα−1, a factor that makes the index invariant to proportional changes in
all income; f (x) is the density function which captures identification; µ is the mean;
0.25≤ α ≤ 1 is the identification effect weight, such that if α = 0, the index reduces to
Gini coefficient. Similarly, the higher α is, the stronger the homogeneity individuals
feel with other members of the same groups. A standard approach in the literature is
to assume α = 0.5.
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Duclos et al. (2004) show that the DER can be decomposed as follows:
PDER = ι¯α a¯α [1+ρi,a] (2.2.4)
where ι¯α =
´
f (y)1+αdy - is the average identification effect; a¯ =
´
a(y)dF(y) - is
overall average alienation (which equals two times the Gini coefficient) and ρi,a =
cov[ f (y)α ,a(y)]/ι¯α ,a¯ - is the normalized covariance between identification and alienation.
For empirical purposes, the DER index is stated as follows:
P ˆDER =
1
n
n
∑
i=1
[
fˆ (yi)
]α
a¯(yi)
where fˆ (yi) is the Gaussian kernel density and ¯a(yi) =
ˆµ+ 2(i−1)−nn yi− 2n∑i−1j=1 yi and
µˆ is the sample mean.
The DER index is conceptualized to satisfy a set of desirable axioms. The axioms are
grouped into those that are common for most distributive indices and those that are spe-
cific to polarization measures. The generic axioms include 1) Anonymity (independ-
ence from individual characteristics except for income), 2) Population-independence
(invariance to population size replication), and 3) Scale-invariant (invariance to uni-
form proportional changes in income). The polarization specific axioms include 4)
Alienation-sensitivity, which states that squeezing the global distribution around its
mean does not increase polarization, 5) Identification-sensitivity, which states that
squeezing the local uni-modal distribution around its mean does not decrease polar-
ization and 6) Interaction-sensitivity, which states that increasing the distance, by the
same level, between incomes which form the local distributions and average incomes
does not decrease polarization.
Both the DER and ER indicators are widely used in the literature. Most empirical
studies were conducted to illustrate and motivate the study of polarization. Nonethe-
less, all the empirical studies can be grouped into four categories. The first category
includes studies that assess the link between polarization and inequality (as in Chakrav-
arty and Majumder (2001); Deutsch, Fusco and Silber (2013) ). The second category
is those on robust polarization comparisons or stochastic dominance in polarization
(as in Chakravarty and D’Ambrosio (2010); Duclos and Taptue (2015). The third
category is those on polarization and growth (Azzimonti (2011); Brzezinski (2013);
Ezcurra, Pascual and Rapún (2006)) and the final category is studies on the linkages
between polarization and conflict (Esteban & Ray, 2011; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol,
2005b).
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In this chapter, we follow the first category of studies, which assesses the link between
polarization and inequality by computing and comparing their respective indices. Zhang
and Kanbur (2001) are among the first to reject the hypothesis of the empirical differ-
ence between the two concepts. They find that, in the context of China, income polar-
ization and inequality have similar trends and relative ranking of subgroups. However,
when they use a new indicator of polarization they develop, their results lead them to
conclude that the two are different. Using information from the Luxembourg Income
Study, Duclos et al. (2004) also find cross-country evidence in support of polarization.
Chakravarty and Majumder (2001) in the case of India discovered that polarization and
inequality move in opposite directions. Also in India, Motiram and Sarma (2012) find
that inequality and polarization have similar trends at the national level, but the mag-
nitudes of changes and the disaggregated trends are different. Therefore, the empirical
difference between polarization and inequality is context specific and depends on the
indices used to measure polarization. Further research using new datasets will likely
expand this literature. Thus, in the present chapter, we contribute by estimating the
FW and DER indicators using South Africa as a case study.
As is common in income inequality studies, we also explain polarization of income by
considering polarization of income in the sub-populations and the polarization of the
main components of total income. Some notable studies in this area of research in in-
clude Araar (2008); Awoyemi and Araar (2009); Bonnefond and Clément (2012); Wan
and Wang (2015). The differences in the impact of an income source on inequality and
polarization could be another indication of their empirical differences. The assump-
tion is that if polarization and inequality are indeed identical, then they ought to have
similar contributors.
Furthermore, the income source and population sub-group decompositions are also
the first steps in understanding the proximate causes of polarization. For instance,
if between-group differences contribute more to polarization than within-group dif-
ferences, it suggests that the country is divided across those groups. Alternatively,
higher within-group contributions suggest decreasing internal homogeneity which in-
dicates an emergence of new strata within the groups. Given that polarization means
the existence of poles, flagging which income component is responsible for creating
the poles may help policymakers to make changes which could narrow social fractures
in a country.
A noteworthy study in this decomposition research is one by Deutsch et al. (2013).
They use Shapley value decomposition to compare the differential impact of income
components on inequality, polarization, and bi-polarization. They discover that differ-
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ences in labour market income contribute considerably to the three concepts. However,
varying income from transfers is the sole contributor to polarization, while differences
in capital income are strongly related to both inequality and polarization. Using a vari-
ant of the Shapley Value approach common in studies on poverty and inequality, Wan
and Wang (2015) show that unequal investment income is a dominant polarizing com-
ponent. When they further decompose these changes into growth and redistribution ef-
fects, their results reveal different patterns across regions. However, on average, wages
and transfer income redistribution affect polarization negatively. Bonnefond and Clé-
ment (2012) find that subsidies are depolarizing in urban areas while non-agricultural
opportunities are polarizing in rural areas. These factor decompositions highlight that,
on average, different income sources contribute differently to both polarization and
inequality.
2.2.3 DER index decomposition
There are generally three approaches one can follow to decompose polarization in-
dices. The first approach is Shorrocks (2013)’s Shapley value decomposition (see
Deutsch et al. (2013)), the second is the micro-simulation approach of Bourguignon,
Ferreira and Lusting (2005) (see Viollaz, Olivieri and Alejo (2009)), and the third is the
analytical approach of Araar (2008). In this chapter, we follow the approach developed
by Araar (2008) because of its simplicity and ease of estimation.
Borrowing ideas from the Gini coefficient decompositions, Araar (2008) develops an
analytical approach to decompose the DER index by both subgroup and factor com-
ponents. Let the population be composed of g exclusive groups (say rural vs urban)
and assume that φg and ψg are, respectively, the population share and income share
of group g. Suppose that the inter-group inequality represents inequality when every
income in every subgroup is replaced by the relevant subgroup’s mean income, then
algebraic decomposition of the Gini index (G) is as follows:
G =∑
g
φgψgGg+ G¯+R (2.2.5)
where Gg is the Gini coefficient for income within subgroup g, G¯ is the inter-group
inequality and R is the residual term, which vanishes if group incomes do not over-
lap. Assuming that fg is the density of group g, the contribution of an individual with
income x to the DER is given as: c(x) = a(x) f (x)
1+α
µ1−α . If pig(x) denotes the local propor-
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tion of individuals belonging to group g with income x, then the local contribution of
group g with income x - cg(x) - to DER is cg(x) = pig(x) f (x)α f (x)a(x)µ1−α . From these local
contributions, the DER index can be written as:
PDER =∑
g
ˆ
cg(x)dx (2.2.6)
Thus, the DER index can be decomposed as follows:
PDER =∑
g
φ1+αg ψ
1−α
g RgP
DER
g︸ ︷︷ ︸
within−group
+ P¯DER︸ ︷︷ ︸
between−group
(2.2.7)
where Rg =
´
ag(x)pig(x) f (x)1+αdx
φg
´
ag(x) fg(x)1+αdx
which is unity if groups do not overlap and depends
again on the correlation between the density function of the group and that of the
population; ag(x) is the alienation component and P¯DER = ∑gφ1+αg a(µ˙g) is between-
group or inter-group polarization which is equivalent to the DER index when within-
group polarization is ignored or assuming that each individual has the average income
of its group, with µ˙g = µg/µ and a(µ˙g) = ∑hφh|µ˙g− µ˙h|.
The income source decomposition of DER follows closely the Gini decomposition
approach of Rao (1969). This approach states that the contribution of each income
source equals the product of i s income share and the coefficient of concentration.
Assuming total income is a sum of k various income sources and ψk is the income
share of source k, then the DER index can be given as:
PDER =∑
k
ψkCPDERk (2.2.8)
where CPDERk =
´
f (x)1+αak(x)dx
ψαk µ
α
k
is the pseudo-polarization index of source k which is
similar to the concentration index. The more equally distributed income source k is, the
lower its pseudo polarization index. Similar to Rao (1969), the contribution of each in-
come source mainly depends on its income share and on its pseudo polarization index.
Comparing the pseudo-polarization index (CPDERk ) with the DER polarization index,
one can easily judge the direction of the contribution simply by checking the sign of
(CPDERk −PDER). An income source is polarizing if its contribution to polarization is
greater than its share in total income, or its pseudo-polarization index is greater than
the overall DER index.
This approach has two limitations. First, in the case of subgroup decomposition, the
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problem arises in the distribution created by replacing each individual income with a
subgroup mean income. This makes the distribution degenerate, which is problematic,
given that polarization depends on the size of the groups and their density. Second, in
the case of factor decomposition, current approaches assume linearity of the underlying
index, and polarization is not linear. These two drawbacks present restraint in drawing
strong conclusions from the decomposition results.
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
2.3.1 Data Description
This chapter uses data from the 1993 Project for Statistics on Living Standards and
Development (PSLSD), the 2000 Income and Expenditure Survey (IES) and the 2008,
2012, and 2014-2015 waves of the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS).
The PSLSD was conducted from January 1993 to April 1994, before the first demo-
cratic elections, to give a detailed picture of the welfare of South Africans at the dawn
of democracy. It was designed as a self-weighting survey. But weighting became
necessary after some areas could not be enumerated because of unrest, and under-
representation of whites in some clusters. The PSLSD targeted 9000 households, and
the final sample consists of 8802 households and 43685 individuals. IES is conducted
every five years to determine the average expenditure patterns of households in differ-
ent areas across the country, and to assist in the calculation of weights for the country’s
Consumer Price Index (CPI). The IES, like most Statistics South Africa (Stats SA)
surveys, targets 30000 households, and the final sample for the 2000 IES consists of
26263 households and 104153 individuals. After the release of 2001 census, Stats SA
calibrated the original design weights to align them to 2001 population totals.
NIDS is the country’s first national panel survey, which started in 2008. It is conducted
every two years. It is designed to capture the distributional dynamics of welfare across
the nine provinces in South Africa. NIDS starts with 7305 households, then followed
and re-interviewed individuals from these households in each of the subsequent sur-
vey waves. The 2014-2015 data set is the fourth and most current wave of the NIDS
survey. The final samples for NIDS are 28226 individuals from 7296 households in
the 2008 wave, 36279 individuals from 9252 households in the 2012 wave, and 40787
individuals from 9951 households in the 2014-2015 wave. Throughout the chapter, we
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treat these waves as independent cross-sectional surveys. That is, we weight them ap-
propriately using post-stratification weights that have been corrected for non-response
and attrition. The post-stratification weights are derived from the non-response adjus-
ted design weights by calibrating them using a cross-entropy approach. For wave 1
(2008), given that it is the original sample, we need not worry about attrition. But
the representativeness of the subsequent waves (the 2012 and 2014-2015) becomes
an issue because by construction they are based on the 2008 sample design, and not
representative of the underlying population. Therefore, the original post-stratification
weights are adjusted by an inverse of the probability of non-attrition4. In theory, these
weights make the sample more representative of the population. We opted to use only
the first, third, and fourth waves of NIDS because the quality of the 2010-2011 wave
is questionable (Finn & Ranchhod, 2013).
These surveys use a two-stage sampling design. The first stage units (or primary
sampling units) are a random sample of Enumeration Areas (EAs) delineated from
the Population Census preceding each survey, (that is, the 1991 census for the PSLSD,
1996 census for the IES and 2001 census for NIDS). The second stage units are private
households5 or dwellings selected systematically in each EA. A PSU in each survey
consists of either one or multiple EAs, depending on whether the number of dwelling
units in the base EA is less than the minimum number of required dwelling units. The
sampling weights in each survey reflect the selection probabilities of each individual.
We use data from these surveys because they cover a wide time span, and are therefore
more likely to accurately reflect the effects of structural changes in welfare distribution
such as inequality and polarization.
In this study, we use real household per capita income. Total household monthly in-
come is derived as the sum and aggregation of individual incomes from the labour
market, remittances, dividends, government transfers, and other income sources (see
appendix 2.6.1 on page 55 for a list of variables used to compute each income com-
ponent). To adjust for no economies of scale, each individual is assigned the total
monthly income of their household, divided by the corresponding household size. The
per capita income adjustment assumes that all household members get the same share
of income, regardless of their individual incomes, their role in the household, and other
characteristics. All incomes are in rands and inflated to 2012 values using the South
African Consumer Price Index of 2012. We thus use real household income per cap-
4For details about calibration of the weights visit http://www.nids.uct.ac.za/images/
documents/wave3/NIDS-W3UserGuide-PublicRelease20150330_v1.5.pdf
5Household includes a group of people (related or unrelated) living together and pooling resources for
purposes of meals and lodging.
26
Un
ive
rsi
ty
of
Ca
pe
To
wn
ita as our indicator of well-being. This is equivalent to performing the analysis at
household level, but weighting each household by the number of members. Lastly, we
remove all households and individuals with zero, missing, and negative income. This
means the samples used in our analyses are slightly smaller than the actual samples,
an issue that may cause bias. But the excluded cases are less than 1% of each sample’s
observations. The final sample (pooled) has 237644 individuals. The PSLSD 1993
accounts for 16.3% of the final sample, the IES 2000 for 43.2%, and the three waves
of NIDS (i.e., 2008, 2012, and 2014) account for 11.4%, 13.5%, and 15.6%, respect-
ively.
2.3.1.1 Data Limitations
The surveys cover a period characterized by significant changes in the structure of the
economy (see Leibbrandt & Levinsohn, 2011). However, they have some methodo-
logical differences and comparability issues that need to be considered when using
the data from them for income distribution analysis. First, the PSLSD and IES sur-
vey questionnaires are administered to a single individual in the household, while the
NIDS interviewed all members of the household. Therefore, PSLSD and IES are more
prone to measurement error, and analyses based on these surveys could produce biased
results.
Moreover, we omit imputed rental income and agricultural income because their meas-
urement differs in the NIDS and PSLSD. The IES only has an agricultural production
variable and does not include requisite data to impute rental income. Another key issue
is that the panel structure of NIDS means there might be high attrition of those in the
top end of the distribution. This under-representation of rich individuals can lead to a
downward bias in the measurement of inequality and polarization.
These limitations do not mean that data from these surveys have no bearing on the
measurement of polarization and inequality, rather one should consider carefully the
conclusions drawn from them. For instance, the exclusion of both imputed rental in-
come and agricultural income may bias comparison of sub-populations across different
surveys and in the same surveys. Evidence from prior studies (Leibbrandt et al., 2012;
Leibbrandt & Levinsohn, 2011) shows that any biases that come from omitting im-
puted rental income and agricultural income are not large enough to explain away the
conclusions drawn. The comparability concerns are discussed in detail by Leibbrandt
et al. (2012).
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2.3.2 Summary Measures and Distribution of Real Income per Capita
Before proceeding with measurement of income polarization, it is important to know
the structure and profile of household income in South Africa. We do this in two ways,
first we compute several typical summary measures to get an initial understanding of
the evolution of incomes. Tables 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 present the summary statistics of
income and of key variables in the data. Second, we apply the non-parametric kernel
density curves and relative distribution approach developed by Handcock and Morris
(1998) to further characterise the distribution of income. Figure 2.3.1 displays overlaid
kernel densities and Figures 2.3.2, 2.3.3 and 2.3.4, and Table 2.3.3 present the results
obtained from the relative distribution approach.
A general conclusion from the summary measures is that the income distribution shif-
ted to the left between 1993 to 2008, and the distance between the rich and the poor
widened. But from 2008 to 2014-2015, the incomes of the rich and the poor tend to
converge as evidenced by the fall in poverty and inequality. The non-parametric ana-
lysis lends support to the results from the summary measures. That is, there is a marked
upward location shift in the income distribution between 2008 and 2014-2015. There
is also evidence of change in the shape of the distribution which is due to changes in
higher moments like skewness. This shape effect happens to be largely influenced by
movement from lower income classes to middle classes.
The detailed results are presented in Table 2.3.1. Total monthly household income
is normalised by the corresponding household size while all income sources are at
household level. We learn the following from this table. During the period leading
up to 2008, average per capita household income increased while median per capita
household income fell. This suggests that those households with high incomes have
moved further away from the middle, thereby likely raising the level of polarization.
Looking at the changes in the income sources, we note the following. First, the mean
and median household income for all, except remittances, have increased since 1993.
Second, ratio of mean to median for household labour income declined in 2008 until
2014, which suggests that mean and median labour incomes are diverging. Third,
government transfers increased sharply after 2008. The first two points can partially
explain the inferred increase in polarization and the latter point can explain the lower
levels of polarization in 2012 and 2012.
Table 2.3.1 gives summary statistics of key variables like the proportion of rural house-
holds, household size, and the proportion of adult workers in the household. These
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variables are related to the income generating capacity of the household, thus their pat-
terns are important. There is a uniform drop in the proportion of rural households and
household size. While the proportion of households in which all adults are working
drops by 10.2% between 2000 and 2008, then rises gently thereafter, the proportion of
households without working adults rises during the period up to 2008, and falls there-
after until 2014-2014. The proportion of employed adults increases marginally from
0.47 to0.52 in 2008, falls to 0.50 in 2012 and rises again by 9.3% in 2014-2015. The
average years of schooling for adults increases throughout the 20 year period. This
increase is possibly due to a drop in the proportion of households whose head has up
to 7 years of schooling (i.e., unskilled), and a rise in semi-skilled household heads and
skilled heads.
Table 2.3.2 gives further summary statistics of real per capita income at the individual
level. Similar to household statistics, the mean is greater than the median for all sample
points, indicating that the distribution of per capita income is skewed to the left. Both
kurtosis and skewness fell between 1993 and 2012, which suggests that people in the
middle-income classes have moved to the top end of the distribution. The Quantile
ratio is about 32.5 in 1993. This means that the income per capita of the poorest
person in the richest 10% is at least 32 times higher than the income per capita of the
richest person in the poorest 10%. This ratio declines to 29 in 2000, rises by 18.9%
to 35 in 2008, then drops by 30.1% in 2012, and by 19.5% in 2012. These changes
reflect the widening of income distances between the rich and poor between 2000 and
2008, and the narrowing of the income distances in 2012 and 2014-2015. As shown
by other studies, income inequality rises during the period 1993 to 2008, then declines
sharply in 2012, and increases again, though slightly, in 2014-2015. Poverty, on the
other hand, declines throughout the period under analysis.
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Table 2.3.1: Household level summary statistics
Variable
1993 2000 2008 2012 2014-2015
n Mean n Mean n Mean n Mean n Mean
Per capita monthly income 7629 2414 25832 2583 6857 2630 7529 3211 8572 3854
Median per capita income 999 937 916 1200 1461
Capital income 706 1504 1230 2571 409 4994 434 6562 464 15326
Remittances 1538 205 10106 669 1011 1690 1138 1545 2049 1441
Labour income 6016 2282 18714 3919 4303 6020 4943 8042 6020 8980
Government income 1895 392 6632 716 4156 854 4841 1272 5287 1372
Other income 50 766 1262 1161 18 4527 35 5083 25 9526
Rural 7629 0.406 25832 0.360 6857 0.326 7529 0.301 8572 0.294
Male dummy 0.460 0.479 0.439 0.479 0.487
Household size 7629 4.33 25832 3.85 6857 3.60 7529 3.47 8572 3.21
Work rich 7629 0.308 25832 0.333 6857 0.299 7529 0.369 8572 0.442
Work poor 7629 0.190 25832 0.269 6857 0.304 7529 0.259 8572 0.222
Some work 7629 0.501 25832 0.398 6857 0.397 7529 0.372 8572 0.336
Individual level
Employed (18<age<66) 20058 0.473 56007 0.478 11763 0.523 16693 0.503 19449 0.550
Years of Education (18<age<66) 7.76 9.29 9.77 10.05
Unskilled 0.7972 0.7046 0.6901 0.6586
Semi-skilled 0.1765 0.2503 0.2527 0.2601
Skilled 0.0263 0.0451 0.0572 0.0813
Notes: All incomes are inflated to 2012 prices, and are analysed at household level, except where
stated. All the values of the income components values are conditional on receiving, that is, strictly
positive non-missing values. Work rich indicates that all adults in the household are working, work poor
indicates no adult works while some work indicates that at least one adult works. Unskilled refers to
those with up to 7 years of education, semi-skilled to those with 7 to 12 years of education, and skilled
refers to those with more than 12 years of education
Source: Own calculations from weighted PSLSD 1993, IES 2000, NIDS 2008, 2012, and 2014-2015.
The income share of the richest percentiles increases at a decreasing rate during the
period from 1993 leading up to 2008, then declines by between 10% and 6% from
2008 to 2012 and rises again in 2014-2015. The income share of the poorest quantiles
shows a startling decline in 2008, a situation which may explain the wider income
gaps in 2008. Table 2.3.2 further shows that the proportion of households receiving
capital income, remittances, and labour incomes decreases between 1993 and 2008.
In contrast, the share of households receiving government transfers increases twofold
during the same period. For the 6 years between 2008 and 2014-2015, the share of both
labour income and remittances increases, whereas the share of government transfers
falls by 8.9%. Overall, these summary measures indicate wider income distances in
2008 which suggests greater degree of polarization of incomes in South Africa during
this period.
Figure 2.3.1 provides further insights into the key distributional changes in income in
South Africa. The figure presents the overlaid kernel densities of the log of real per
capita income. We use Epanechnikov 2 to estimate all densities and the Silverman
method to select the optimal bandwidth. The growth in average income between 1993
and 2014-2015 is set out by the upward or rightward shift of the 2014-2015 income
distribution. The 2014-2015 distribution is twin-peaked, which is indicative of bi-
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Table 2.3.2: South African income per capita summary statistics for all individuals
1993 2000 2008 2012 2014-2015
Mean (at individual level) 1475 1792 1808 2067 2453
Median 521 596 537 751 903
Skewness 17.6 18.3 8.1 6.3 33.3
Kurtosis 589 892 114 60 1320
Quantile ratio (p90/p10) 32.5 29.2 35.7 24.8 20.0
Gini Coefficient 0.675 0.686 0.709 0.665 0.675
Headcount Poverty 0.557 0.519 0.558 0.447 0.377
Income Shares
Poorest 5% 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002
Poorest 10% 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.007
Poorest 20% 0.015 0.016 0.013 0.019 0.019
Richest 5% 0.381 0.407 0.430 0.390 0.431
Richest 10% 0.539 0.565 0.588 0.544 0.567
Richest 20% 0.720 0.735 0.756 0.711 0.717
Prop. of households with income source
Capital 0.103 0.056 0.083 0.076 0.086
Remittances 0.185 0.368 0.138 0.133 0.212
Labour 0.804 0.738 0.700 0.730 0.769
Government 0.229 0.231 0.499 0.486 0.458
Other 0.007 0.046 0.004 0.007 0.003
Notes: All incomes are inflated to 2012 prices, and re computed at individual level, except where
stated. All the income components values are conditional on receiving (i.e positive non-missing values).
The poverty headcount is based on the R636 poverty line of Finn and Leibbrandt (2013), which is based
on a cost of basic needs approach.
Source: Own calculations from weighted PSLSD 1993, IES 2000, NIDS 2008, 2012, and 2014-2015.
modality. The existence of multiple modes suggests that there may be groups in the
income distribution. The 2008 distribution is relatively leptokurtic, suggesting a small
clustering around the mean or higher density at the extreme ends. While a simple visual
inspection cannot determine whether one distribution is more polarized or unequal than
another, the densities lend support to patterns observed in tables 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. That
is, there is a clear-cut increase in all incomes in 2012 and 2014-2015.
2.3.3 Relative Distribution Analysis
The section discusses results from the relative distribution approach. A detailed de-
scription of the approach is provided in section 2.3.3 in the Appendix. The approach
gives information about where and by how much an income distribution changes. Un-
less stated otherwise, we use the 2008 income distribution as the reference group and
other years income distributions as the comparison group. The choice of 2008 distri-
bution as the reference group is informed by the results from the summary measures.
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Figure 2.3.1: Overlaid kernel density curves for South Africa
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Notes: This figure shows the income distribution for South Africa. All densities are estimated by
epanechnikov 2 kernel densities, using the Silverman method to select optimal bandwidth.
Source: Weighted PLSLD 1993, IES 2000, NIDS 2008, 2012, and 2014-2015.
Figures 2.3.2, 2.3.3 and 2.3.4, and Table 2.3.3 present the results derived from the ap-
proach. Panel A shows the relative density (or overall effect), panel B the relative CDF,
panel C the shape effect and panel D the location effect.
A relative density greater than 1 means that the 1993 distribution (comparison group)
has more density than the 2008 distribution (reference group). Panel A of Figure 2.3.2
shows that this is systematically true for r < 0.25 and r > 0.81. Therefore, the 1993
distribution has a lower proportion of individuals in the middle-income classes or lower
proportion for those with incomes in any percentile between 25th and 81st of the 2008
distribution. Thus, defining cut-offs of the middle-class as the range of income between
the 25th and 81st of the 2008 income distribution would likely lead to a larger size of the
middle class. Another point to note is that individuals in 1993 have a higher probability
(than individuals in 2008) of having income that corresponds to any percentile above
81st of the 2008 distribution. There are relatively more poor people in 1993, as shown
by r < 1 for percentiles less 25th. This is another evidence of the decline in poverty
between 1993 and 2008. Figure 2.6.1 (in the Appendix) provides a much clear relative
density. The upshot of this figure is that the relative density is not weighted by the
survey sampling weights. The density of the 1993 income distribution compared to the
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2008 distribution at the 20th percentile levitates at 1.2 (g(0.2) = 1.2). This implies that
there is a 20% chance of individuals in 1993 to be at the 20th percentile of the 2008
distribution. And at the 43rd percentile, the relative density of 1993 is about 0.6, which
means individuals in 2008 are 40% more likely to be at the 43rd percentile.
Figure 2.3.2: Relative distribution of income per capita, South Africa 1993-2008
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A: Relative Density, 1993−2008
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B: Relative CDF, 1993−2008
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C: Shape Effect, 1993−2008
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Note: Reference group is 2008
Notes: This figure shows changes in the South African income distribution using the relative distribu-
tion approach developed by Handcock and Morris (1998). The x-axis is the percentile of the reference
year, 2008, while the y-axis is the ratio of share of individuals in the comparison year, 1993, to the share
of individuals in the reference year, 2008. A y-value less than 1 means that the 1993 distribution has a
lower share of individuals than the 2008 distribution at that percentile. All densities are estimated by
epanechnikov kernel densities using the Silverman method to select optimal bandwidth.
Source: Weighted PLSLD 1993, IES 2000, NIDS 2008, 2012, and NIDS 2014-2015.
The slope of the relative income distribution gives information about the direction of
the movement of people. For instance, between the 20th and 43rd the relative density
is negatively sloped which suggests that people moved into the lower middle-income
range. And the slope is positive from the 43rd percentile indicative of movement away
from the middle-income categories towards high-income deciles. However, the pro-
portion of individuals in 1993 with an amount of income corresponding to the top per-
centiles (80th and above) is higher than the analogous proportion in 2008. Even though
it is by a small margin, the relative CDF (in panel B) lies above the 45◦ line, a result
which confirms that 2008 distribution has higher frequency in the middle. The relative
CDF shows the proportion of the comparison group (1993) whose incomes lie below
the rth percentile of the reference group (2008). One possible explanation for this is
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that social grants can only move people out of poverty, they can not make them rich.
Therefore, during the period 1993 to 2008, there is bunching of incomes, as people
move from the lower percentiles towards the middle and those in the middle move to-
wards the top end. This movement into middle-level incomes is often interpreted as an
increase in the size of the middle class.
We extend the analysis by decomposing the relative density into shape and location
effects. This is analogous to growth and distributional effects in the poverty and in-
equality decompositions. This decomposition allows us to examine the convergence
of incomes towards the middle or median. The shape effect (Panel C) and the overall
effect or relative density (Panel A) are almost similar, implying that most of the income
changes between 1993 and 2008 are due to changes in higher moments. An inverse
U-shape of the shape effects suggests that the 2008 distribution is more spread around
the median. The unweighted relative density, Figure 2.6.1 in the Appendix, gives a
clearer picture of this result. The location effect is largely uniform, which means there
is no significant change in the mean and median between 1993 and 2008.
Moving to income changes between 2008 and 2012, we use the 2012 income distri-
bution as the comparison distribution and that of 2008 as the reference distribution.
Figure 2.3.3 presents the results. Panel A shows that for all incomes below the median
(50th percentile) of the 2008 distribution, the 2012 distribution has a lower density, and
for incomes corresponding to 50 < r < 95 percentiles it has a higher density. Beyond
the 95th percentile, 2008 distribution has more density. Therefore, during the four
years between 2008 to 2012, incomes increased such that people moved into middle-
income ranges. Panel B (relative CDF) further shows that the 2008 distribution has the
lowest proportion of individuals with incomes lower than the 95th percentiles. Surpris-
ingly though, there is a higher proportion of rich people in the 2008 distribution than
that of 2012. Panels C and D reveal the incomes changes are largely due to the growth
of incomes.
Figure 2.3.4 presents a comparison between the 2012 and 2014-2015 income distribu-
tions. The reference distribution is the 2012 income distribution and that of 2014-2015
is the comparison distribution. The share of people with incomes greater than the 42nd
percentile is higher in the 2012 distribution than in the 2014-2015 distribution.
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Figure 2.3.3: Relative distribution of income per capita, South Africa 2008-2012
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Notes: This figure shows changes in the South African income distribution using the relative distribu-
tion approach developed by Handcock and Morris (1998). The x-axis is the percentiles of the reference
year, 2008, while the y-axis is the ratio of share of individuals in comparison year, 2012, to share of
individuals in the reference year, 2008. A y-value less than 1 means that the 2012 distribution has a
lower share of individuals than the 2008 distribution at that percentile. All densities are estimated by
epanechnikov 2 kernel densities, using the Silverman method to select optimal bandwidth. All estimates
are done using the reldist Stata code developed by Ben Jann.
Source: Own calculations from weighted PSLSD 1993, NIDS 2008, 2012, and 2014-2015.
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Figure 2.3.4: Relative distribution of income per capita, South Africa 2012-2014-2015
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Notes: This figure shows changes in the South African income distribution using the relative distribu-
tion approach developed by Handcock and Morris (1998). The x-axis is the percentiles of the reference
year, 2012, while the y-axis is the ratio of the share of individuals in the comparison year, 2014-2015,
to the share of individuals in the reference year, 2012. A y-value of less than 1 means that the 2012
distribution has a lower share of individuals than the 2014-2015 distribution at that percentile. All dens-
ities are estimated by epanechnikov 2 kernel densities using the Silverman method to select optimal
bandwidth. All estimates are done using the reldist Stata code developed by Ben Jann.
Source: Own calculations from weighted PSLSD 1993, NIDS 2008, 2012, and 2014-2015.
The relative distribution also includes the median relative polarization (MRP) index
that measures the direction and magnitude of these shape changes towards the median
or towards one or both tails. To further understand the increases in the lower tail (down-
grading) and increases in the upper tail (upgrading), the Median Relative Polarization
(MRP) is decomposed into Lower Relative Polarization (LRP) and Upper Relative Po-
larization (URP) indices. The three indices (i.e., MRP, LRP, &URP) vary between -1
and 1 such that a value of zero represents no change in the distributional shape. Pos-
itive values suggest an increase in polarization or the comparison distribution is more
polarised than the median reference distribution. Negative values suggest convergence
towards the median. Table 2.3.3 provides the scores of these indices to figure out if
these distributional patterns suggest clustering of incomes at the local poles.
During the period from 1993 to 2008, the scores of these indices are close to zero,
confirming increased bi-polarity in the 1993 distribution. That is, the distributions on
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each side of the median are tightened up, such that individuals nearer to the median
move away from it, while those further from the median move towards it. The score
of MRP is negative, implying lower convergence of incomes around the mean in the
2008 distribution. Between 2008 and 2014-2015, the indices are positive which means
incomes in 2008 are more polarised than incomes in 2012.
Table 2.3.3: Relative Polarization Indices, 1993-2012
1993-2008 2008-2012 2012-2014
MRP -0.0149 0.1820 0.1107
LRP 0.0103 0.3097 0.2003
URP -0.0402 0.0542 0.0212
Notes: Median relative polarization index and its lower (LRP) and upper (URP) decompositions. All
estimates are done using the reldist Stata code developed by Ben Jann.
Source: Own calculations from weighted PSLSD 1993, NIDS 2008, 2012, and 2014-2015
2.4 Results
In this section, we discuss the results on the extent of polarization in the South African
income distribution. First, we consider the patterns of polarization by employing the
FW index and the DER index. Second, we move to decompose the polarization pat-
terns by population subgroups and by income sources.
2.4.1 Extent of Polarization
Figure 2.4.1 plots polarization indices and Tables 2.4.1, 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 present changes
in the scores of the indices over time and the components of the indices. The numbers
in parenthesis are linearized standard errors, adjusted for the sample design. The first
y-axis in Figure 2.4.1, on the left, with a larger scale, plots the estimates of the Gini
coefficient or alienation component, FW index, and identification component. The
second y-axis, on the right, with a lower scale, plots the estimates of the DER index.
We find that while bi-polarization decreased between 1993 and 2014-2015, thus imply-
ing a larger middle class, it increased in 2008. This is true for South Africa as a whole,
and for urban income distribution. In the rural areas, bi-polarization falls during the 15
years between 1993 and 2008. Multi-polar income polarization also increased in 2008
and remains somewhat unchanged in the rural areas during the 21 years from 1993 to
2014-2015.
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2.4.1.1 Bi-polarization Patterns
Taking a closer look at the extent of bi-polarization, we attempt to ascertain whether
the South African distribution of income is composed of two groups, one poor, and the
other rich. The score of FW index in Table 2.4.1 ranges between 0.91 in 1993 and 0.75
in 2014-2015, which indicates a high degree of bi-polarization. The score of the FW
index drops marginally by 0.7% in the 7 years between 1993 and 2000, then increases
by 10.37% in the 8 years leading up to 2008, and falls by 24.6% during the 6 years lead-
ing up to 2014-2015. The decline during those 6 years is statistically significant. Since
the value of bi-polarization of zero means no polarity and a value of one (or higher)
suggests bipolarity, then there is an 18% decline in income bi-polarization in the South
African income distribution since the end of Apartheid. This decline can be due to the
reduction in income spread, as indicated by the relative distribution approach. Thus
the de-racialisation policies that sought to integrate previously disadvantaged groups
into the mainstream economy have had a positive effect. The decrease is, however, not
monotonic, as there is a huge spike in 2008.
In the urban areas (Table 2.4.2) we see a simil r pattern of bi-polarization. That is, the
value of the FW index declines from 0.80 in 1993 to 0.74 in 2014-2015. It however,
increases by 24.8% during the period 1993 to 2008 until it reaches its local maximum.
Then, during the 6 years between 2008 and 2014-2015, it declines at an annual rate of
4.2% (with the total decline equivalent to 25.5% for the period). This therefore sug-
gests that national patterns of bi-polarization are driven by urban patterns. For rural
South Africa, the story is quite different, as shown in table 2.4.3. During the period
1993 to 2008, the score of the FW index falls by an average rate of 1.2% per annum
(with a total decline for the period equal to 18.3%). The recorded fall appears to be
statistically significant. Between 2008 and 2012, it rises by 14.4%. The implication
is that bi-polarization in the distribution of rural income decreased in 2008, and then
increased in 2012 and 2014-2015. A possible explanation for the decline could be
the increase in state transfers and the educational attainment of Blacks. And the in-
crease could be due to the emergence of new strata among previously disadvantaged
individuals who managed to join those in the upper-income class.
A related point to consider is that bi-polarization patterns move in opposite directions
for rural and urban incomes. That is, from 1993 to 2008 the score of FW index rises in
urban regions and from 2008 to 2014-2015, it falls. In the rural regions, it falls in the
first period and rises in the later years. Put in a different way, as the distance between
rich and poor widens (or narrows) in urban areas, it tends to narrow (or widen) in rural
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areas. Moreover, polarization and inequality also tend to give similar rankings in these
regions. The similarity in the rankings between bi-polarization and inequality chal-
lenges the view that polarization and inequality can behave differently, at least in the
context of South Africa. All things considered, the magnitudes suggest greater income
spread between the two income groups. This has thus resulted in two groups, one ex-
tremely rich and the other exceptionally poor. In line with theory, the group below
the median has very low, and unequal incomes, while the group above the median has
somewhat high evenly distributed incomes.
The drop in the degree of bi-polarization between 2008 and 2014-2015 may signal a
drop in wealthy individuals in the country. However, it is essential to note that bi-
polarization measures are not very sensitive to incomes at the top end. This is mostly
because measures of bi-polarization are concerned with the relative size of different
income groups and not their incomes. In any case, during the 6 years between 2008
to 2012, all incomes increase, which means incomes of the poor might have increased
faster than the those of the rich. Thus, bi-polarization has in fact fallen, though margin-
ally. A conceivable explanation for the rise in bi-polarization in the 15 years leading
up to 2008 could be the movement of the situates in the middle of the income towards
the top end of the distribution.
We examine the changes in the extent of bi-polarization further by disaggregating the
FW index. We use the mean to median ratio, the Gini coefficient, and the share of
income held by the poorest 50%. From equation 2.2.1 the increase in the mean/median
ratio, ceteris paribus, prompts a rise in the FW index, though an expansion in either the
Gini or the income share of the poorer half decreases the FW index.
For the national income distribution, the mean/median ratio rises by 28.2% over the
period from 1993 to 2008, the share of income held by the poorer half falls by 12.4%.
In other words, the incomes of those at the top moved further away from the median
(higher mean/median ratio), and the incomes of those below the median moved further
down. Taken together, these two components reinforce each other and lead to increas-
ing bi-polarity and increasing spread in the South African income distribution. The
increase in bi-polarization between 1993 and 2008 is therefore due to the tightening of
the income distribution on either side of the median (bunching). The effects of these
two components are enough to offset the downward pressure exerted by the growth in
the Gini coefficient during the same period. For the 6 years between 2008 and 2014
the mean/median ratio and the share of income of the poorer half fall by 19.6% and
30.4%. The consequence is therefore a reduction in bi-polarization.
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Figure 2.4.1: The extent of Income Polarization in rural, and urban areas, and for
South Africa as a whole.
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(b) Urban South Africa
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(c) Rural South Africa
Notes: This figure presents the summary indices of polarization in South Africa. FW is the Foster and
Wolfson (2010/1992) index of bi-polarization, DER is the Duclos et al. (2004) index of income polar-
ization and identification is a component of DER index. All estimates are done using the Distributional
Analysis Stata Package (DASP).
Source: Own calculations from weighted PSLSD 1993, NIDS 2008, 2012, and 2014-2015
Even though the magnitudes of the components of the FW index are different for urban
areas, the story remains the same. That is, the growth in the degree of bi-polarization
appears to be due to the narrowing of income distance within the two groups on either
side of the median. In the distribution of income for rural areas, each of the three
components demonstrates swings between 1993 and 2014-2015. For example, the
mean/median ratio rises in 2000, then falls in 2008 and 2012 and rises again in 2014-
2015. Importantly, between 1993 and 2012 the share of income held by the poorer
half records an average annual growth rate of 1.04% (for a total growth of 19.8%
for the period), and falls marginally in 2014-2015. The indicator of skewness (the
mean/median ratio) and the Gini coefficient rise in 2000, decline between 2000 and
2012, and increase in 2014-2015. Thus, the drop in bi-polarization during the period
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1993 to 2008 appears to be due to growth in the income share of the poorer half. It is
important to note that the drop in inequality over the period from 2008 to 2012 leads
to an increase in bi-polarity.
We next use components from Rodríguez and Salas (2000)’s restatement of the FW
index (that is, the GW ,GB,S). To estimate these components, we first partition the
country into mutually exclusive groups based on median income. Partitioning the
samples by the corresponding median income reveals that the income share of those
above the median is about 0.91 across the sample periods. This confirms earlier con-
jectures as well as theoretical predictions that those below the median have very low
incomes in polarized societies (Rodríguez & Salas, 2000). We then use the Yitzhaki
and Lerman (1991) Gini subgroup decomposition method to find the between-group
and within-group Ginis. The higher the between-Gini scores, the lower the within-
Gini scores, and the further the top incomes are from the median, the higher the degree
of bi-polarization. This decomposition confirms that narro ing distance between the
incomes of those below and above the median (i.e lower GB) influenced the increase
in bi-polarization during the period 1993 to 2008. The increment in the skewness
(i.e S = 2µ/m) and between-Gini (i.e GB) is sufficient to counterbalance the downward
pressure exerted by the rising income differences within the groups (i.e GW ). The three
components appear to be reinforcing each other in the rural distribution.
A conclusion from the above discussion is that, while bi-polarization clearly increases
during the 15 years leading up to 2008, it decreases between 2012 and 2014-2015.
Nonetheless, the magnitude of the bi-polarization shows that the country is indeed
composed of two groups, one poor and one very rich.
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Table 2.4.1: Extent of polarization in South Africa
1993 2000 2008 2012 2014 Differences
2008 - 1993 2012 - 2008 2014 - 2012
FW
0.9113 0.9049 0.9907 0.8323 0.7465 0.0794 -0.1584 -0.0858
(0.0572) (0.0227) (0.0807) (0.0618) (0.0426) (0.0989) (0.0475) (0.0376)
Mean/Mdian 2.83 3.01 3.37 2.75 2.71
Gini
0.6749 0.6861 0.7085 0.6653 0.6753 0.0336 -0.0433 0.0100
(0.0108) (0.0055) (0.0154) (0.0173) (0.0293) (0.0188) (0.0156) (0.0298)
L(50) 0.082 0.0812 0.0718 0.0918 0.0936
GB 0.4178 0.4182 0.4269 0.4082 0.4063
GW 0.2571 0.2679 0.2817 0.2571 0.2689
DER
0.4060 0.4231 0.4578 0.4239 0.4249 0.0785 -0.0365 -0.0046
(0.0125) (0.0066) (0.0299) (0.0285) (0.0362) (0.0357) (0.0245) (0.0374)
Alienation 0.6749 0.6861 0.7085 0.6653 0.6753
Identification 0.8724 0.9192 0.9914 0.9716 0.9782
Covariance -0.3106 -0.3291 -0.3483 -0.3441 -0.3567
Notes: All incomes are inflated to 2012 values. For a description of these indices and formulae, see
Section 2.2. The polarization sensitivity parameter or identification effect weight (α) for DER index is
set at 0.5. L(50) is the Lorenz ordinate for 50% - share of income held by the poorer half. GBand GW are
between-group and within-group Ginis when groups are separated by median value. Numbers in paren-
thesis are linearized standard errors.
Source: Own calculation from weighted PSLSD 1993, IES 2000, NIDS 2008, 2012, and NIDS 2014-
2015
Table 2.4.2: Extent of polarization in Urban South Africa
1993 2000 2008 2012 2014 Changes
2008 - 1993 2012 - 2008 2014 - 2012
FW
0.7982 0.8920 0.9958 0.8208 0.7420 0.1976 -0.1750 -0.0788
(0.0494) (0.0232) (0.0749) (0.0648) (0.0479) (0.0897) (0.0492) (0.0445)
Mean/Mdian 2.27 2.60 2.91 2.48 2.63
Gini
0.6177 0.6432 0.6806 0.6463 0.6650 0.0629 -0.0343 0.0187
(0.0132) (0.0064) (0.0168) (0.0179) (0.0346) (0.0213) (0.0188) (0.0360)
L(50) 0.1032 0.0927 0.0740 0.0941 0.0973
GB 0.3966 0.4073 0.4256 0.4059 0.4024
GW 0.2211 0.2359 0.2550 0.2404 0.2626
DER
0.3596 0.3835 0.3990 0.3780 0.4138 0.0538 -0.0265 0.0450
(0.0109) (0.0062) (0.0176) (0.0175) (0.0410) (0.0248) (0.0199) (0.0412)
Alienation 0.6177 0.6432 0.6806 0.6463 0.6650
Identification 0.7790 0.8646 0.8872 0.8896 0.9511
Covariance -0.2526 -0.3104 -0.3392 -0.3426 -0.3457
Notes: All incomes are inflated to 2012 values. For a description of these indices and formulae, see
Section 2.2. The polarization sensitivity parameter or identification effect weight (α) for DER index is
set at 0.5. L(50) is the Lorenz ordinate for 50% - share of income held by the poorer half. GBand GW are
between-group and within-group Ginis when groups are separated by median value. Numbers in paren-
thesis are linearized standard errors.
Source: Own calculation from weighted PSLSD 1993, IES 2000, NIDS 2008, 2012, and NIDS 2014-
2015
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Table 2.4.3: Extent of polarization in Rural South Africa
1993 2000 2008 2012 2014 Changes
2008 - 1993 2012 - 2008 2014 - 2012
FW
0.5725 0.5178 0.4676 0.4947 0.5350 -0.1049 0.0272 0.0403
(0.0336) (0.0109) (0.0286) (0.0284) (0.0282) (0.0441) (0.0236) (0.0220)
Mean/Mdian 2.04 2.10 1.85 1.79 1.95
Gini
0.5954 0.6119 0.5859 0.5448 0.5668 -0.0095 -0.0411 0.0220
(0.0180) (0.0154) (0.0228) (0.0162) (0.0139) (0.0290) (0.0250) (0.0158)
L(50) 0.1321 0.1326 0.1438 0.1583 0.1480
GB 0.3678 0.3664 0.3557 0.3408 0.3519
GW 0.2276 0.2455 0.2301 0.2039 0.2149
DER
0.3359 0.3540 0.3334 0.3244 0.3364 0.0125 -0.0070 0.0069
(0.0138) (0.0125) (0.0184) (0.0134) (0.0145) (0.0243) (0.0227) (0.0142)
Alienation 0.5954 0.6119 0.5859 0.5448 0.5668
Identification 0.7784 0.8145 0.7814 0.8124 0.8271
Covariance -0.2751 -0.2897 -0.2718 -0.2670 -0.2823
Notes: All incomes are inflated to 2012 values. For a description of these indices and formulae, see
Section 2.2. The polarization sensitivity parameter or identification effect weight (α) for DER index is
set at 0.5. L(50) is the Lorenz ordinate for 50% - share of income held by the poorer half. GBand GW are
between-group and within-group Ginis when groups are separated by median value. Numbers in paren-
thesis are linearized standard errors.
Source: Own calculation from weighted PSLSD 1993, IES 2000, NIDS 2008, 2012, and NIDS 2014-
2015
What do these bi-polarization patterns say about the size of the middle-class in South
Africa? Bi-polarization implies that the income distribution is dispersed from the cent-
ral value are such that the middle of the distribution is hollowed out. In other words,
the greater the degree of bi-polarization, the smaller the middle class. A convenient
feature of measuring the exten of middle class this way is that there is no need to
define a cut-off point for the middle class category.
The following conclusions are discernible from the results above. There is a significant
decline in the size of the middle-class population from 1993 to 2008. While there is
growth in the size of the middle class from 2008 to 2014, it is only statistically signi-
ficant between 2012 and 2014-2015. The results further show an increase of incomes,
including those of previously disadvantaged individuals, which suggest that the com-
position of the middle class has changed. All in all, we conclude that there has been an
increase in the size and composition of the middle class in South Africa since the end
of Apartheid. In the urban areas, the results suggest disappearance of the middle class
from 1993 to 2008. Admittedly, there is a shift towards perfect bi-modality (i.e., higher
values of FW index) during this period, which means the size of the middle-class was
small in urban areas during this period. This decline is however is reversed between
2008 and 2012. In the rural areas, the middle-class grows significantly between 1993
and 2008. Overall, the rural middle class has increased in the post-Apartheid era.
Even though our evidence suggests an increase in the size and composition of the
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middle class in the post-apartheid era, the magnitudes are very small, which means
this category can easily be eroded by shocks to household income.
2.4.1.2 Income polarization Patterns
We complete our discussion on the patterns of polarization by estimating the DER
index. In the empirical analysis that follows, we set the identification effect weight
(α) to 0.5. The larger the value of the DER index, the higher the number of clusters
(or more polarized) the distribution of income. The discussion therefore provides an
answer to the question of whether South Africa’s income distribution is composed
of multiple groups. Overall, we discover similar patterns to those of bi-polarization.
That is, that multi-polar income polarization rises from 1993 to 2008, then decreases
between 2008 and 2012. From 2012 to 2014-2015, income polarization increases.
Thus, incomes are indeed clustered around local poles in South Africa.
Table 2.4.1 present DER indicators for the South African income distribution as a
whole. In this case, we ask whether multi-polar income polarization follows the same
path as income bi-polarization. The answer is clearly that it does. For instance, we note
that from 1993 to 2008 the score of DER index’s annual growth rate is 0.73% (with
total growth for the period of 10.9%). The changes in the DER index during these years
are statistically significant at 5%. This means a significant growth in heterogeneity in
the distribution of incomes. However, from 2008 to 2014-2015, the patterns change.
That is, the polarization of income declines. Nonetheless, the changes in the score of
DER index in these periods are not statistically significant, which means we reject the
hypothesis of a decline in the clustering of incomes in post-Apartheid South Africa.
Tables 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 provide the patterns of polarization in the urban and rural distri-
butions. There is evidence of clustering of incomes among urban residents from 1993
to 2008, a reduction between 2008 and 2012 and another increase in the years between
2012 and 2014-2015. As expected, the picture is quite different in the rural distribu-
tion. The DER index first rises by 5.4% in 2000, then falls by 5.8% in 2008 and falls
by another 2.7% in 2012, before it finally rises by 3.6% in 2014-2015. This means that
7 years after the end of Apartheid, there was a formation of groups in the rural income
distribution, and in the 12 years between 2000 and 2012, the groups tend to disappear.
The wide coverage of government transfers at the dawn of democracy perhaps created
the local means/poles in the rural distribution. A notable feature is that the distribution
of income in urban areas is more polarised (i.e. has more clusters) than the distribution
of income in rural areas.
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To deepen our understanding of the patterns of clustering of incomes we decompose
the DER index into identification, alienation, and normalised covariance between the
two components. Identification is a function of the number of people in an income
group, thus it reflects the extent of internal homogeneity such that, when it is high, the
density of income groups is higher. Alienation is scaled to equal the Gini coefficient,
thus it captures external heterogeneity. The normalised covariance indicates the ex-
tent to which income groups with high identification are alienated from other income
groups.
Figure 2.4.1 shows that the identification line is everywhere and always above the Gini
coefficient line, meaning the identification component is greater than the alienation
component. The difference between the two tends to widen over time. This reflects
greater clustering and a small number of significantly sized income groups in the in-
come distribution. The rapid increase in the identification component during the study
period suggests that the well populated poles become even more populated, at the
expense of the less populated poles. This is evidence of bunching of incomes. The
covariance between identification and alienation rises by 14.8% in the national distri-
bution, which implies that the high identification groups have become more alienated
towards others groups. Since all three components move in the same direction, we
conclude that they reinforce each other to drive the observed patterns.
We conclude our discussion by noting that the magnitude of the FW index, regardless
of the identification effect weight (α), is higher than that of the DER index, for all
sample points. Interpreting this result to mean that there are few poles in the South
African income distribution, supports the idea that South Africa’s income distribution
has only two income groups. The magnitudes of the DER index also suggest that
the distribution of urban incomes, as well as the national income distribution, have
multiple clusters. Moreover, the strong identification effect lends support to earlier
findings that the country has near perfect bi-polarity, and also that the income groups
are expanding in size. This result was first discovered when applying the relative dis-
tribution approach. Nonetheless, these results highlight the need to further investigate
the spatial patterns of polarization in order to stall social conflict.
How do these polarization patterns compare to findings on income inequality? Are the
conclusions obtained using Gini coefficients significantly changed when polarization
measures are used instead? We attempt to determine the redundancy of polarization
measured by comparing the relative ranking for rural and urban areas and for South
Africa as a whole. We find that the three summary measures (Gini, FW, and DER)
tend to agree on the relative ranking across the sample. Moreover, the overall trends
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for these measures fluctuate similarly, but at substantially different rates during the
21 year period under review. We therefore conclude that, even though inequality and
polarization are theoretically different concepts, empirically they are highly correlated
and tend have similar trends. Nonetheless, the results do confirm that South Africa’s
income distribution cannot be analysed using only traditional inequality measures.
2.4.2 Decomposition of Polarization Patterns
In this section, we complement the above statistical analysis by decomposing the pat-
terns of polarization using an approach proposed by Araar (2008). It is a well doc-
umented fact that subgroup and factor components decompositions (of either poverty
and inequality) provide insights into the underlying forces driving the observed changes
(Ogwang, 2014). Thus, our analytical decomposition of income polarization can assist
in designing polarization-reduction strategies.
This section proceeds in two ways, first (in section 2.4.2.1), we decompose by differ-
ent income components of total income. This exercise seeks to examine polarization
patterns of various income sources (like labour earnings, remittances, capital income,
state grants, and others), and find the differential impact the incomes on overall income
polarization. Second (in section 2.4.2.2), we decompose by population subgroups to
assess the contribution of incomes gaps between subgroups and within subgroups to
overall income polarization. The subgroups we consider are region (urban and rural)
and race (Blacks, Coloureds, Whites, and Indians).
2.4.2.1 Income Source decomposition
Table 2.4.4 presents the results of the factor components decomposition of the DER
index. We use equation 2.2.8 on page 24 to examine the contribution of five income
components to income polarization. Panel (a) shows the results for the national in-
come distribution, panel (b) and panel (c) show the results for the distribution of urban
incomes and of rural incomes. They provide information about the income share,
polarization levels, and contributions (relative and absolute) of each component. An
obvious conclusion from the results is that the distribution of government transfers and
that of remittances contribute negatively to income polarization, whereas the distribu-
tion of labour market income contributes positively to the polarization. Additionally,
we also find that the distribution of capital dividends has a tendency to disequalize and
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polarize the income distribution.
Starting with panel (a), we see that the labour market income share varies between 75%
and 85% during the study period. However, this share falls at an average annual rate
of 0.57% in the 21 year period probably due to a fall in the proportion of households
receiving labour income (see Table 2.3.2). The share of government transfers doubles
between 1993 and 2012, and then slightly drops in 2014-2015. Government transfers
generally accrue to the poor, which means its distribution can either lower the aliena-
tion component (that is, lessen the within-group inequality) or reduce the identification
component (by equalizing income across race groups). Equally important is capital in-
come, whose share rises from 0.071 in 1993 to 0.141 in 2014-2015. Leibbrandt et al.
(2012) show that capital income is virtually zero for those in low and middle-income
deciles, which means it will likely create a local pole at the top end of the distribu-
tion, thereby increasing polarization. The remittance income’s share of total income
remains largely unchanged during the period.
The columns labelled CPk provide the concentration index (or pseudo-polarization in-
dex) for each income component for all sample points. Greater pseudo-polarization
indicates higher clustering of incomes in the distribution. Therefore, labour market
earnings and capital dividends tend to have multiple clusters. A possible explanation
for the polarization of labour income could be disappearance of mid-level occupa-
tions which require moderate skills (like those from Grade 12 or Matric Certificate).
This, in turn, leads to growth in employment for unskilled and highly skilled occu-
pations. This phenomenon is known as Job Polarization (Acemoglu & Autor, 2011).
This finding gives an insight in the dis-equalizing role of these income components. In
the case of government transfers, pseudo-polarization is negative for 2012 and 2014-
2015 sample points, implying government transfers contribute negatively to income
inequality. Capital income contributes the most to pseudo-polarization, which means
high capital income inequality.
The columns labelled RCk provides information on the relative contribution of the dis-
tribution of each income source to polarization. We note that labour earnings contribute
the most to the polarization of incomes in South Africa. For instance, their contribution
ranges from 91% in 1993 to 82% in 2014-2015. The decrease in the income share of
the labour earnings may partly explain the influence of labour earning on polarization.
Capital income has the second largest relative contribution to polarization. The share
of capital income in the overall DER index hovers around 8% and reaches a maximum
of 16% in 2014-2015. The relative contributions of remittances and of government
transfers are almost zero, meaning that they little effect on polarization. Interestingly,
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government transfers made negative absolute and relative contributions to polarization
during the years 2012 and 2014-2015, which means that if there were no government
transfers, the DER index would have been higher in 2012 and 2014-2015.
A sufficient condition for an income source to be polarizing (positive effect) is for its
concentration index to be greater than that of the overall income polarization (CPk >
PDER ). For all sample points, the distribution of labour income and that of capital
income have a polarizing effect, while the distribution of government transfers and
that of remittance income have a depolarizing effect. The insignificance of government
transfers in determining polarization is in line with the literature on inequality in the
country. That is, most studies agree that the state transfers have only reduced poverty
rates, not inequality. The findings further support the view that the de-racialisation
policies only changed the racial composition of the situates at the top end of the South
African income distribution, thus leaving the majority of the formerly disadvantaged
at lower income levels.
Next, we turn our focus to disaggregation by rural and urban areas. Beginning with
panel (b) which provides results for the urban income distribution, a similar pattern
to the national distribution emerges. That is, the share of labour income share ranges
between 80% to 76% and decreases over the study period. Capital income’s share
reached a global maximum of 16% in 2014-2015, and the share of remittances re-
mained fairly stable. The share of government transfers, though it rises during the
period, is somewhat less. A notable difference is that government transfers contribute
negatively to both inequality and polarization for all survey points, except in 2000.
This indicates that if government transfers were zero in these years, both inequality
and polarization would have been higher.
In the distribution in rural incomes (panel (c)), the patterns are quite distinctive. First,
the labour income polarization share is between 63% and 72%, meaning labour income
affects polarization less in rural areas. The second largest influence on polarization is
from the distribution of government transfers. While this confirms the significance of
government social grants as a source of income for rural residents, it shows that their
importance declines from 2008 to 2014-2015. For instance, during the 15 year period
from 1993 to 2008 the share of government transfers increases by 117%, then declines
by 5.6% and 16.9% in 2012 and 2014-2015, respectively. The increase in govern-
ment transfers nevertheless results in higher pseudo-polarization, especially during the
period from 1993 to 2008. All in all, in the rural distribution, state grants and remit-
tances are depolarizing, and labour earnings and capital incomes are polarizing.
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2.4.2.2 Subgroup Decomposition
Tables 2.4.5 and 2.4.6 present the decomposition of the DER index by region and race.
The idea in this section is to examine whether income differences between and within
the two subgroups tend to create local means in the distribution such that people cluster
around those means. As with inequality subgroup decompositions, between-group de-
composition represents polarization, where every income in the subgroup is replaced
by the subgroup’s mean income. Within-group polarization is the sum of the product
of population share, income share, and residual polarization, which is unity if subgroup
incomes do not overlap. It is important to note that the between-group polarization cre-
ated by merging the within-group polarization to one point makes the income distribu-
tion degenerate, that is, breaks the continuity. This is problematic because polarization
is sensitive to the size of the group and its density6.
Starting with the rural-urban decomposition shown in Table 2.4.5 we note the follow-
ing: In 1993 and 2000, income disparities between the urban and rural areas contribute
more to polarization than the disparities of incomes within the regions. In 2008 the
income gaps between and within the regions contribute equally to polarization, and in
2012 and 2014-2015 within-group polarization becomes greater than between-group
polarization. Put differently, the influence of income gaps between the rural and urban
residents tend to declines, while the influence of income disparities within the regions
has increased. This suggests a formation of of income clusters in each of the regions
in recent times such that there is greater degree of internal heterogeneity within each
region. Assuming that rural areas are “homelands” or “Bantustans”7, and the urban
areas the the previously White areas, this is evidence of reduction of economics dis-
tances across race.
Moving to Table 2.4.6, where we categorise the population into four race groups
(African/Black, Coloured, Indian/Asian and White), the following results are appar-
ent. The income share of Blacks increases from 35% to 52% from 1993 to 2014-2015,
while the income share of Whites falls from 52% to 34% for the same period. This,
in turn, translates into lower and higher deficit/surplus ratio values for Blacks and for
Whites during the same period. Such a drop in the number of poor Black South Afric-
ans could lessen polarization. The situation of “Coloured” South Africans is quite
surprising. This group’s income share is rather stagnant in this period, while their de-
ficit/surplus ratio tends to rise, implying an increase in the headcount poverty in their
group. While we cannot say for certain, these changes point to convergence of in-
6Thanks to Jean Yves Duclos for pointing out this problem.
7For details about the homelands visit http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/homelands
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comes of Blacks and Whites and also suggest that the incomes of Coloureds are being
left behind.
The columns labelled Pg show that clustering of incomes is greatest in the distribu-
tion of income for Blacks. That is, the Black group’s income polarization increases
by 22.2% between 1993 and 2008, then declines by 6.75% in 2012, and remains un-
changed thereafter. The larger population share of Blacks (about 75%) will surely
heighten the identification component, and increase polarization in turn. The lower
income share of Blacks, which may signal higher inequality, also explains the greater
income polarization of this group. As expected, there is also evidence of formation
of clusters in the distribution of Coloureds incomes from 1993 to 2008. A possible
explanation for the rise in the clustering of Coloureds incomes could be the increasing
share of the poor. The polarization of income for Whites rises almost twofold from
1993 to 2014-2015.
The columns titled RCk in Tables 2.4.6 and 2.4.7 provide information about the relative
contribution of income differences between and within the racial groups to the overall
level of income polarization in the country. We find that the contribution of income
differences between the groups is greater than that of income differences within the
groups. For example, the between-group relative contribution is 0.702 in 1993 while
the within-group relative contribution is 0.298. This means that income differences
between racial groups contribute about 2.4 times more to polarization than income
differences within the race groups. This does not necessarily mean that there are large
income distances between the racial groups, as is the case with inequality. Rather, it
suggests that the different racial groups’ incomes may be clustered at distinct poles in
the income distribution.
By and large we should point out that as within-group contribution increases (by an
annual rate of 2.25% during the period), between-group contribution falls (by an annual
rate of 0.95%). Even though the expansion of intra-group contribution and contraction
of inter-group share signals convergence in incomes across the race groups, it also
means the emergence of new strata within each of the racial groups.
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Table 2.4.5: Decomposition of DER by rural-urban area
(a) 1993
φg ψk Pg R D S D/S AC. RC
Urban 0.497 0.796 0.366 1.053 0.115 0.057 2.012 0.12 0.292
Rural 0.503 0.204 0.34 0.886 0.221 0.019 11.525 0.049 0.118
Intra-Group 0.169 0.41
Inter-Group 0.243 0.59
(b) 2000
φg ψk Pg R D S D/S AC. RC
Urban 0.569 0.826 0.396 1.063 0.154 0.064 2.385 0.164 0.377
Rural 0.431 0.174 0.366 0.862 0.202 0.016 12.951 0.037 0.085
Intra-Group 0.201 0.462
Inter-Group 0.234 0.538
(c) 2008
φg ψk Pg R D S D/S AC. RC
Urban 0.609 0.861 0.41 1.144 0.185 0.075 2.473 0.207 0.447
Rural 0.391 0.139 0.341 0.863 0.19 0.014 13.926 0.027 0.058
Intra-Group 0.234 0.505
Inter-Group 0.229 0.495
(d) 2012
φg ψk Pg R D S D/S AC. RC
Urban 0.611 0.84 0.386 1.121 0.168 0.075 2.225 0.19 0.445
Rural 0.389 0.16 0.334 0.862 0.167 0.016 10.774 0.028 0.066
Intra-Group 0.218 0.511
Inter-Group 0.208 0.489
(e) 2014
φg ψk Pg R D S D/S AC. RC
Urban 0.619 0.835 0.422 1.036 0.174 0.074 2.34 0.194 0.455
Rural 0.381 0.165 0.346 0.871 0.162 0.016 10.059 0.029 0.068
Intra-Group 0.223 0.523
Inter-Group 0.204 0.477
Notes: φg is the population share of group g; ψg is the income share; Pg is Polarization of group
g; R is residual polarization due to overlapping of groups; D is the deprivation; S is the surplus; D/S
is Deprivation surplus ratio; AC and RC are absolute and relative contributions of group g to overall
polarization.
Source: Own calculations from weighted PSLSD 1993, IES 2000, NIDS 2008, 2012, and NIDS 2014-
2015.
Another notable development in this period is that Blacks are not just the largest con-
tributors to overall polarization, but their contribution increases almost twofold. For
instance, in 1993, Blacks’ relative contribution is about 0.277, compared to 0.419 in
2014-2015. Perhaps the growth in the Black population and the persistence of inequal-
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ity of opportunity are behind their large relative contribution, and, by extension, the
growth of within-group polarization. This highlights the need for more effective so-
cial reforms for Black South Africans. In general, these racial decompositions present
a strong argument in favour of race as a key factor in determining socio-economic
outcomes. They, however, seem to suggest an emergence of new strata.
Table 2.4.6: Decomposition of DER by race, 1993 - 2008
(a) 1993
φg ψk Pg R D S D/S AC. RC
Black/African 0.759 0.345 0.315 0.934 0.305 0.035 8.807 0.114 0.277
Coloured 0.086 0.084 0.298 0.913 0.02 0.008 2.589 0.002 0.005
Indian/Asian 0.025 0.048 0.313 0.787 0.003 0.004 0.87 0 0.001
White 0.13 0.523 0.256 0.738 0.007 0.03 0.219 0.006 0.015
Intra-Group 0.123 0.298
Inter-Group 0.289 0.702
(b) 2000
φg ψk Pg R D S D/S AC. RC
Black/African 0.788 0.447 0.366 0.945 0.322 0.042 7.663 0.161 0.37
Coloured 0.089 0.09 0.317 0.984 0.024 0.008 2.849 0.003 0.006
Indian/Asian 0.025 0.045 0.341 0.789 0.004 0.004 1.026 0 0.001
White 0.097 0.419 0.298 0.857 0.007 0.026 0.253 0.005 0.011
Intra-Group 0.169 0.388
Inter-Group 0.267 0.612
(c) 2008
φg ψk Pg R D S D/S AC. RC
Black/African 0.783 0.441 0.385 0.937 0.334 0.042 7.872 0.166 0.359
Coloured 0.093 0.084 0.397 0.869 0.028 0.008 3.539 0.003 0.006
Indian/Asian 0.026 0.07 0.462 0.92 0.004 0.006 0.71 0 0.001
White 0.098 0.404 0.316 0.947 0.008 0.032 0.239 0.006 0.013
Intra-Group 0.175 0.378
Inter-Group 0.288 0.622
Notes: φg is the population share of group g; ψg is the income share; Pg is Polarization of group
g; R is residual polarization due to overlapping of groups; D is the deprivation; S is the surplus; D/S
is Deprivation surplus ratio; AC and RC are absolute and relative contributions of group g to overall
polarization.
Source: Own calculations from weighted PSLSD 1993, IES 2000, and NIDS 2008.
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Table 2.4.7: Decomposition of DER by race, 2012 and 2014-2015
(a) 2012
φg ψk Pg R D S D/S AC. RC
Black/African 0.798 0.495 0.359 0.948 0.3 0.047 6.362 0.171 0.402
Coloured 0.089 0.085 0.355 0.943 0.025 0.008 3.251 0.003 0.006
Indian/Asian 0.025 0.065 0.467 0.809 0.004 0.006 0.669 0 0.001
White 0.088 0.355 0.327 0.89 0.006 0.03 0.195 0.005 0.011
Intra-Group 0.178 0.419
Inter-Group 0.247 0.581
(b) 2014-2015
φg ψk Pg R D S D/S AC. RC
Black/African 0.806 0.519 0.359 0.956 0.298 0.049 6.068 0.179 0.419
Coloured 0.089 0.083 0.395 0.839 0.025 0.008 3.016 0.003 0.006
Indian/Asian 0.023 0.059 0.504 0.806 0.004 0.005 0.734 0 0.001
White 0.082 0.339 0.521 0.844 0.009 0.028 0.331 0.006 0.014
Intra-Group 0.188 0.439
Inter-Group 0.239 0.561
Notes: φg is the population share of group g; ψg is the income share; Pg is Polarization of group
g; R is residual polarization due to overlapping of groups; D is the deprivation; S is the surplus; D/S
is Deprivation surplus ratio; AC and RC are absolute and relative contributions of group g to overall
polarization.
Source: Own calculations from weighted NIDS 2012, and NIDS 2014-2015.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we make a contribution to a much-discussed topic in South Africa, that
is, the patterns of income distribution in the post-apartheid era. Specifically, we detail
our analysis of the extent to which incomes are clustered around a small number of
distant poles (polarization). Using survey data collected in 1993, 2000, 2008, 2012,
and 2014-2015, our first objective is to examine if persistent income inequality happens
in tandem with clustering of incomes around local means in the income distribution.
This investigation is important because clustering of incomes could increase between-
income-group conflict.
We find that from 1993 to 2008 the income distribution is highly dispersed from its
central value, such that there is a disappearance of the middle class during this period.
The size and composition of the income groups appear to be growing, which is evid-
ence of increasing bi-polarity in the country. Between 2008 and 2014-2015, there is a
positive (rightward) location shift of the distribution of income such that the extent of
clustering is lowered. Actually, there is a decrease in the extent of bi-polarization and
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income polarization in the post-Apartheid era.
Secondly, we investigate the relative contribution of different income sources and that
of income differences between and within groups on polarization. While there is a re-
duction in the income disparities between the regions and between race groups, there is
growth in within-group income disparities. The income source decomposition affirms
the importance of government social grants in reducing the disparities in the income
distribution. For instance, distribution of government transfers tend to have an impact
on polarization of rural incomes. Finally, we find that the distribution of labour earn-
ings and of capital dividends have a positive effect on polarization, that is, they tend to
create poles in the overall income distribution.
There are, however, an important limitations of the decomposition approach. The
between-group polarization is created by assigning each individual the mean income
of his/her group. This procedure breaks the continuity of the income distribution, thus
leads to a bias in the decomposition results. The source decomposition assumes lin-
earity of polarization, and the DER index is not linear. Thus future research needs to
develop and apply new decomposition methods that address these limitations.
From a policy perspective, this chapter shows the existence of distances between the
rich and poor in the country. The poor may be Blacks and are located in the rural areas,
and the rich may be Whites and residing in the urban areas. Therefore, public policy
needs to focus on stimulating the income generating activities of rural residents and of
Blacks.
2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Variables included in analysing income sources
The five major components of total household monthly income are:
1. Labour market income, which includes earnings from main, secondary and
part-time work, self-employment, profits, bonuses, benefits. and cash allow-
ances.
2. Capital income includes interest or dividends, rental and property earnings,
private pensions and annuities, as well as royalties.
55
Un
ive
rsi
ty
of
Ca
pe
To
wn
3. Remittances include the value of food, clothing, and housing received, alimony,
child maintenance, and similar allowances and all other inter-household remit-
tances received.
4. Government transfers include old age pensions, child grants (including foster
care and care dependency), disability grants, UIF income, as well as workman’s
compensation.
5. Other income includes all income not specified elsewhere.
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2.6.2 Relative Distribution Concept
The relative distribution is a non-parametric approach that analyses changes in the
income (or other) distributions of two groups, the reference and the comparison group
(Handcock & Morris, 1998). Specifically, the relative distribution re-scales the density
ratio of the two distributions such that it returns the proportion of the comparison
group that falls in each percentile of the reference group (Clementi & Schettino, 2013;
Massari et al., 2009). Thus, it is an informative graphical tool that shows where and
by how much an income distribution changes (Clementi, Dabalen, Molini & Schettino,
2017).
Let Y0 and Y to be incomes for the 2008 and 1993 populations, respectively. Then
the relative distribution of Y to Y0 is defined as: R = F0(Y ). R is a random variable
which is referred to as “relative data”, and its probability density function is called
the “relative density”. The relative density (g(r)) gives the ratio of income density in
the 1993 distribution to income density in the 2008 distribution evaluated at the rth
percentile of the 2008 income distribution. It is therefore a set of ranks that individuals
in 1993 would have if they were placed in the 2008 income distribution. The relative
distribution can be formally represented as:
g(r) =
f [F−10 (r)]
f0[F−10 (r)]
=
f (yr)
f0(yr)
, 0≤ r ≤ 1 , yr ≥ 0 (2.6.1)
where f (·) and f0 (·) are density functions for both Y (1993) and Y0 (2008), and
yr = F−10 (r) is the quantile function of Y0. This means if no income changes occur
between the two distributions or they have the similar density at the rth percentile of
the 2008 distribution, then the ensuing relative density is uniform in [0,1]. A relative
density less than 1 means the 2008 distribution (reference) has more density than the
1993 distribution (comparison) at the rth percentile of the latter. And a relative density
greater than 1 means that the 1993 distribution has more density than the 2008 distri-
bution. Put differently, a relative density greater than 1 means individuals in 1993 have
a higher probability than individuals in 2008 of having income that corresponds to the
rth percentile of the 2008 distribution.
The differences between the 2008 and 1993 distributions could be due to changes in the
57
Un
ive
rsi
ty
of
Ca
pe
To
wn
first moment (i.e., location effect), or changes in higher order moments like variance or
skewness, (i.e., shape effect). The location and shape effects are analogous to growth
and distributional effects in the poverty and inequality decompositions. Thus relative
distribution can be additively decomposed to distinguish these two effects. This de-
composition goes through an additive location-adjusted population with reference to
the median income, Y0L = Y0+ρ . The value ρ is the difference between the medians
of the 2008 and 1993 distributions. Thus, Y0L is the counterfactual income distribution,
with the same shape as the 2008 distribution, but with the median of the 1993 distribu-
tion. The CDF of Y0L is given by F0L(y) = F0(y+ρ), and its PDF is f0L. Formally, the
decomposition is given as:
g(r) =
f (yr)
f0(yr)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Relative density
=
f0L(yr)
f0(yr)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Location effect[gL(r)]
∗ f (yr)
foL(yr)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Shape effect[gs(r)]
(2.6.2)
From equation 2.6.2, it is apparent that if the two distributions have similar median
incomes, then the density ratio for location difference is uniform in [0,1]. However,
if the 2008 distribution, our reference group, has a lower (or higher) median, then the
location effect decreases (or increases). The shape effect represents the relative density
net of location effect, and it can detect redistribution that has occurred between the dis-
tributions. For example, a U-shaped effect is indicative of the 1993 income distribution
being more spread around the middle than the location-adjusted population. A Bell-
shaped effect suggests that the 2008 distribution is more spread around the median.
This means we can assess the extent of income polarization (that is, how it increases
in both tails) or convergence of incomes towards the median (how it decreases in both
tails).
The relative distribution also includes the median relative polarization (MRP) index
which quantifies the degree of polarization resulting from changes in the shape of
the income distribution. This index measures the direction and magnitude of these
shape changes towards the median or towards one or both tails. The index varies
between -1 and 1 such that a value of zero represents no change in the distributional
shape. Positive values mean an increase in polarization or that the median comparison
distribution is more polarised than the median reference distribution. Negative values
mean convergence towards the median. Formally, the relative polarization index of
1993 and 2008 is given as:
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MRP =
4
n
(
n
∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣ri− 12
∣∣∣∣−1
)
(2.6.3)
where ri is the proportion of median-adjusted 2008 incomes that are less than the ith in-
come from the 1993 sample, for i= 1, . . . ,n, and n is the sample size in 1993. The MRP
is further decomposed into lower relative polarization (LRP) and upper relative polar-
ization (URP) to figure out increases in the lower tail (downgrading) and increases in
the upper tail (upgrading). Formally
LRP =
8
n
[
n/2
∑
i=1
(
1
2
− ri
)]
−1 (2.6.4)
URP =
8
n
[
n
∑
i=n/2+1
(
1
2
− ri
)]
−1 (2.6.5)
where MRP = 1/2(LRP+URP). Similar to MRP, both LRP, and URP range from -1
to 1.
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2.6.3 Extra Figures and Tables from the Relative Distribution Approach
Figure 2.6.1: Unweighted Relative Distributions of South Africa, 1993-2008
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Notes: This figure shows changes in the South African income distribution using the relative distribu-
tion approach developed by Handcock and Morris (1998). The x-axis is the percentiles of the reference
year, 2008 while the y-axis is the ratio share of individuals in comparison year, 1993 to the share of indi-
viduals in the reference year, 2008. Therefore, a y-value less than 1 means that the 1993 distribution has
a lower share of individuals than the 2008 distribution at that percentile. All densities are estimated by
epanechnikov kernel densities using the Silverman method to select optimal bandwidth. All estimates
are done by reldist Stata code developed by Ben Jann.
Source: PLSLD 1993, IES 2000, NIDS 2008 and NIDS 2012.
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Figure 2.6.2: Unweighted Relative Distributions of South Africa, 2008-2012
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Notes: This figure shows changes in the South African income distribution using the relative distribu-
tion approach developed by Handcock and Morris (1998). The x-axis is the percentiles of the reference
year, 2008, while the y-axis is the ratio share of individuals in comparison year, 2012 to the share of
individuals in the reference year, 2008. Therefore, a y-value less than 1 means that the 2012 distribution
has a lower share of individuals than the 2008 distribution at that percentile. All densities are estimated
by epanechnikov kernel densities using the Silverman method to select optimal bandwidth. All estim-
ates are done by reldist Stata code developed by Ben Jann.
Source: Own calculations from weighted PSLSD 1993, NIDS 2008 and 2012
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Figure 2.6.3: Unweighted Relative distribution of South Africa, 2012-2014
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Notes: This figure shows changes in the South African income distribution using the relative distribu-
tion approach developed by Handcock and Morris (1998). The x-axis is the percentiles of the reference
year, 2012 while the y-axis is the ratio of share of individuals in comparison year, 2014 to the share of
individuals in the reference year, 2012. Therefore, a y-value less than 1 means that the 2014 distribution
has a lower share of individuals than the 2014 distribution at that percentile. All densities are estimated
by epanechnikov 2 kernel densities using the Silverman method to select optimal bandwidth. All estim-
ates are done by reldist Stata code developed by Ben Jann.
Source: Own calculations from weighted PSLSD 1993, NIDS 2008, 2012 and 2014.
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Chapter 3
Income Stratification in Post-Apartheid South
Africa: A Gini Decomposition Approach
3.1 Introduction
It is a well-documented fact that over the last 20 years, South Africa has experienced
persistence of income disparities. At the same time, there has been a slow reduction or
disappearance of the clustering of incomes around local means in the income distribu-
tion. The persistence of these inequalities and of antagonistic groups has spurred great
interest among both academics and policymakers. This chapter discusses our attempts
to investigate the impact of the South African government’s de-racialisation policies
on these durable inequalities. In particular, we examine whether two decades after
the end of Apartheid, the society is divided into a number of hierarchically ordered
identity groups such that their members differ from the rest of the population. This
investigation complements research in the previous chapter, by considering the extent
to which the incomes of distinct identity groups cluster.
The chapter follows the literature that measures economic distance (or stratification)
across groups (see, among others, Allanson (2014); Dagum (1987); Monti and Santoro
(2011); Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991)). Stratification refers to the formation of observ-
able layers, or the state of being comprised of layers (Yitzhaki, 1994). In the context
of income, these layers may be segments of the overall income distribution. Perfect
income stratification is equivalent to no overlap across different groups in their ranges
of income (Zhou, 2012). Thus, stratification can be defined as the inverse of overlap-
ping of distributions. Put differently, it refers to how much the poorest of one group
descends into the richest of the group below it or the extent to which the richest of one
group ascends into the poorest of the group above it.
Stratification is inversely related to within-group inequality and positively related to
higher between-group inequality. For instance, high within-group inequality is likely to
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increase overlap of income of the group with that of other groups, thus reducing strat-
ification (Allanson, 2014; Monti & Santoro, 2011). Higher between-group inequality,
on the other hand, indicates wider income distances across the groups. Therefore,
stratification of incomes shows how different the members of a group are from the
members of other groups. This implies that stratification of incomes is associated with
horizontal inequalities. Horizontal inequality is concerned with disparities between
groups, and thus enters into members’ welfare function (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000).
According to Stewart, Brown and Mancini (2010), this is partly because membership
to the group constitutes a significant aspect of a person’s identity, which increases per-
ceptions of poverty traps if the group is impoverished relative to others. It follows that
stratification of income across groups can be an obstacle to the achievement of other
targets, like social and economic inclusion.
From a normative perspective, income stratification is therefore a social problem which
ought to be tackled. This chapter sketches out trends in the stratification of income
across groups, in order to provide an understanding of the relative fortunes of differ-
ent groups. In countries undergoing socio-economic transformations, such as South
Africa, this investigation can be an important indicator of the assimilation of different
groups into the economy. Defining integration as the degree of overlapping of income
distributions, this work provides, for the first time in South Africa, the dynamics of eco-
nomic integration and its effect on within-group and between-group inequalities. This
ties patterns of stratification to efforts by the post-Apartheid government to remove ra-
cial discrimination in the labour market and open up new economic opportunities. For
instance, the Affirmative Action (or Employment Equity) and Black Economic Em-
powerment (BEE) policies enacted at the end of Apartheid advocated for promotion of
Blacks/Africans, Coloureds and Indians as well as women to higher paid occupations
in the labour market, and the expansion of entrepreneurial and business-owning classes
of these groups (Seekings & Nattrass, 2008). While these de-racialization policies
surely lowered the inter-racial inequalities, they may have contributed to the rise in
intra-racial inequalities (Nattrass & Seekings, 2001). Thus, in our research covered in
this chapter, we postulate that these inequalities signify income stratification.
The main proposition of the chapter is that the differences between income distribu-
tions of salient groups mirror income stratification. To define groups, we use race and
education of the household head. Even though race has fallen out of academic favour,
in South Africa it still forms the basis for many debates and conflicts, especially those
relating to economic security. The choice of race is, therefore, meant to interrogate
the extent of economic integration in post-apartheid South Africa. Grouping by edu-
cation, on the other hand, is meant to test the emergence of education as the new strata
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replacing race as a defining stratum. This chapter aims to answer the following ques-
tions: Has the income of previously disadvantaged groups converged to that of their
White counterparts? What is the evolution of stratification of income across the relev-
ant groups in the post-apartheid era? How has the change in the distribution of the five
components of total income interacted to impact on the extent of stratification? This
last question is analogous to assessing the impact of the de-racialization policies on
stratification.
This chapter is at the intersection of studies that investigate the existence and extent
of racial disparities in the South African income distribution. Most recently, Gradín
(2013) and Gradin (2015) decompose the differences in the risk of poverty across ra-
cial and ethno-linguistic subgroups, while Schiel, Leibbrandt, Lam et al. (2016) apply
a series of decompositions to examine the effect of social grants on income inequality.
Our study differs from these in one aspect. We focus on the extent of economic integ-
ration of groups defined by race and education level. This kind of analysis has not pre-
viously been attempted using South African data. The findings will therefore provide
new insights into the stratification of and convergence of income among groups. For
policymakers, these insights include an evaluation of social process and opportunities
for mobility and ways of tackling the economic disadvantage of low-income groups.
This study adds to the literature first by presenting new information on the extent of
overlapping of income distributions of well-defined groups in South Africa, a country
with persistent and socially embedded inequalities. Given that groups differ across
societies, and are often dynamic, the South Africa perspective is therefore unique. We
make another contribution by documenting the unconditional effects of various income
sources on the level of stratification. That is, we examine the proximate causes of
stratification of incomes across groups. To the best of our knowledge, this investigation
has not been done in the literature.
Our proposition is motivated by three hypotheses. First, there has been a convergence
of income across racial groups. Convergence means that the incomes of previously
disadvantaged groups are catching up to that of their Whites counterparts. Thus, con-
vergent incomes could signify higher overlapping (lower stratification) of income dis-
tributions across racial groups. Using survey data collected in 1993, 2008, 2012 and
2014-2015, our convergence analysis reveals significant convergence in education at-
tainment and household per capita income of Blacks to that of Whites. Our second
hypothesis is that stratification of racial groups’ income ought to have declined be-
cause of the higher levels of convergence. The Analysis of Gini approach (ANOGI
hereafter) reveals that the incomes of Blacks and Coloureds overlap with each other
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and with the income of the population as a whole. The incomes of Whites’ incomes
have a low degree of overlapping with other groups, which means they are more strat-
ified. We conclude the statistical analysis by showing that the findings are robust to
disaggregating Blacks into seven groups based on linguistic identity.
The third and last hypothesis is that the distribution of labour earnings and that of gov-
ernment transfers have the largest effect on the stratification of incomes. The basis of
this hypothesis is the effects of these income components on inequality and polariz-
ation. A series of shift-share simulations show that changes in government transfers
have a tendency to lower stratification, while changes in the distribution of labour earn-
ings tend to increase stratification. While these simulations are an accounting exercise
and cannot offer any causal interpretations, they provide evidence which can inform
the design of effective public policies.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief review of the
related literature. Section 3.3 describes the data and presents summary statistics of
selected variables for the identity groups. Section 3.4 describes our two analytical
strategies. Section 3.5 discusses our results, elaborates on the findings and summar-
ises results from the robustness checks. Section 2.5 concludes with a summary of
findings.
3.2 Literature Review
In this section, we review some important studies related to the measurement of income
stratification1. The primary goal is to summarise general conclusions that will facilitate
an understanding of the terms discussed in the chapter and highlight contributions in
the field.
The income stratification literature deals with the decomposition of the Gini coeffi-
cient by population subgroups. Early decompositions of the Gini coefficient follow
Theil’s approach by considering only two components, the between-group compon-
ent, and the within-group component. The between-group component gives inequality
1Income stratification should not be confused with economic or income segregation, which deals with
the extent to which individuals or households with different socio-economic characteristics are un-
evenly distributed throughout a society. Income stratification rather implies a hierarchical ordering
of groups according to income. The idea of stratification is not exclusive to economics, but we rely
on the measures developed in economics because we are not familiar with measures of stratification
in other fields.
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between the mean incomes of the groups, and the within-group component measures
inequality within each group of the population. Mehran (1975) and Pyatt (1976) show
that the decomposition of the Gini concentration ratio gives more information than the
generalized entropy measures.
The decomposition of the Gini coefficient by Pyatt (1976) gives a third or residual term,
which vanishes (i.e. equals zero) when income ranges of the subgroups do not overlap
and is positive when income ranges overlap. The decompositions by Dagum (1998)
and Deutsch and Silber (1999); Silber (1989) provide further information regarding
the third term. This term is known as the overlapping term. For instance, Dagum
(1987, 1998) introduces the concept of economic distances between distributions and
relative economic affluence (REA) by interpreting the overlap term as the intensity of
transvariazione between population subgroups. The concept “Transvariazione” was
first defined by Corrado Gini as an indicator of overlapping of income distributions.
Transvariazione occurs whenever a member of a poorer group has income higher than
a member of a richer group (Deutsch & Silber, 1997; Monti & Santoro, 2009). Deutsch
and Silber (1999); Silber (1989) focus on the correspondence between the Gini’s trans-
variazione concept and the overlapping of distributions.
Most relevant to the research outlined in this chapter is the decomposition developed
by Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991) and Yitzhaki (1994). Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991) de-
compose the extended Gini coefficient of Lerman and Yitzhaki (1984) by population
subgroup to derive a measure for the sociological concept of stratification. Specific-
ally, they define stratification as the inverse of overlapping. Yitzhaki (1994) extends the
overlapping index presented in Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991) by decomposing the Gini
coefficient into two terms, the between-group component, and a second term which is a
sum of products of income shares, within group Ginis and overlaps of all groups. Sev-
eral authors have since modified this two-term decomposition (see Allanson (2014);
Frick, Goebel, Schechtman, Wagner and Yitzhaki (2006); Monti and Santoro (2011);
Wodon (1999)).
The two-term decomposition by Yitzhaki (1994) has been applied in the literature.
For instance, when examining whether the existence of several independent panel sub-
samples within the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) represent the same
population, Frick et al. (2006) rearrange and reinterpret the Yitzhaki (1994) decom-
position in a manner analogous to Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), but performed with
the Gini coefficient. They refer to their approach as an Analysis of Gini (ANOGI).
Another important extension of the Yitzhaki (1994) decomposition approach was in-
troduced by Wodon (1999), who analysed stratification by taking into account several
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dimensions at once2. Extensions of this work by other authors like Monti and Santoro
(2011) and Allanson (2014) are aimed at showing that the impact of stratification (or
overlapping) on inequality is a function of the probability of transvariazione.
We apply the ANOGI approach in this chapter because of its simplicity and intu-
itive appeal. The notable applications of ANOGI concern the assessment of con-
vergence of incomes across regions or countries (Frick & Goebel, 2008; Milanovic
& Yitzhaki, 2002); the quality of classification into population subgroups (Heller &
Yitzhaki, 2006; Liberati & Yitzhaki, 2012); the differences in the welfare of various
groups (Zacharias & Vakulabharanam, 2011); the economic assimilation of immig-
rants (Ceccarelli, Giorgi & Guandalini, 2014; D’Agostino, Regoli, Cornelio & Berti,
2016), and the examination of whether panel sub-samples represent the same popula-
tion because of attrition.
In a study of the relationship between wealth inequality and caste divisions in India
between 1991/92 and 2002/03, Zacharias and Vakulabharanam (2011) find that for-
ward Hindus caste are more stratified in terms of their wealth distribution, that is, they
have a low degree of overlapping. The other caste divisions show a high degree of
overlapping with the overall population, as well as with each other. D’Agostino et
al. (2016) group the population by immigration status to investigate the extent of im-
migrant assimilation in Italy. Their results confirm that income ranges of the groups
intersect, both among the groups, and with reference to the overall population. Heller
and Yitzhaki (2006) use the ANOGI approach to examine the quality of the classific-
ation of families of prehistoric snails according to observable characteristics of their
shells.
The conclusion from this literature review is that the extent of income stratification and
economic integration depends on the study context, type of classification (or identities),
and not so much on the number of population groupings. This literature is limited in
that it is mostly focused on developed countries, which means little is known about the
patterns of income stratification across salient identities in developing countries. Fur-
thermore, it does not offer an explanation of the causes of stratification. The research
discussed in this chapter makes a contribution in this regard by investigating income
stratification across well-defined racial identities in the South African context.
We further contribute by documenting the unconditional effects of a range of income
components on household income distribution and income stratification. Our conjec-
2Other notable contributions to the multi-level decomposition of the Gini index are presented in Mus-
sard and Richard (2012); Mussini (2013).
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ture is that changes in an income source can increase (decrease) the degree of stratific-
ation (overlapping) in a number of ways. For instance, if the distribution of an income
source increases in favour of the richer group, the richer become stratified. To do this,
we use a shift-share micro-simulation approach derived from Burtless (1999) and Daly
and Valletta (2006). This approach, unlike most micro-simulation approaches3 such as
the technique of DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996), has the ability to observe how
a range of income sources interact to account for changing income distribution. The
shift-share technique we use is a rank-preserving income exchange similar to the one
used by Larrimore (2014); Larrimore, Burkhauser and Armour (2015) to demonstrate
how factors accounting for income inequality have evolved over time in the United
States. It is important to note that our micro-simulation does not provide any causal
relationship. Rather it is the first step in understanding the proximate causes of strati-
fication. A detailed discussion of this approach is included in section 3.4.2.
3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.3.1 Data
The data used in this chapter come from the 1993 Project for Statistics on Living
Standards and Development (PSLSD) and the 2008, 2012 and 2014-2015 waves of
the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS)4. A detailed description of these survey
datasets is in section 2.3.1 of chapter 2. Despite a few comparability issues which are
discussed in detail n Leibbrandt et al. (2012) and summarised in section 2.3.1.1 of
chapter 2, these survey datasets have similarities that have resulted in them being im-
portant references for analysis of welfare dynamics in post-apartheid South Africa (see
Burger and McAravey (2014); Leibbrandt and Levinsohn (2014); Leibbrandt, Woolard,
Finn and Argent (2010)).
In our analysis, the main outcome variable is real per capita household income. We
use income because it influences most dimensions of well-being, and also has a broad
range of potential demand and supply policy interventions. We compute per capita
3Micro-simulation approaches involve the construction of counterfactuals (i.e simulated distribution)
and their comparison with the actual distribution (Fortin, Lemieux & Firpo, 2011a). The difference
between the outcome of interest (in our case income stratification or income overlapping) allows the
influence of the characteristics to be assessed. Fortin et al. (2011a) provide a detailed survey of the
common micro-simulation approaches.
4For more details about the PSLSD visit http://sada-data.nrf.ac.za/handle/10956/76, and for NIDS visit
http://www.nids.uct.ac.za/
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income by assigning to each individual the total monthly income of their household,
divided by the household size5. This procedure assumes that intra-household alloca-
tion is egalitarian, that is, all members of the household get the same share of income,
regardless of their individual incomes, their role in the household and other character-
istics. To ensure comparability of income across these surveys. We follow the common
precedent in the studies that use these datasets (see Leibbrandt et al. 2012). That is, we
omit imputed rental income and agricultural income because they are not uniformly
available across the surveys. Thus, total monthly income is the sum of household in-
comes from labour, remittances, capital, government transfers, and other incomes (see
appendix 2.6.1 for a list of variables used for computing each income source). To ar-
rive at real incomes, we inflate the per capita monthly household income to 2012 price
levels using the national consumer price index of 2012. Household income per capita
is considered the unit of analysis.
We allocate individuals to key identity groups based on their race and the level of edu-
cation of their household head. Race is identified by four groups, Blacks, Coloureds,
Indian/Asian and Whites6. Race is the primary partition because it reflects the stylised
fact that membership of racial groups have been and remain a significant source of
income disparities in the country. The second partition, by level of education of the
household head, is largely to test for the emergence of education as a new stratum.
Level of education is grouped into three groups. Firstly, an unskilled group, which in-
cludes individuals whose household head has up to seven years of schooling. Secondly,
a semi-skilled group, which is made up of individuals in households whose head has
at least seven years, but less than 12 years of schooling. Finally, a skilled group, which
consists of individuals in households where the head has more than 12 years of edu-
cation. Education is our secondary partition because its attainment is one of the surest
pathways to poverty reduction.
All households with zero, missing, and negative incomes are removed which means
the samples used in the analysis are slightly smaller than the actual samples for each
survey. This loss of data may cause bias, but the excluded cases account for less
than 1% of the observations in each sample. The final sample (pooled) has 135005
individuals from 30591 households.
5We need to ensure that the results do not depend on the type of transformation or equivalence scale
used to take into account economies of scale. We therefore plotted kernel density curves for 2008 us-
ing different transformations. The plots (available on request from the authors) are similar, implying
that the results are not sensitive to the choice of transformation.
6Due to very small (less three percent (3%)) proportions of the Indian/Asian race group in the surveys,
the discussion will be limited to three races only.
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3.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
It is instructive to start the analysis by aggregating a few facts regarding the relative
gaps in education and income among the groups since 1993. Table 3.3.1 shows sum-
mary statistics of selected variables. There was a growth in real mean and median
income for all race groups. However, the average income premium of Whites relative
to Blacks declines from 8.8 times in 1993 to 7.2 times in 2008, and 6.5 and 6.4 times
in 2012 and 2014-2015. The mean income of Whites stays at least 4 times higher than
that of Coloureds over the 21 year period. Whites median income relative to that of
Blacks also declines, from 12 times in 1993 to 9 and 5.9 times in 2012 and 2014-2015.
In conjunction with the declining income share of Whites and the growing income
share of Blacks, the mean and median incomes clearly indicate economic integration
among the racial groups.
The Gini coefficient for Blacks, which ranges between 0.55 and 0.59, is higher than
for Whites, which ranges from 0.43 to 0.51 between 1993 to 2008. In 2014-2015,
however, the Gini coefficient for Whites is higher than that of Blacks, a result that
may signal economic assimilation across the groups. The overall path of racial Ginis
mimics the upward (2008) and downward (2012) tendency observed at the national
level. These results are supported by the literature on the direction of inequality, if not
the magnitude.
With the exception of labour income, Blacks are more likely to receive their income
from government transfers, whereas Whites are more likely to receive income from
capital income. That is, the income share of government transfers is highest among
Blacks, and the share capital income is highest among Whites. A possible explanation
is that during the apartheid regime, Whites owned most productive property and busi-
nesses, and thus have a higher share of capital dividends. It seems though, that while
the de-racialisation policies did not always achieve their desired objectives (Seekings
& Nattrass, 2008), the expansion of government transfers had the intended effect of
increasing incomes of groups who are not expected to participate fully in the labour
market, and therefore vulnerable to low income.
Household size and number of children of Blacks and Coloureds have remained larger
than of White households, but the difference has narrowed over the years. Blacks’
average household size relative to that of Whites declined from 1.55 to 1.26 between
1993 and 2014-2015, whereas the difference in the number of children in Black and
White households has dropped from 1.12 in 1993 to 0.65 in 2014-2015. For summary
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statistics on education, we convert education categories into years of schooling. In
1993, the average years of schooling of Whites (11.15) relative to that of Blacks (6.9)
show a 62% relative discrepancy. There is, however, a clear trend of convergence in
education levels of Blacks to that of their White counterparts, as the gap declines stead-
ily to 40% in 2008, 32% in 2012, and 26% in 2014-2015. Convergence in education
attainment can signal convergence in labour market earnings, which in turn could lead
to overlapping of income distributions.
Table 3.3.1: Summary statistics of selected variables
Black Coloured Indians White
1993 2008 2012 2014 1993 2008 2012 2014 1993 2008 2012 2014 1993 2008 2012 2014
Population share 0.7587 0.7827 0.7981 0.8056 0.0861 0.0935 0.0888 0.0892 0.0255 0.0262 0.0255 0.0234 0.1297 0.0977 0.0876 0.0819
Income Share 0.3449 0.4410 0.4953 0.5190 0.0838 0.0845 0.0848 0.0829 0.0479 0.0702 0.0649 0.0588 0.5234 0.4043 0.3549 0.3393
Mean income 670 1019 1283 1580 1435 1634 1975 2280 2773 4844 5274 6177 5952 7482 8373 10161
Median 366 419 603 752 980 861 1055 1223 1803 2220 2322 2874 4478 5036 5500 4458
Gini coefficient 0.5540 0.6409 0.5958 0.5979 0.4990 0.5923 0.5646 0.5564 0.4692 0.6286 0.5993 0.5883 0.4252 0.5091 0.4875 0.6478
Share of Capital income 0.0272 0.0150 0.0182 0.0408 0.0099 0.0244 0.0209 0.0187 0.0568 0.1348 0.1355 0.1035 0.1111 0.1490 0.1403 0.3313
Share of Remittances 0.0713 0.0441 0.0455 0.0592 0.0253 0.0114 0.0172 0.0244 0.0121 0.0204 0.0272 0.0034 0.0069 0.0553 0.0075 0.0082
Share of Labour income 0.8001 0.7901 0.7935 0.7846 0.9241 0.8675 0.8700 0.8667 0.9047 0.8164 0.8060 0.8668 0.8721 0.7779 0.8241 0.6486
Share of Government transfers 0.1006 0.1490 0.1422 0.1129 0.0390 0.0848 0.0910 0.0832 0.0257 0.0284 0.0313 0.0258 0.0063 0.0141 0.0171 0.0117
Other 0.0008 0.0018 0.0006 0.0025 0.0017 0.0120 0.0009 0.0070 0.0006 0 0 0.0006 0.0036 0.0037 0.0111 0.0002
Average Household size 4.68 3.74 3.56 3.24 4.74 3.86 3.83 3.76 4.26 3.65 3.89 3.51 3.02 2.68 2.59 2.58
Average Number of children 2.05 1.57 1.44 1.21 1.87 1.40 1.39 1.21 1.43 1.11 1.05 0.93 0.93 0.66 0.65 0.56
Average Years of Schooling (Adult) 6.85 8.86 9.44 9.78 8.29 9.28 9.36 9.66 9.87 11.16 11.05 11.61 11.15 12.40 12.54 12.33
No Education (%) 15.53 7.79 6.03 4.35 5.24 5.67 4.86 3.51 6.81 2.98 2.79 2.03 6.06 0 0.09 0
Primary (%) 34.13 21.4 17.17 15.16 27.67 20.37 18.91 16.79 9.72 9.71 7.18 3.07 4.85 0.09 0.65 1.3
High School (%) 47.66 61.85 63.65 64.73 63.74 61.93 65.21 64.38 71.3 55.86 64.8 61.17 59.24 62.08 55.9 56.45
Tertiary (%) 2.68 8.96 13.15 15.75 3.35 12.04 11.02 15.32 12.17 31.44 25.23 33.73 29.86 37.83 43.37 42.25
Urban 35.76 52.42 53.66 54.91 93.34 91.9 92.7 91.36 99.44 64.97 60.04 64.57 92.2 97.76 97.52 97.4
Rural 64.24 47.58 46.34 45.09 6.66 8.1 7.3 8.64 0.56 35.03 39.96 35.43 7.8 2.24 2.48 2.6
Notes: All incomes are deflated to 2012 prices. All the income components values, which are con-
ditional on receiving (that is, positive, non-missing values), represent income shares in total household
income. All individuals aged less than 18 years are cl ssified as children while adults are individuals
aged 18 to 65 years. Years of schooling are derived from completed education levels. No education
refers to those with zero years of schooling, while primary refers to those with 1 up to 7 years of educa-
tion, high school to those with between 7 and 12 years of schooling and tertiary is those with more than
12 years of schooling or with college or university education.
Source: Own calculations from weighted PSLSD 1993, NIDS 2008, 2012 and 2014-2015
3.3.2.1 Education Convergence
To get a clearer idea about convergence in education attainment, we calculate difference-
in-difference estimates in the average years of schooling. Between 1993 and 2014-
2015, the gap in the years of schooling between Blacks and Whites falls from 4.3 to
2.55. That is, the education attainment of Blacks increases by 1.75 years relative to
that of Whites. A comparison of Whites and Coloureds shows that the gap in average
years of schooling increases from 2.86 in 1993 to 3.18 in 2012, and falls to 2.67 in
2014-2015. Thus, Coloureds’ education attainment falls behind that of Whites by 0.32
years from 1993 to 2012, and increases by 0.51 in 2014-2015. The gap between years
of schooling for Coloureds and Blacks falls from 1.44 to 0.42 between 1993 and 2008
and falls to -0.08 and -0.12 in 2012 and 2014-2015. This reflects that Coloureds have
gained in education relative to Blacks between 1993 to 2008, while Blacks have gained
during the latter period, 2008 to 2014-2015.
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This demonstrates a convergence of education attainment of Blacks to that of their
White and Coloured counterparts. These convergence trends are robust to using 25
years as the lower bound age cut-off for adults7. There is also a notable degree of
divergence in the education attainment of Coloureds relative to Whites. The slow or
lack of convergence for Coloureds forms the basis of the hypothesis that not all racial
groups undergo the same integration, which explains the need to measure economic
stratification.
The percentage of each racial group in the education categories can also explain some
of these convergence patterns. Between 1993 and 2014-2015 the number of Blacks
with no education drops, while the share of those with high school and tertiary edu-
cation increases. The share of Coloureds with no education slightly increases (from
5.24% to 5.67%) between 1993 and 2008, then falls continuously thereafter. The num-
ber of Blacks and Coloureds with tertiary education increases between 1993 and 2014-
2015. The urban proportion of Blacks rises (from 36% to 55%) from 1993 to 2014, and
the urban Coloured population steadies above 90% during the same period. Assuming
the proportion of a race group in this urban sector signals the group’s absorption into
the formal sector of the economy, then this is further evidence of reduction of distances
across groups.
To test the statistical significance of this education convergence patterns, we follow
an approach similar to Hnatkovska, Lahiri and Paul (2012). That is, we estimate an
ordered probit regression with education categories as the dependent variable. Our
main regressor is race, thus we attempt The control variables include age, gender,
years of schooling of the household head, rural dummy, and province. Table 3.3.2
reports the marginal effects of these regressions. In all regressions, we use White as
the reference category. Thus the marginal effects represent the probability of an indi-
vidual belonging to each education category relative to Whites. In 1993 the marginal
effects for Blacks and Coloureds are positive for the no-education and primary educa-
tion categories, while they are negative on high school and tertiary levels of education.
This means that, relative to Whites, both Blacks and Coloureds are more likely to have
no education and primary education, and less likely to have high school and tertiary
education.
During the period from 2008 to 2014-2015, the primary and high school marginal ef-
fects dropped moderately, while the no-education effects fell massively. For example,
the probability of Blacks completing primary education fell from 18.8% in 1993 to
7The 25 years cut-off is common within the South African literature given that a number of individuals
below 25 are still in the schooling system.
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16.7% in 2008 and to 10.1% in 2014. This suggests a small drop in the probabil-
ity of having primary and high school certificates and a huge drop in the probability
of no-education. The changes for high school marginal effects are significant for the
entire sample period, which confirms that convergence is mainly due to an increase
in high school education among Blacks and Coloureds. The probability of attaining
tertiary education for Blacks was 16.1% lower than that of Whites in 1993. In 2008
it increased to 28.9%, then to 22.3% in 2014. Thus, relative to Whites, Blacks are
less likely to complete tertiary education. The same pattern emerges for Coloureds as
well. This reflects an increase in the probability of Whites having a tertiary education
relative to Blacks and Coloureds.
Table 3.3.2: Ordered Probit Regressions of Race for Education Categories
(a) Marginal effects
1993 2008 2012 2014
(1) (2) (4) (5) (7) (8) (10) (11)
Blacks Coloureds Blacks Coloureds Blacks Coloureds Blacks Coloureds
No Education 0.122*** 0.0780*** 0.0620*** 0.0471*** 0.0455*** 0.0498*** 0.0297*** 0.0325***
(0.00613) (0.0119) (0.00445) (0.00945) (0.00348) (0.00806) (0.00310) (0.00697)
Primary 0.188*** 0.147*** 0.167*** 0.141*** 0.131*** 0.138*** 0.101*** 0.108***
(0.0135) (0.0169) (0.0143) (0.0209) (0.0122) (0.0169) (0.0121) (0.0189)
High School -0.149*** -0.0860*** 0.0596** 0.0780*** 0.107*** 0.103*** 0.0922*** 0.0911***
(0.00907) (0.0176) (0.0270) (0.0300) (0.0294) (0.0312) (0.0273) (0.0275)
Tertiary -0.161*** -0.139*** -0.289*** -0.266*** -0.283*** -0.291*** -0.223*** -0.231***
(0.0161) (0.0171) (0.0407) (0.0420) (0.0414) (0.0415) (0.0402) (0.0440)
Observations 20,230 20,230 14,074 14,074 16,818 16,818 19,345 19,345
(b) Changes in the Marginal effects
1993-2008 2008-2012 2012-2014
Blacks Coloureds Blacks Coloureds Blacks Coloureds
No Education -0.0601*** -0.0309** -0.0165*** -0.0123** -0.0158*** -0.0173**
(0.0045) (0.0095) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0031) (0.0070)
Primary -0.0213 -0.0064 -0.0366** -0.0288** -0.0295** -0.0308
(0.0143) (0.0209) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0121) (0.0189)
High School 0.2090*** -0.0079 0.0473* 0.0435 -0.0147 -0.0120
(0.0270) (0.0300) (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0273) (0.0275)
Tertiary -0.1276** -0.4054*** 0.0059 -0.0025 0.0599 0.0601
(0.0407) (0.0420) 0.0407 0.0407 (0.0402) (0.0440)
Notes: Panel A reports the marginal effects of race in an ordered probit regression of education categor-
ies, while Panel B reports changes in the marginal effects. The dependent variable reflects the categories
of education and the control variables include race, age, gender, household head’s years of schooling, a
rural dummy, a set of province dummies. The reference group for race is White, thus he values (or coef-
ficients) therefore report the probability of an individual belonging to each education category relative
to a White individual. All regressions are based on individuals aged 18 years to 65 years. In parenthesis
are linearised standard errors. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.
Source: Own calculations from weighted PSLSD 1993, NIDS 2008, 2012 and NIDS 2014-2015.
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3.3.2.2 Income Profiles
Next, we examine profile income by presenting the distribution of incomes. Kernel
density estimates of the distribution of the log of real per capita income are shown in
figure 3.3.1. The Epanechnikov kernel is used in all the density estimation processes
in this study, while the optimal bandwidth was selected using the Silverman plug-in
method. Looking at figure 3.3.1 two features emerge. The income distributions seem to
have shifted to the right over the years. The higher mode, median and mean of Whites
can be appreciated by the rightward position of their distribution. The differences in
skewness and kurtosis in the distribution of Black and White curves are immediately
obvious, with the Blacks income distribution being more skewed to the left and having
thicker tails. Overall, the Whites income distribution has the highest peak followed by
the Coloureds income distribution.
Figure 3.3.1: Overlaid density plots, 1993 - 2014
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Source: Weighted PLSLD 1993, NIDS 2008, 2012 and 2014-2015
To understand further the difference between the income distributions of the racial
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groups, we performed the non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)8 two-sample
test of equality of distributions. The KS test does not only confirm that Blacks and
Whites do not have the same distribution function but also fails to reject the hypothesis
that Whites have a higher income than Blacks. Moreover, the test also rejects the hy-
pothesis that the 1993 and 2008 income distributions are similar. This finding is also
true for Whites income distribution in 1993 and 2008. Repeating the KS tests for the
five remaining pair-wise combinations lends support to the graphical results, that is,
Whites, then Coloureds have higher per capita incomes than Blacks.
These differences in incomes, together with the education convergence results make it
evident that the racial groups are likely to report different levels of income convergence
and overlapping of incomes among each other and with the overall population. In
the next section, we investigate whether there has been any convergence in per capita
incomes of racial groups. Specifically, we discuss whether the incomes of both Blacks
and that of Coloureds are catching up with those of their White counterparts.
3.3.3 Income Convergence
To examine the extent of income convergence across racial groups, we proceed in
three ways. First, we highlight the gains and losses of each race group, relative to
others, in terms of average per capita income. Second, we look at income gaps at each
percentile of the income distributions. Lastly, we run quantile regressions to estimate
the effect of race on income. Table 3.3.3 presents the marginal effects for race dummies
from Recentered Influence Function (RIF) regressions of log income per capita. It is
important to note that these regression coefficients reflect absolute income gaps, and
the percentile gaps in figure 3.3.2 reflect relative gaps.
Table 3.3.1 presents the evidence on the gains and losses. We note that the mean
income gap between Blacks and Whites rises from R5282 in 1993 to R6463, to R7090
and R8581 in 2008, 2012 and 2014. Put differently, the average per capita income
of Blacks fell behind that of Whites by R1181 from 1993 to 2008, while between
2008 and 2014 Whites gained R2118 relative to Blacks. A possible explanation for
the average income gains of Whites may be their higher probability of having tertiary
education. Compared to Coloureds, Blacks have gained R150 between 1993 and 2008,
and they have fallen behind by R85 in 2014-2015. By and large, the difference-in-
difference estimates in average income per capita indicate that the incomes of Blacks
8All the KS tests were computed using the ksmirnov program in Stata, and the results are available on
request.
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and that of Coloureds are not catching up to that of their White counterparts. However,
these mean income comparisons mask where exactly along the income distribution
divergence took place.
We proceed by looking at income differences among the racial groups at each per-
centile of the distribution to determine where the catching up happens. Figure 3.3.2
presents the difference in the percentiles of log income per capita of the racial groups.
From panel (a), which reports the percentile gaps of Blacks and Whites, the following
features are apparent. All four lines show evidence of first-order stochastic dominance
of the Whites income distribution relative to the Blacks income distribution. That is,
the lines are uniformly higher for Whites at every percentile. However, the degree of
stochastic dominance declines because the line for 2014-2015 is closer to the zero line
for all percentiles.
Second, lines for 1993, 2008 and 2012 slope downward indicating that the differences
are higher for lower percentiles than for higher percentiles. These downward slop-
ing lines also suggest that the income distribution of Blacks is more unequal than the
Whites income distribution. The 2014-2015 line, although somewhat flatter, has a neg-
ative slope after the 70th percentile, which means smaller income distances between
Blacks and Whites at higher incomes. Third, the 2008 line is lower than the 1993
line, up to the middle of the distribution (53rd percentile), which implies that income
gaps only narrowed for situates at the lower end of the distribution. This result is fur-
ther evidence in support of the higher degree of polarization during 2008. That is, the
lower gaps at the lower and higher percentiles in 2008 suggest bunching of incomes or
increasing bi-polarity in the country.
The plot suggests a convergence of incomes between Whites and Blacks. The declin-
ing distance between the 1993 and 2014-2015 lines as we move up the percentiles
confirms the emergence of the “nouveau riche” within the Blacks. This rich strata
among Blacks may explain the higher within-group polarization and lower between-
group polarization observed in the previous chapter.
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Figure 3.3.2: Difference in percentile log-income among the racial groups
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Notes: The figure presents the differences in percentiles log income per capita of the racial
groups plotted against the percentiles in the three sample periods. The lines above the hori-
zontal axis suggest stochastic dominance.
Source: Own calculations from weighted PLSLD, NIDS 2008, 2012 and 2014-2015.
Panel (b) presents the income differences between White and Coloureds. From the
plot, the 2014-2015 line is closer to the zero line, and the 2008 line is furthest from the
zero line. This suggests that from 1993 to 2008, the income distances between Col-
oureds and Whites widened, and then narrowed somewhat in 2014-2015. The lines are
flatter, suggesting that income differences are similar for all percentiles. A noteworthy
feature is that in 2008, for the bottom 8 percentiles, the gap between the incomes of
Whites and that of Coloureds is highest. This is driven by an emergence of the upper
high-income class among Whites. All in all, the income gap between Whites and Col-
oureds narrowed between 1993 and 2014-2015, especially for situates at the bottom
and middle of the income distribution (i.e., for bottom 58 percentiles).
Panel (c), which reports the differences between incomes of Coloureds and Blacks,
shows that between 1993 and 2008, the gap is narrower for situates at the bottom
half than for those at the top half. However, in 2012 and 2014-2015, the income gap
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remains constant at the lower percentiles (less than 40th), and narrows further for those
in the middle and top of the distribution. The flattening out of the 2012 and 2014-2015
line means a decrease in the income inequality of the two distributions. For the bottom
8 percentiles in 2008, incomes for Blacks are higher than those of Coloureds incomes.
The incomes of Coloureds in 2008, when compared to those of Whites and Blacks,
hints at contrasting levels of integration across race.
To investigate the significance of these income convergence patterns across races, we
follow the literature that examines income gaps across salient groups by regressing in-
come on a dummy of the relevant group(s). The coefficient of the dummy is interpreted
as an indicator of group differential. To do this, we use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
and Recentered Influence Function (RIF) regressions to estimate the effect of race on
the mean and unconditional quantile of the log of income per-capita. Hnatkovska et
al. (2012) use these approaches to estimate the effect of caste on wages in the case of
India. We also use them to estimate regressions of log income on race and other cov-
ariates. The control variables include age (and age squared), gender, education level,
household size, rural area, and province. The RIF regressions amount to evaluating
income convergence across race conditional on the stated control variables. While the
approach is valuable in highlighting income differences that are not due to pre-market
individual characteristics, it is fails to observe how a range of income sources interact
to account for changing inequality, which is the primary focus of this paper.
According to Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009), RIF regression is similar to running
a linear probability model of the probability of income exceeding the specific quantile
on the set of covariates. Following the presentation in Porter (2015), RIF is based on
a transformation of the dependent variable, household income per capita in our case,
into a recentered influence function
RIF (y; qτ ,Fy) = qτ +
τ−1{y≤ qτ}
fy (qτ)
(3.3.1)
where τ indicates a specific quantile (say 10th, or 0.10), qτ is the value of the dependent
variable, income per capita, y, at that specific quantile. Fy is the cumulative distribution
function of y, and fy(qτ) is the density of y at qτ . The indicator function, 1{y≤qτ},
identifies whether the value of the income per capita, y , for the individual is below qτ .
It equals 1 when the income per capita is less than or equal to the value of the income
at quantile τ , and 0 otherwise.
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Table 3.3.3 presents the marginal effects for race dummies from RIF regressions of log
income per capita at the 10th, 50th and 90th quantiles. The columns labelled “Mean”
report the OLS regressions results. In all regressions, Whites are the reference cat-
egory, thus the coefficients represent the income differential relative to a corresponding
White individual. Evident from this table is that the absolute income gaps are lowest
at the low end of the distribution, and highest at the top end of the distribution.
Taking a closer look at Table 3.3.3, we see that the OLS coefficient of the Blacks
dummy shows that the log of income for Blacks is, on average, over 1.4 less than
that of Whites with similar characteristics. The OLS coefficient is lowest in 2014 (at
1.098) and highest in 1993 (at 1.532), which means Black-White income differentials
are lower in 2014. The RIF regressions, however, tell a different story. In 1993, at the
bottom end of the distribution, the White-Black differential is about 0.09, increasing
to 0.94 at the middle (or median) and then to 3.99 at the 90th percentile. This suggests
that the White-Black differential is small when income per capita is low, but much
bigger when income per capita is high. Even though the magnitudes differ, this pattern
is true for all the sample periods. For instance, in 2014, the White-Black differential
increases from 0.212 at the 10th quantile to 2.695 at the 90th quantile. The White-
Coloured income differential shows similar patterns. The differentials seem to have
declined in the post-Apartheid era, which points to a reduction of distances across the
groups.
Figures 3.7.1 and 3.7.2 in the appendix provide a clearer picture of the income differ-
entials across the racial groups at different percentiles. The figures plot the marginal
effects, at each percentile, of the regression of income on race dummies. The purpose
is to show the direction of income differential at each percentile. They show that after
the 80th percentile there is a reversal in the White-Black income differentials. That is,
there is a sharp decline in the income differentials which suggests that convergence is
happening mostly at the top of the income distribution. Nevertheless, the confidence
bands are quite wide after the 80th percentile. Recall that these regression coefficients
reflect absolute income gaps, and the percentile gaps in figure 3.3.2 reflect relative
gaps. Therefore, the results show that the relative gaps are highest at the lower per-
centiles and the absolute gaps are lowest at the lower end of the income distribution.
The White-Coloured income differentials show a similar pattern.
Given the convergence results above, we fail to reject the hypothesis of convergence
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Table 3.3.3: Marginal Effects of Race of income per capita
(a)
1993 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Q0.10 Q0.50 Q0.90 Mean Q0.10 Q0.50 Q0.90 Mean
Blacks -0.0892*** -0.939*** -3.992*** -1.532*** -0.376*** -0.928*** -3.913*** -1.575***
(0.0197) (0.0203) (0.0710) (0.0708) (0.0395) (0.0379) (0.202) (0.120)
Coloureds 0.0931*** -0.240*** -3.770*** -1.055*** -0.159** -0.564*** -3.472*** -1.219***
(0.0259) (0.0316) (0.0878) (0.0978) (0.0694) (0.0571) (0.216) (0.148)
Indians/Asians 0.281*** 0.0822*** -2.833*** -0.570*** -0.265 0.224** -2.331*** -0.521
(0.0276) (0.0312) (0.141) (0.127) (0.169) (0.0956) (0.376) (0.317)
Observations 38,360 38,360 38,360 38,360 26,814 26,814 26,814 26,817
(b)
2012 2014
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
VARIABLES Q0.10 Q0.50 Q0.90 Mean Q0.10 Q0.50 Q0.90 Mean
Blacks -0.293*** -0.890*** -3.934*** -1.435*** -0.212*** -0.697*** -2.695*** -1.098***
(0.0267) (0.0404) (0.270) (0.103) (0.0265) (0.0607) (0.255) (0.117)
Coloureds -0.0892 -0.462*** -3.472*** -1.094*** 0.0519 -0.303*** -2.270*** -0.744***
(0.0599) (0.0606) (0.290) (0.154) (0.0388) (0.0661) (0.286) (0.137)
Indians/Asians 0.170*** 0.353*** -2.226*** -0.297 0.119** 0.214** -1.033** -0.0229
(0.0332) (0.0786) (0.456) (0.201) (0.0467) (0.0909) (0.434) (0.172)
Observations 31,781 31,781 31,781 31,786 36,716 36,716 36,716 36,716
Notes: This table reports the marginal effects of race on the log of income per capita in South Africa.
The columns labelled Q0.10, Q0.50 and Q0.90 display RIF regression results at the tenth, fiftieth and
ninetieth quantiles of the income per capita distribution, the columns labelled mean ( 4, 8, 12 & 14)
report the OLS regression results. In all regressions, White is the reference category, meaning the
values report the individual income per capita differential relative to a similar White individual. The
control variables include age, age squared, gender, household size, education category, rural dummy,
and province dummies. In parenthesis are robust and linearised standard errors for RIF and OLS. ***
Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.
Source: Own calculations from weighted PSLSD 1993, NIDS 2008, 2012 and 2014-2015.
of incomes across racial groups We therefore conclude that there has been a reduction
of economic distances across racial groups in post-Apartheid South Africa. Does this
convergence imply higher (lower) overlapping of income distributions (degree of strat-
ification) of the racial groups? Defining stratification as the extent to which the poorest
of one group descends into the richest of the group below it or vice-versa, we expect
to see lower or declining levels of stratification. Further, how have different income
components interacted to account for changes in income stratification? These ques-
tions lie at the heart of our next analytical exercise, which seeks to establish the degree
of income stratification and the impact of different income sources on the degree of
stratification.
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3.4 Empirical Strategies
This section begins with an overview of the approach for measuring the degree of
income stratification. We then explain the methodology for assessing the impact of
different income sources on stratification. Finally, in section 3.5, we move into the
discussion of the results on stratification.
3.4.1 Analysis of Gini (ANOGI)
This section explains the Analysis of Gini (ANOGI) approach we use to measure the
stratification of incomes. Following the presentation in Liberati (2015) and Monti and
Santoro (2011), let yi, si, Fi(y), fi(y), µi, pi represent the income, income share of
group i, cumulative distribution, the density function, the mean, and the share of group
i in the overall population, respectively. Stratification index, Qi - a measure of overlap
between members of group i and the rest of the population is defined formally as;
Qi =
covi [y,(Fi−Fui)]
covi [y,Fi]
(3.4.1)
where Qi is a ratio of two terms, such that on the numerator, we have the covariance
between the income of the individuals in group i and these individuals’ difference in
ranking in their own group and in the rest of the overall population. The denominator,
which can be treated here as a normalizing factor, is the covariance for individuals
in group i between the incomes and the rankings in their own group. Assume that
the population is composed of identity groups (for example by race and education
level) such that Fu(y) = ∑i piFi(y) (i.e cumulative distribution of the population is the
weighted average of distributions of the groups and the weights are the relative size of
the population in each group).
Yitzhaki (1994) combined the Lerman and Yitzhaki (1984)’s extended Gini coefficient
and the stratification index, Qi above to show that the decomposition of Gini coefficient
by population subgroup encompasses an indicator of stratification. Frick et al. (2006)
extended or rearranged the Yitzhaki (1994)’s decomposition in a manner analogous to
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), but performed with the Gini coefficient. They refer to
their approach as an Analysis of Gini (ANOGI).
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According to ANOGI the Gini coefficient of the entire population can be decomposed
as follows:
Gu =
n
∑
i=1
siGiOi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gwo
+Gb
= ∑
i
siGi︸ ︷︷ ︸
IG
+∑
i
siGi (Oi−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
IGO
+Gbp+(Gp−Gbp)︸ ︷︷ ︸
BGO︸ ︷︷ ︸
BG
(3.4.2)
where Gb = 2cov(µi,F¯ui)/µu is the Gini coefficient of gross between-inequality or across
group inequality; Gbp = 2cov(µi,F¯i)/µu is the between-Gini coefficient of the Pyatt (1976)’s
decomposition; and Oi is the overlapping index of the distributio of identity/subgroup
group i with the overall national distribution (explained belo ).
The overlapping index measures the extent to which one group is overlapped by the
other or how much the distributions are intertwined. In other words, it tells us about
the degree of assimilation. It is described formally as;
Oi = Oui =
covi(y,Fu(y))
covi(y,Fi(y))
(3.4.3)
The numerator of Oi is the covariance between incomes in group i and their ranking in
the national distribution - Fu(y). The denominator is the covariance between the same
incomes and their ranking within each identity group. The denominator can be treated
as a normalizing factor.
This means that Oi = 1 if the incomes of a given group i have the same ranking as the
national income distribution. That is, group i has a range of income that coincides with
the range of income of the population or the two distributions perfectly overlap. More
generally, Oi < 1 when the scatter of the ranks of a given group is narrower than that
of the total population. Oi > 1 when the scatter of ranks of the individuals in a given
group i is larger than that of the total population, which suggests that the distribution
of income within the subgroup is much more polarized than in the overall distribution.
The implication is that the members of the subgroup constitute two strata, one that has
much higher incomes and the other that has much lower income than µu - the average
income of all individuals in all groups (Zacharias & Vakulabharanam, 2011). The
minimum value of Oi is given by the share of identity group i in the population and its
maximum value is equal to 2. When the index equals the minimum possible value, it
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suggests that the identity group in question is a perfect stratum, that is, it occupies an
exclusive segment of the overall income distribution. These properties of Oi make it
an insightful index of stratification.
The overlapping index can further be written as the weighted sum of overlapping of
group i with all other groups j as follows:
Oi = ∑
j
p jO ji = piO ji = pi+∑
j 6=i
p jO ji (3.4.4)
where
O ji =
covi(y,Fj(y))
covi(y,Fi(y))
(3.4.5)
and pi is the share of group i in the total population and O ji is the overlapping of group
j by group i - that is the degree by which members of group j are included in the range
of group i. It follows that O ji ≥ 0 if no member of the distribution j lies within the
range of distribution i. That is, if group j is a perfect stratum then O ji = 0. In this case,
Oi = pi, i.e. total overlapping is equal to the share of group i. However, if over the
range of distribution i, the shape of the distribution of group j is similar to the shape
of distribution i, then O ji = 1 and Oi = pi+∑ j 6=i p j = 1.
The extreme upper bound O ji occurs when all observations belonging to distribution j
are located in the range of group i and are concentrated around the mean of distribution
i, with no member of group i lying inside the range of group j. In this case, O ji ≤ 2,
which means it is bounded from above by 2. In general, the higher the overlapping
index O ji, the lower Oi j will be. That is, the more group j is included in the range
of distribution i, the less distribution i is expected to be included in the range of j.
Therefore, overlapping index (O ji) describes the extent to which different groups are
stratified.
Given these properties, it becomes clearer that IGO (see equation 3.4.2) provides either
a negative or a positive revision of intra-group variability (IG) for Oi < 1 and Oi > 1
respectively. This explains how overlapping may affect within-group components. The
BG component is the weighted covariance between the various group’s mean income
and their mean rank. BGO represents the loss of between-group inequality (BG) due
to overlapping. It is always non-positive and reaches the upper limit (zero) if the
ranges occupied by the different groups do not overlap. Thus, the higher the degree of
overlapping between subgroups the higher the IGO and the lower the BGO.
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To clarify this, consider the difference between Gb and Gbp. The decomposition of
Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991) defines Gb as the covariance between the mean income
of each group and the average rank of its members in the overall population -F¯ui(y).
Alternatively, Pyatt’s (1976) decomposition defines Gbp as the covariance between
mean income of each subgroup and the ranking of mean income in the distribution
of mean incomes - F¯i(y). Thus, the main difference between them is the way group
ranks are established. Therefore, when there is no overlapping between groups, the
two ranks are equal, and the two methods yield the same results. However, incomes
generally overlap which makes the correlation between the rank of mean incomes and
the mean rank of incomes less than 1.
3.4.2 Shift-Share Analysis
This section presents the shift-share micro-simulation method we use to examine the
association between income components and income stratification. The method is sim-
ilar to that employed by Larrimore (2014).
To assess the importance of each income type, each is added sequentially and the res-
ulting stratification (or overlapping) is compared to what would have occurred had the
specified source remained unchanged. Following the presentation in Fortin, Lemieux
and Firpo (2011b) and Larrimore (2014), consider a general income formation model
for individual/household i at time t to be expressed as yit = g{xit ,wu,eit}, where g(•)
is the unknown function of a set of individual or household characteristics or some
policy variables (e.g. taxes), x, a set of sampling weights, w, and some unobserv-
able characteristics or error term, e. The function g(•) is not constrained to be linear
nor parametric and can represent a single income-generating equation or a system of
income-generating functions.
In this paper, we assume g(•) to be a system of income-generating functions. We use a
rank-dependent transformation that was proposed by Burtless (1999), Daly and Valletta
(2006) and Larrimore (2014) to perform our counterfactual analysis. It does not involve
estimation of a regression model and does not consider g(•) as the income-generating
function but more simply as the function that aggregates different individual incomes
(such as labour earnings or government transfers) into total individual income and,
eventually, into household income. It incorporates the fact that the income distribution
within each sub-population group is changing as well. These changes can result from
any income source. Therefore, each individual’s income, ykit can be represented as the
sum of their incomes from each income source, f k1it through f
k
Nit :
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ykit = f
k
1it + f
k
2it + . . .+ f
k
Nit (3.4.6)
We assign individuals a percentile rank, p f ik, for each income source based on the
rank of their source-level income within their sub population group, k. To estimate the
impact that changes to the distribution of source f1 have on income stratification, each
individual’s income from the source f1 in year t is replaced with the income of the
individual at the same percentile rank of the source f1 income distribution in year tt .
ykitt (p f ik) = f
k
1itt (p f ik)+ f
k
2it + . . .+ f
k
Nit (3.4.7)
The counterfactual income vector is defined by using the inverse rank function such
that the lowest income at year t + 1 is replaced with the lo est at year t. the second
lowest with the second lowest and so on. This transformation preserves the con-
ditional income rank of each individual from source f1 and the rank correlation of
incomes from source f1 with other income sources while capturing changes in the
source-level income distribution of source f1 within each population group. As in any
micro-simulation analysis, a base year had to be chosen and 2008 was selected as our
base year.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 ANOGI results
In this section, we present results from the subgroup decomposition of the Gini coeffi-
cient in order to find evidence suggestive of stratification. Tables 3.5.1 and 3.5.3 report
the outcomes of the ANOGI by race. Specifically, Table 3.5.1 provides information on
the extent of economic integration of racial groups. Columns headlined “Overlapping
(Oi)” give evidence on the extent of income stratification. Note that if Oi = pi, then
racial group i forms a perfect stratum whereas a value of 1 indicates that the income
distribution of that racial group mimics the national income distribution, and Oi > 1
signals two strata (one poor and the other rich) in the income distribution of group i.
Column siGi gives the size of intra-group component while siGi(Oi−1) identifies the
revision of the contribution of each subgroup to intra-group variability.
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In Table 3.5.1 the overlapping coefficient for Blacks is close to 1 in 1993 and from 2008
to 2014, it is greater than 1.This means in 1993, there is a a high degree of synonymy
between the income distribution of Blacks and the national distribution. Put differently,
the income of Blacks form less of a stratum (or have a high degree of overlapping with)
in the national income distribution. Given the larger population share of Black people
(at least 75%), this is to be expected. Interestingly, during the same period, the degree
of overlapping of income of Whites is 0.29. This means that Whites form a stratum
in the national income distribution. The overlapping of Coloureds is 0.70, meaning
their income distribution is less stratified or overlaps more with the national income
distribution.
The growth in the score of overlapping index for Blacks between 2008 and 2014 means
an increase in the degree of heterogeneity of this racial group with respect to the overall
population. That is, the income distribution of Blacks is characterized by the presence
of extreme observations, some richer and some poorer than the rest of the country. The
overlapping of incomes of Coloureds increases to above 0.80 during the same period.
This could be evidence of an increase in the economic assimilation of this racial group.
Incomes of Whites, on the other hand, overlap the least with the national distribution,
which indicates greater stratification of the income of Whites. The score of overlap
indices for Whites is smaller in 2012 than in 2008 and 2014-2015. This is an increase
in stratification, which means the inc mes of Whites increased much faster than those
of other race groups between 2008 and 2012 (see section 3.3.3).
Adjusting the scores of the overlapping indices by Oi−pi/2−pi to account for the pop-
ulation share of each group the following is apparent. Incomes of Whites still have
the lowest amount of overlapping, suggesting near- perfect stratification. The incomes
of the Coloured group have generally the most notable degree of overlapping. Non-
etheless, even after controlling for population shares, the overlap indices still suggest
higher levels of stratification in 1993 than in 2008 and 2014-2015. There is, however,
evidence of higher stratification of incomes in 2012.
This evidence supports the claims of the failure of de-racialisation policies enacted
at the dawn of democracy in 1994. The de-racialisation policies were expected to
increase employment and equalise incomes, thereby resulting in the greater degree
of economic assimilation of previously disadvantaged individuals. Although we find
evidence of declining income stratification of Whites, they still overlap less. This
higher stratification of income of Whites casts further doubt on the success of the
government’s de-racialisation policies. Seekings and Nattrass (2008) argue that these
policies only managed to change the racial composition at the top end of the income
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distribution.
The results, in general, are not surprising because Liberati (2015) finds that the overlap
index of South Africa with respect to the world is always and increasingly above 1.
A note worthy finding that emerges from the above discussion of values scores of
overlapping indices is that the education convergence levels observed are translated
into less stratification of income among the races. The divergent of income levels
in the 2008-2012 period, however, led to more income stratification among the races
during the same period.
To further illustrate the extent of income stratification in the country, Table 3.5.2
presents information on the income differences among races. In particular, panel A
shows the decomposition of the overlap index to reflect pair-wise indices of overlap-
ping among the groups (see equation 3.4.5). Each term of the overlap matrix (O ji)
reports the extent to which the distribution of group j (row) is included in the refer-
ence distribution of group i (column). Thus, O ji is the overlapping of the distribution
of group i by that the distribution of group j. It is worth noting that the matrix is not
symmetric, rows represent the group whose distribution is used as the base distribu-
tion.
For instance, the overlapping of incomes of Blacks by that of Whites is 0.16 in 1993,
increasing to 0.24 in 2008, then declining to 0.22 in 2012, and rising to 0.33 in 2014-
2015.This means the share of White population intersecting the range of income dis-
tribution of Blacks increases between 1993 and 2008, declines in 2012 and rises in
2014-2015. Another way to conceptualise the overlapping of Blacks incomes by that
of Whites is to interpret it as the extent to which the incomes of the poorest of Whites
descends into the income of the richest of Blacks. In this case, between 1993 to 2008,
the incomes of more Whites have descended into the Blacks income distribution. This
indicates similarities between the income distribution of Blacks and Whites between
1993 and 2008. However, from 2008 to 2012 less Whites descended into the range of
income of Blacks, which supports the wider income distances highlighted under the
income convergence discussion. For the entire post-apartheid period, however, more
Whites have intersected the range of income of Blacks, which suggest some degree of
homogeneity between the income distributions of Blacks and White.
The extent to which the income distribution of the Black group is incorporated into the
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income distribution of the White group increases from 0.455 in 1993 to 0.864 in 2008,
declines to 0.812 in 2012, and rises to 0.969 in 2014-2015. This is further evidence
of greater homogeneity in the income distribution of the two groups. A possible ex-
planation for the growth in the degree of similarity between the shapes of the income
distributions of these two racial groups is the expansion of government transfers. This
result ties with the income per capita convergence results between Blacks and Whites.
The oddity of less overlapping (or higher stratification) in 2012 is still observed. Par-
ticularly interesting is the overlapping of the income distribution of Coloureds by that
of Blacks. That is, the extent to which the distribution of Blacks is included in that
of Coloureds is greater than unity for all sample points, that is O ji > 1. Actually, the
score of the overlap index between Blacks and Coloureds increases from 1.118 in 1993
to 1.178 in 2014. This suggests that the income distribution of the base group, Blacks,
forms two strata, one poorer and one richer, in the income distribution of the Coloured
group. This distributional characteristic has not changed in the past 21 years.
The extent to which the income distribution of Whites is included in the income dis-
tribution of Coloureds ranges from 0.33 in 1993 to 0.48 in 2014-2015. This shows a
slight increment in the convergence of incomes of Coloureds to that of Whites. The
overlapping of Whites’ income distribution by that of Coloureds increases by a value
equivalent to 17% from 1993 to 2008, then by 7.7% and by 3.9% in 2012 and 2014-
2015. Put differently, the extent to which Coloureds are included in the incomes of
Whites increased from 0.78 in 1993 to 1.021 in 2014-2015. This means that Coloureds
form two income groups in the distribution of Whites.
All in all, we find that the overlap of the income distribution of each racial group by
the income distribution of the White group is lower than the overlapping of the income
distribution of Whites by those of other groups. This affirms that Whites still have
higher incomes, and consequently, a low share of the income distributions of other
racial groups is likely to be found in the upper half of the Whites’ income distribution.
This supports our view that not all racial groups undergo the same integration process,
nor are they uniformly integrated. We therefore conclude that the government’s de-
racialisation policies have not significantly reduced the imbalances of Apartheid.
Another way of looking at the evolution of the distances between incomes is by looking
at mean ranks. The mean ranks give information on the average position of individuals
in each racial group calculated on the basis of the national income distribution. From
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table 3.5.1 the average rank of a Black individual in 1993 is located at the 41.1st per-
centile of the national distribution, and the rank of that individual rises to 43.8th, 44.2th
and 45.1th percentiles in 2008, 2012 and 2014-2015. Individuals in other racial groups
have an average position that is always above the 50th percentile. Interestingly, their
mean ranks drop between 1993 and 2008, and rise again, though slightly in 2012 and
2014. For example, a Coloured and White individual in 1993 are positioned at the
61.9th and 88.6th percentiles, but in 2008, their positions decline to 57.1th and 86.7th
percentiles, respectively. Only the average ranks of Blacks increases monotonically
over the period. This confirms the earlier finding that the income distance between
the average positions of the different racial groups narrows from 1993 to 2008. How-
ever, in 2012 the income distances either increases or shows no significant change
from 2008. In order words, stratification of the distribution according to race ought to
decline between 1993 and 2008. In other words, the degree of economic integration
should be higher in 2008. The increase in economic assimilation continues in 2012
and 2014-2015. The degree of assimilation is, however, different across racial group
due to differing average percentile ranks.
Panel B of table 3.5.2 presents the average ranking of groups. An average rank greater
than 0.5 means individuals in race group j (rows) have, on average, higher rank in
the income distribution of race group i (columns) than in their own distribution. They
form a richer group relative to the other race groups. As expected, White individuals
have this characteristic in all sample periods, compared to other racial groups. Whites’
income distribution on average rank around the 93rd and 88th percentile of the income
distributions of Blacks and Coloureds, respectively. Since the sum of average rank of
group j in the distribution of group i and average rank of group i in the distribution
of group j is unity (i.e., Fji +Fi j = 1), this means that the average ranks of the other
groups are at their lowest levels when they are placed beside the distribution of Whites.
Quite strikingly, the situation appears to have worsened from 2008 to 2012.
Finally, we look at the association between overlapping and inequality. Table 3.5.3
gives the data on between-race inequality, within-race inequality and the impact of
overlapping on both. The standard within-group inequality (Gwo) increases from 1993
to 2008, declines slightly in 2012, before increasing again in 2014. That is, the within
race Gini increases by 0.14 points, or 47.8% between 1993 and 2008, and by an-
other 9.8% in 2014-2015. This shows that racial income distributions are becoming
internally heterogeneous. Given that within-group inequality and income stratification
are inversely related, these results confirm a reduction in income stratification by race
between 1993 and 2008. The contribution of between-race inequality decreases by
45% between 1993 and 2014, another indication that the race groups are becoming
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externally homogeneous. The Pyatt (1976)’s between-Gini (Gbp), where each race is
represented by mean income and its rank (instead of mean ranks of the members), gives
a clear picture of declining income differences between races from 1993 to 2014.
Table 3.5.3: Within-group and Between-group inequality, 1993, 2008, 2012, and 2014-2015
ANOGI components 1993 2008 2012 2014
Within-group Gini (Gwo) 0.2852 0.4218 0.4095 0.4633
Between-group Gini (Gb) 0.3898 0.2867 0.2558 0.2119
Within-inequality without Overlapping (IG) 0.4779 0.5827 0.5549 0.6108
Impact of Overlapping on within-inequality (IGO) -0.1928 -0.1608 -0.1454 -0.1475
Pyatt (1976) Between-group Gini (Gbp) 0.4571 0.3792 0.3338 0.3165
Difference (Gb−Gbp) BGO -0.0674 -0.0925 -0.0780 -0.1045
Notes: All rows correspond to the components of equation 3.4.2
Source: Own calculations from weighted PSLSD 1993, NIDS 2008, 2012 and 2014
We further decompose the standard within-group inequality to isolate within-group
inequality without overlapping (IG) and the impact of income overlapping (IGO). We
observe a decline, in absolute terms, in IGO (of almost 16.6%) between 1993 and
2008, another 8.3% decline in 2014-2015. If IGO is equal to zero, it implies that
the income distribution of each race group perfectly overlaps with that of the entire
population. Thus, the decline signifies an increase in the degree of overlapping of
income distribution across race groups. The effect of overlapping on the between-
group component (BGO) increases between 1993 and 2008 before it falls in 2012,
and rises again 2014-2015. That is, the loss of the between-race component due to
overlapping of incomes is 6.7 Gini points in 1993, and 9.3, 7.8 and 10.5 Gini points
in 2008, 2012, and 2014-2015. Given that a BGO of zero indicates that the groups
are perfectly stratified, this attests to the income stratification decline between 1993
and 2008, and the slight increase in 2012. Overall, between-group inequality shows
evidence of cohesive tendencies towards equality of incomes across race.
We supplement the results from Table 3.5.3 by considering them in conjunction with
the size of intra-group component (sG in able 3.5.1) and the contribution of each race
group to intra-group variability (sG(O− 1)). From sG we note that in 1993, 2008,
2012 and 2014-2015, Blacks are responsible for 19.11, 28.3, 29.5 and 31 Gini points
of inequality, which translates to 40%, 49%, 53% and 51% of intra-group inequality.
Whites are responsible for 46%, 35%, 31% and 35% of intra-group inequality and
Coloureds’ share of intra-group inequality is 8.7%, 8.6%, 8.6% and 7.5% during the
same period. The largest contribution to intra-group variability comes from Blacks
and the lowest from Coloureds. These findings, together with the negative slope of
percentile differences between Blacks and Whites (seen in panel (d) of figure 3.3.1),
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affirms that Blacks have higher income inequality than Whites. These findings support
those observed by Leibbrandt et al. (2012).
Columns sG(O− 1) identifies the revision of the contribution of each race to intra-
group variability determined by the overlapping component. Here we notice a system-
atic negative revision for all races in all the years except for Blacks in 2008, 2012,
and 2014-2015. This means that the scatter of ranks for Blacks in these years is larger
than the scatter of ranks of individuals in the national income distribution. This result
suggests an emergence of rich strata among Blacks, which may lead to higher cluster-
ing of incomes the Black group. This distributional characteristic is not surprising and
gives a partial explanation for why Gini coefficients are greater for Blacks. The larger
revision of the contribution White individuals to intra-group variability means that this
race forms a stratum in the national distribution, or overlaps less with the country’s
overall distribution.
3.5.1.1 Education level strata as the defining stratum
To supplement our analyses, we look at the extent to which these distributional patterns
suggest the emergence of new strata replacing race as a defining stratum. We follow
Heller and Yitzhaki (2006) who deal with the quality classification of snails into groups
according to observable characteristics like the shells, and Frick and Goebel (2008)
who decomposes well-being in Germany based on region.
For this purpose, we use years of schooling or education attainment to examine whether
a grouping by race or education attainment is more stratified. We chose to use educa-
tion because of its positive impact on probability of finding a job and earning more,
which in turn helps people to integrate into the economy and society. While there are
multiple ways that education attainment could be measured, we rely on the education
attainment of the household head for two reasons. First, the decision to register into
formal schooling is generally made by the head of the household. Second, the head of
the household is usually a role model for younger members of the household. Thus,
household heads with more years of schooling are likely to invest in human capital and
encourage other members to invest in education. To categorise the education attain-
ment of households heads, we group all household heads with no formal schooling up
to seven years of schooling together. We label this group the Unskilled. The second
group includes household heads with between seven and 12 years of schooling. We
refer to them as Semi-Skilled. The third and last group includes those households
heads with more than 12 years of schooling and we refer to them as Skilled.
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Race is a better classifier of a society if inequality within races is lower than inequality
within education groups, and the overlapping between races is lower than the over-
lapping between education groups. Thus, a grouping is better if it is based on low
intra-group inequality and minimal overlapping of income distributions, that is, high
between-group inequality. To assess this, we decompose the Gini coefficient by edu-
cation level group and compare the results with those from the racial decomposition.
Table 3.5.4 presents the ANOGI outcomes by these groups of education.
A number of features of the income profiles of the three education groups, shown in fig-
ure 3.5.1, deserve a comment. First, the income distribution of individuals living with
an unskilled household head is to the left in the four sample years. This reflects that
they have, on average, low incomes, compared to individuals living with a household
head who is semi-skilled or skilled. A possible explanation for this is that educated or
skilled household heads are more likely to encourage other household members to im-
prove their education, and they possibly serve as role models of education attainment
for other members. A simple average of adult years of schooling across the skill cat-
egories reveals that individuals who live in households with less educated or unskilled
households heads have fewer years of schooling. However, this gap has been reduced
over the years. The convergence in education attainment across race groups appears to
have resulted to income distributions across the skills groups becoming closer in 2012
and 2014-2015.
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Figure 3.5.1: Overlaid densities for Household head education groups
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capita for for individuals grouped by the level of education of household head.
Source: Weighted PLSLD 1993, NIDS 2008, 2012, and 2014-2015.
We now investigate the ANOGI outcomes, shown in table 3.5.4, for evidence of strat-
ification based on education groups. Starting with the data in the columns labelled
overlapping (Oi), it is clear that the income distribution of individuals in households
with unskilled household head tends to be bi-polarised. That is, the scores of the over-
lapping indices are always above unity, which indicates the existence of two income
groups. Incomes of individuals in households with a skilled household head are more
stratified, as there is a very little overlap with the income distributions of other groups.
The overlapping of incomes for individuals who live with a skilled household head
more than doubles between 1993 to 2008, and then declines sharply by 2012. This
remarkable turn-around in the degree of stratification in 2012 is consistent with other
previous findings in the paper. The mean ranks in the columns labelled F¯ui(y) indicate
that the average position of individuals living with unskilled heads remains somewhat
constant across the four survey years. However, for individuals living in households
headed by either a semi-skilled or a skilled individual, the average percentile ranks
decrease by 12.1% and 7.6%, between 1993 and 2008. In other words, the results con-
firm the narrowing of income distances across these groups. To sum up, we see that
the incomes of individuals in households with more educated (or skilled) household
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head are more stratified (overlap less with the national income distribution), whereas
incomes of those in households with less skilled household heads are less stratified.
Next, we examine which grouping between race and education level has the least in-
come overlap (the highest stratification). We argue here that, if education is an emer-
ging stratum replacing race, then the stratification of incomes of those grouped by
education levels should approach that of race groups with the possibility of overtak-
ing in the future. Comparing tables 3.5.4 and 3.5.3, we see that both the intra-group
inequality and overlapping among racial groups are lower than their counterparts in
the years of schooling groupings. This situation is true for both 1993 and 2008 years.
Therefore, we conclude that racial grouping is the best income grouping in these years
since it has the highest stratification and between-group inequality. However, intra-
group income variability and overlapping coefficients by education groups are similar
in 2008. This is unmistakably a key element in support of education emerging as the
defining stratum. The picture becomes clearer when we examine data for in 2012,
where those grouped by years of schooling had the lowest intra-group inequality.
A conclusion that emerges from the measurement and analysis of stratification above
is that, even though income stratification, especially for Whites, falls between 1993
and 2014, it is still evident. This indicates the slow pace at which we are overcoming
the economic legacy of Apartheid. Given that ANOGI provides unconditional conver-
gence of income across the racial groups, the following emerges. The conditional (i.e.,
the RIF regressions) and unconditional convergence results allude to greater income
gaps between the Blacks and Whites. A portion of these income gaps can be explained
by occupational segregation (Naidoo, Stanwix & Yu, 2014). That is, Blacks are over-
represented at low and median skill jobs, while whites hold higher paying jobs. The
higher convergence at the top of the income distribution is portrayed by the decrease
in stratification of the income distribution of Whites. Moreover, race still emerges as
a better classifier of South African society. The evidence also hints at education as a
stratum which could replace race.
Having established this patterns of stratification, we move to examine how different
income sources interact to impact the degree of income stratification in the population.
Before undertaking the analysis, we first check the robustness of the above results.
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3.5.2 Robustness of results
In this section, we examine the sensitivity of our income stratification results to mem-
bership of identity groups. The accuracy of the results may stem from the argument of
Elbers, Lanjouw, Mistiaen and Özler (2008) that between-group inequality is a func-
tion of a groups’ mean income, number, and size of the groups. Thus, the high degree
of income overlap for the Blacks may be due to their large population share. Disag-
gregating Blacks into smaller groups may therefore tend to raise (reduce) their degree
of stratification (overlapping). Though we have partially addressed this issue by ad-
justing the overlap indices for group size, here we disaggregate the Black group into
seven smaller groups, based on ethno-linguistic identity9. This gives a total of 11 iden-
tity groups which we use in the ANOGI analysis. The aim is to investigate whether the
increase in the number of groups might significantly affect the results.
The tables in Appendix 3.7.3 report the outcomes of the ANOGI decomposition by
ethno-linguistic identities. Tables 3.7.1 and 3.7.2 clearly show that the incomes of
Whites still have the least amount of overlapping with the incomes of the rest of the
population, compared to other groups. Across Black identities, all levels of overlap-
ping are considerably large, and close to one. From tables 3.7.3 and 3.7.4 where the
richest group - Whites - is used as the baseline, the other groups form an almost per-
fect stratum with respect to the income distribution of Whites. However, when the low
income groups are used as a baseline, the overlapping indices are, as expected, higher.
These differences suggest that there are more (poor) White individuals in the range of
the Black group’s distribution, than there are Blacks in the income distribution range
of Whites.
Tables 3.7.5 and 3.7.6 confirm these results by showing that the average rank of Whites
would be at the 90th percentile in the distribution of the Black identities. None of the
Black identity groups would be above the 10th percentile of the White income distri-
bution. Looking across the years, similar patterns are observed, with more overlapping
of incomes in 2008 than in 1993, and less overlapping in 2012 and 2014-2015 than
in 2008. At this stage, we can conclude that the stratification results are robust to the
number of groups in the decomposition of the Gini coefficient.
9The linguistic identity is derived from the question regarding the most spoken language in the house-
hold. Respondents are asked to choose any of the 11 official languages in the country. The Ndebele-
Swati, Venda-Tsonga and Indian identities have small population shares in the sample which may
result in biased findings. Their results are presented for sake of completeness. It worth noting that
we could have used the 11 linguistic identities instead of only languages of African origin. The
problem with this approach however is that it groups Whites, Coloureds and Indians into Afrikaans
and English identity groups.
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3.5.3 Shift-Share results
As pointed out, the above findings leave unexplained the factors behind the changing
patterns of stratification. For instance, they fail to explain the impact of different in-
come sources on the degree of overlapping of income across groups. In this section, we
detail our analysis to measure the effects of income components on the stratification of
incomes. We use the microsimulation approach outlined in section 3.4.2.
Table 3.5.5 presents the simulated effects of the four income sources on between-group
inequality, within-group inequality and the impact of income overlap on both. The
table shows what happens to these ANOGI components when the headlined income
source changes to its 1993 distributions, while all other income components remain
at their 2008 levels. The simulated effects are reported as percentage changes from
2008 - the base year. A negative value, in this case, suggests that the component in
question falls, and positive values indicate an increase from the base year. Before
discussing the results, two observations must be pointed out. First, the simulations are
path dependent, that is, the effects depend on the order in which the incomes are added.
Second, the simulated effects are unconditional on group characteristics.
The table clearly shows that the simulated effects of changing labour earnings, cap-
ital dividends and remittances to their 1993 levels are generally negative, whereas the
effects of state transfers are positive. This implies that South Africa’s income distri-
bution would be less unequal (that is, have a lower Gu, Gw, Gb), and more stratified
(have a higher BGO and a lower IGO) than the one observed in 2008 if labour income
had stayed at its 1993 distribution. For example, looking at labour income effects
in column 1 labelled “Labour” of table 3.5.5, we see that national income inequality
(Gu) falls by 0.0508, an amount equivalent to 7.2%, standard within-race inequality
(Gwo) by 6.2% and between-race inequality (Gb) by 8.7%. The revision of intra-group
variability due to overlapping (IGO) falls by 10.5%, while the loss of between-group
inequality due to overlapping rises by 3%.
Similarly, there is a drop in the overall Gini and between-group Gini when both capital
income (shown in column 4) and remittances (shown in column 3) assume their 1993
distributions. The within-group inequality, however, rises in both scenarios. The fall
of both Gu and Gb suggests an increase in external heterogeneity while the rise inGw
means an increase in internal homogeneity across race. Taken together with the fall of
IGO and the rise BGO, this suggests a decrease in the degree of stratification. Data in
column 2 labelled “Government” shows that all ANOGI components rise by an amount
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no less than 6%. This suggests that income distribution would have been more unequal
(with a higher Gu, Gw, Gb) had government transfers assumed their 1993 state. The
extent of stratification would however be indeterminate. This is because IGO and BGO
move in the same direction, which could mean either a fall or a rise in the degree of
stratification.
Table 3.5.5: Simulated Within and Between inequalities
ANOGI components
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Labour Government Remittances Capital
Gu -7.21 6.66 -1.17 -0.55
Gwo -6.16 6.55 0.65 2.12
Gb -8.74 6.81 -3.88 -4.69
IG -7.33 6.44 -0.57 0.56
IGO -10.50 6.15 -4.04 -4.11
Gbp -5.93 6.81 -2.58 -2.86
Gb−Gbp = BGO 2.96 6.80 1.06 2.03
Notes: The values are percentage changes from the base year, 2008 if the headed income component
remains unchanged at its 1993 level. The simulations are done sequentially meaning the government
transfers simulated affects are conditional on labour income changes, and remittances effects are con-
ditional on government transfers and labour income changes. A reverse order simulation barely alters
the percentage changes of each income component. A negative value suggests that the component in
question would have fallen, and a positive value signals an increase.
Source: Own calculations from weighted PSLSD 1993, NIDS 2008, 2012 and 2014-2015
Repeating the simulations with 1993 as the base year corroborates the above findings.
That is, holding all other incomes constant at their 1993 levels while changing labour
income to its 2008 distribution, Gini coefficient increases to 0.7288. This is equivalent
to an 8.4% increment in inequality. However, when government transfers are at their
2008 levels, the overall Gini would have fallen by an amount of no less than 3%.
The results from the labour income simulations appear to accord with evidence from
earlier studies (Leibbrandt et al., 2012; Schiel et al., 2016), showing the strong positive
effects of the labour market on inequality. Several hypotheses have been proffered to
explain the labour market effects of inequality. One of these is the Job Polarization
hypothesis. Job polarization results from high demand for unskilled and highly-skilled
workers, thereby leading to the disappearance of mid-level occupations. The results
relating to the influence of capital and remittances are also consistent with those of
Leibbrandt et al. (2012). But unlike their finding, in the current context, these incomes
appear to widen between-group inequality and to reduce within-group inequality. We
further find a strong negative effect of government transfers on inequality. This finding
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seems to repudiate the research results of Leibbrandt et al. (2012) who find practically
no impact of state grants on inequality.
There is a lack of studies measuring the extent of stratification and those investigating
the effect of different income sources on the degree of stratification. This knowledge
gap limits comparison of our research results with other findings. Nevertheless, the
literature theorises an inverse relationship between stratification and inequality (Allan-
son, 2014; Monti & Santoro, 2011). Using these studies as the basis, the above results
give a first indication of the stratifying role of labour earnings, capital dividends, and
remittances. Though the effect of government transfers on income stratification is in-
determinate, they tend to move their recipients from lower income deciles into middle
quantiles (Leibbrandt et al., 2012). This would increase the degree of overlapping of
these groups’ income distributions.
The above deductions on stratification are consistent with expectations. For instance,
if an income source k moves group i members from lower income deciles into middle-
income quantiles, and leads to no significant movement of recipients in group j, then
income source k should curtail stratification. These movements and the resultant ef-
fects on stratification are due , in part, to the differential impact of each income source
across identity groups. Based on this assumption, we move to analyse how each in-
come source affects the income distribution of different racial groups.
Table 3.5.6 presents detailed simulated effects of the four income sources on the extent
of income overlapping in the groups. Each table shows the effects of a change in the
income source to its 1993 distribution while holding all other incomes at their 2008
levels. The values represent a percentage change from the base year, 2008. A neg-
ative value suggests the component in question would have decreased, and a positive
value signals an increase. Panel A in the tables provides general information on the
racial groups, while panels B and C provide changes in an overlapping matrix and rank
matrix.
Looking closely at Panel A of Table 3.5.6a titled “Labour income simulations”, the
following is evident. Even though average income per capita (µi) falls for all racial
groups, only the income share (si) for Whites in total income falls. One explanation
for the rise in the income share of Blacks and Coloureds is that between 1993 and
2008, Whites increased their labour market earnings more than other racial groups.
This may have occurred for two reasons. First, during the Apartheid regime most
positions of power were reserved for Whites, and non-Whites were confined to lower
paying occupations. This is thus a lingering footprint of Apartheid. Secondly, the
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probability of attaining tertiary education for Whites is almost double that for Blacks
and Coloureds. This is shown in Table 3.3.2.
The column labelled Oi shows that the overlapping of the income distribution of Whites
with the national distribution increases by an amount equivalent to 8.3%. This means
incomes of Whites are less stratified. Therefore, the labour income changes between
1993 and 2008 lead to Whites’ incomes being more stratified in 2008. The overlap-
ping of the income distribution of Blacks and that of Coloureds fall by 2.2% and 0.3%.
This shows that the incomes of Blacks and that of Coloureds would, however, be more
stratified if labour income had its 1993 distribution. More specifically, the labour in-
come changes that occurred increased the degree of economic assimilation of Blacks
and Coloureds.
The average percentile ranks in the column labelled Fui show a 0.09% rise to the 44th
percentile for mean ranks of incomes of Blacks in the national distribution. The av-
erage percentile ranks of Coloureds in the national distribution rise by 0.64% to the
57th percentile. The average position of the incomes of Whites, on the other hand, falls
by 0.39% to the 87th percentile. Even if this change is small, this means that labour
income changes tend to widen the distance between the incomes of the races.
The overlapping of income distributions across racial groups (shown in Panel B of table
3.5.6a) shows that the labour income changes between 1993 and 2008 reduced the of
stratification of the incomes of Whites relative to those of Blacks and Coloureds. That
is, the extent to which the incomes of Whites are included in the income distribution
of Blacks and in that of Coloureds falls by 13.4% and 6.8%. This is evidence in favour
of labour incomes creating a stratified society. A comparison between Blacks and Col-
oureds shows a rise (of 2.4%) in the extent to which the income distribution of Blacks
is included in the Coloureds’ income distribution. This suggests that labour income
changes have increased the similarity between the income distributions of Coloureds
and Blacks.
Panel C presents changes in the percentile ranks of incomes of one race group (row) in
the income distributions of another race group (column). The average percentile rank
of incomes of Whites in the Black distribution would have increased by an amount
equivalent to 0.48% to the 91st percentile. In the Coloureds income distribution, the
mean rank of Whites incomes would have grown by 0.16% to the 86th percentile. The
implication therefore is that, between 1993 and 2008, the labour incomes of Whites
have grown faster than those of Blacks and Coloureds, thereby creating layers in the
income distribution. The average ranks of incomes of Blacks and that of Coloureds
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in the income distribution of Whites would have fallen by 5.6% and 1.05% . That is,
they would rank around the 8thand 14th percentile. Therefore, despite the convergence
in income, Whites still form a relatively wealthier group within other racial groups’
income distributions.
Taken together, the evidence presented in Table 3.5.6a is consistent with the findings
of other studies using labour income simulations to investigate inequality (Schiel et
al., 2016). That is, labour income changes between 1993 and 2008 had a disequalizing
effect. Our research finds further evidence of the stratifying role of labour incomes.
This evidence is consistent with expectations.
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Table 3.5.6: Shift Share analysis of Income Stratification, 1993 vs 2008
(a) Labour income simulations
Panel A Panel B. Overlapping matrix
µi si Gi Oi Fui siGi siGi(Oi−1) Black/ Coloured Indian White
Black/African -7.06 4 -11.27 -2.15 0.09 -7.72 463 Black/Africa 0 2.38 12.32 19.41
Coloured -0.95 10.84 -4.76 -0.29 0.64 5.57 7.13 Coloured 0.88 0 -1.38 -3.22
Indian/Asian -5.34 5.93 1.64 4.6 -1.69 7.66 -1.1 Indian/Asian -6.78 -1.08 0 -0.09
White -17.47 -7.66 -6.27 8.3 -0.39 -13.45 -17.18 White -13.36 -6.77 -3.00 0
Total -10.63 -7.21 -7.33 -10.5 Panel C. Ranks matrix
Black/Africa 0 1.18 -6.93 -5.64
Coloured -0.66 0 -2.64 -1.03
Indian/Asian 1.78 1.13 0 1.83
White 0.48 0.16 -0.84 0
(b) Government Transfers simulations
Panel A Panel B. Overlapping matrix
µi si Gi Oi Fui siGi siGi(Oi−1) Black/ Coloured Indian White
Black/African -9.8 -4.85 12.15 0.12 -0.1 6.71 1.91 Black/Africa 0 -0.97 -1.04 0.15
Coloured -4.49 0.76 6.08 -1.31 0.64 6.89 13.9 Coloured 1.67 0 0.33 0.50
Indian/Asian -0.89 4.56 1.64 -0.88 0.28 6.28 8.16 Indian/Asian 1.37 -0.76 0 0.21
White -0.61 4.85 1.03 0.75 -0.04 5.94 5.47 White -0.95 -1.65 -0.39 0
Total -5.21 6.66 6.44 6.15 Panel C. Ranks matrix
Black/Africa 0 1.26 1.21 -0.33
Coloured -0.69 0 -0.59 -1.04
Indian/Asian -0.34 0.26 0 -0.29
White 0.03 0.16 0.13 0
(c) Remittances simulations
Panel A Panel B. Overlapping matrix
µi si Gi Oi Fui siGi siGi(Oi−1) Black/ Coloured Indian White
Black/African -0.82 1.83 -1.39 0.12 0.02 0.41 -4.53 Black/Africa 0 0.19 1.17 -2.58
Coloured 0.29 2.96 -0.53 -0.15 0.54 2.42 3.11 Coloured 0.51 0 0.60 -2.39
Indian/Asian -0.53 2.13 0.55 1.49 -0.39 2.69 -0.31 Indian/Asian -1.91 -1.50 0 -0.26
White -5.69 -3.18 -0.81 2.21 -0.34 -3.96 -5.22 White -2.98 -3.88 -1.29 0
Total -2.6 -1.17 -0.57 -4.04 Panel C. Ranks matrix
Black/Africa 0 0.86 -1.88 -3.19
Coloured -0.46 0 -1.68 -4.85
Indian/Asian 0.52 0.75 0 -2.79
White 0.29 0.77 1.24 0
(d) Capital income simulations
Panel A Panel B. Overlapping matrix
µi si Gi Oi Fui siGi siGi(Oi−1) Black/ Coloured Indian White
Black/African -0.92 2.19 0 0.32 0.21 2.19 2.19 Black/Africa 0 -0.04 -1.17 -4.24
Coloured -1.37 1.73 -0.24 0.08 0.79 1.48 1.83 Coloured -0.02 0 -0.64 -0.38
Indian/Asian -10 -7.18 -2.98 0.67 -0.37 -9.95 -4.92 Indian/Asian -1.75 -1.15 0 3.45
White -4.51 -1.51 2.33 6.16 -1.29 0.79 -1.15 White -8.41 -8.49 -6.29 0
Total -3.04 -0.55 0.56 -4.11 Panel C. Ranks matrix
Black/Africa 0 0.03 -0.52 -10.00
Coloured -0.02 0 -0.58 -9.35
Indian/Asian 0.15 0.27 0 -4.04
White 0.93 1.57 1.88 0
Notes: The values show percentage changes from the base year, 2008, when the income source changes
to its 1993 level, and all other income sources remain unchanged at their 2008 levels. A negative value
suggests that the components in question would have fallen, and a positive value signals an increase.
All the simulations are sequential, thus they may have the restrictive path dependence property.
Source: Own calculations from weighted PSLSD 1993, NIDS 2008, 2012 and 2014
We now turn to government transfer simulations, which are shown in Table 3.5.6b.
Similar to the labour earnings analysis, the average income falls for all races, though
Blacks instead of Whites record the largest magnitude. Income share (si) falls for
Blacks while it rises for Whites and Coloureds. The Gini coefficient for Blacks rises
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by an amount not less than 12%, meaning the changes in the government transfers
between 1993 and 2008 did lower inequality. As pointed out earlier, Blacks are the
major beneficiaries of post-Apartheid state transfers. It is not surprising that they have
worse income distribution when government transfers assume their 1993 levels. The
degree of income overlap (stratification) for Blacks rises (falls) by 0.12% to 0.98. This
means greater similarity between the income distribution of Blacks and the national
distribution. Similarly, the overlapping of the income distribution of Whites increases
(by 0.75%), meaning this distribution becomes less stratified. The overlapping of the
income distribution of Coloureds by 1.31%, reflecting an increase in the intersection
of the income distribution of Coloureds and the national distribution. Put differently,
the transvariazione of Coloureds increases due to an increase in social grants between
1993 and 2008.
The simulated overlapping matrix in Panel B of the same table (3.5.6b), shows that the
income range of Whites included in the income range of Blacks and that of Coloureds
falls by 0.95% and 1.7%. This is another indication that government grants heightened
the similarity between income distributions, and reduced the degree of income strati-
fication. It therefore follows that the income of Blacks and of Coloureds included in
the income range of Whites should increase. This is systematically true as overlapping
of incomes of Blacks and of Coloureds by those of Whites rises by 0.15% and 0.5%.
The simulated ranks matrix in Panel C shows a 1.26% rise to the 35th percentile, and a
0.33% fall to the 8th percentile for average ranks of Blacks in the income distributions
of Coloureds and Whites. The average ranks of incomes of Coloureds and those of
Whites within the income distribution of Blacks fall by 0.69% to the 65th percentile,
and rises by 0.03% to the 92nd percentile. The evidence presented in Table 3.5.6b
shows a tendency for government transfers to narrow income gaps across race groups,
and thereby attenuate income stratification and expand economic integration.
Table 3.5.6c shows the effects of adjusting remittances to 1993 levels, conditional on
labour income and government transfers. Similar, to the labour income simulations,
average income falls for all races except the Coloured group. And only the income
share of Whites falls as remittances take their 1993 distribution. Overlapping of the
income distributions of Whites, of Blacks, and of Coloureds by that of the overall
population rises by 2.2% to 0.38, by 0.12%, and by 0.15%, respectively. A direct im-
plication is that the reduction in remittances has a tendency to increase stratification.
This is clearly shown by the overlapping matrix in Panel B of the same table. Overlap-
ping of the income distribution of Whites by those of Blacks and those of Coloureds
falls by 2.9% and 3.9%. The role of remittances in enhancing income stratification is
further shown by the growth (of about 0.3% and 0.8%) in the mean rank of incomes of
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Whites incomes in the income distributions Blacks and Coloureds.
We complete our discussion with capital income simulations in table 3.5.6d. Panel
A shows that, as expected, Whites experience the largest fall in their mean income.
The income share of Blacks and of Coloureds rise by 2.2% and 1.7%, while that of
Whites falls by 1.5%. The income distribution of Whites turns out to be more unequal
(their Gini coefficient rises by 2.3%) while that for Blacks remains unchanged at 0.62.
These changes translate to lower degree of stratification of incomes of Whites. More
precisely, the overlapping of the income distribution of Whites with that of the general
populace increases by an astounding 6.2%. Pairwise comparison across the groups is,
however, indicative of income convergence across racial groups. That is, the extent to
which Whites’ income distribution is included in either the Blacks income distribution
or that of Coloureds declines by about 8%.
Considered in conjunction with the fall in the mean rank of Blacks and Coloureds
in the White distribution, and the rise of the mean rank of the incomes of Whites in
the Black and Coloured distribution, these results further confirm that capital income
increases the stratification of Whites’ incomes relative to other groups. This is not sur-
prising because changing capital income to its 1993 distribution means reverting to its
Apartheid-era level, where Whites owned most of the productive property. It is there-
fore worth noting that the simulated effects capture the effects of policies like Black
Economic Empowerment (BEE)10. Thus, they indicate assimilation of other races into
the economy.
3.6 Conclusion
High and persistent levels of economic inequality are one of the defining character-
istics of South Africa in the post-Apartheid era. These inequalities demonstrate a
larger within-race component and a smaller between-race component. A great deal
of research has been devoted to the measurement of income inequalities across racial
groups (Gradín, 2013; Leibbrandt et al., 2012; Leibbrandt & Levinsohn, 2014).
This study is an attempt to understand the extent of economic integration and its prox-
imate drivers. We show that underlying these increasing income inequalities, there
has been an overall increase in convergence in education attainment and household
income. Education attainment convergence is most evident at middle education levels
10For some details about BEE, see Krüger (2011, 2014)
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(i.e. high school followed by primary), and there is some degree of divergence with
tertiary education attainment. Income convergence is greater for situates in lower in-
come percentiles. We take this as evidence for different degrees of stratification across
racial groups.
Motivated by these convergent patterns, we perform an ANOGI decomposition to find
evidence of income stratification. From this, we find a large decrease in the stratifica-
tion of income distributions across racial groups from 1993 to 2008, a small increase
in 2012, and a decrease again in 2014-2015. More importantly, even though the strati-
fication of the incomes of Whites decreases, it is still large (that is, their income distri-
bution overlaps less with that of the overall population and those of other race groups).
This shows the rather slow pace of economic change since the end of Apartheid. We
also sought to investigate whether the observed changes in South Africa’s income dis-
tribution suggests the emergence of education as a new stratum replacing race as a
defining stratum in the economy. A key finding in this regard is that race is still a
better classifier of our society.
We next apply a rank preserving income exchange method developed by Burtless
(1999) and Larrimore (2014) to assess how unconditional changes in a range of in-
come sources (like labour income, and government transfers) account for changes in
household income distribution among race groups. The simulated effects of income
stratification suggest that increases in government transfers have a tendency to lower
income stratification of Blacks, whereas changes in labour income, remittances, and
capital income tend to increase stratification of incomes of White people. In sum-
mary, these results suggest some uplifting findings, that is, in the past two decades,
some Blacks and some Coloureds have sharply narrowed their historical income gaps
relative to the Whites.
More research is, however, needed to investigate other factors that could strengthen
(weaken) economic integration (stratification). For example, does the convergence in
education attainment of racial groups decrease or encourage income stratification? An-
other area of interest involves examining which type of capital income has the largest
effect on the income distribution in general.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Figures
Figure 3.7.1: Black and White income differentials
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Notes: This figure reports the marginal effects, and their respective 5% confidence bands, of the Blacks
dummy in the RIF regressions of log of income per capita in South Africa. In all regressions, White
is the reference category, meaning the values report log of household income per capita of a Black
individual relative to a similar White individual. The control variables include age, age squared, gender,
household size, education level, rural dummy, and province dummies.
Source: Own calculations from weighted PSLSD 1993, NIDS 2008, 2012 and NIDS 2014-2015
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Figure 3.7.2: Coloured and White income differentials
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(b) 2008
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(d) 2014
Notes: This figure reports the marginal effects, and their respective 5% confidence bands, of the Col-
oured dummy in the RIF regressions of log of income per capita in South Africa. In all regressions,
White is the reference category, meaning the values report log of household income per capita of a Col-
oured individual relative to a similar White individual. The control variables include age, age squared,
gender, household size, education level, rural dummy, and province dummies.
Source: Own calculations from weighted PSLSD 1993, NIDS 2008, 2012 and NIDS 2014-2015
3.7.2 Variables included in computing income sources
The five major components of total household monthly income are:
1. Labour market income includes earnings from main, secondary and part-time
work, self-employment, profits, bonuses and benefits, and cash allowances.
2. Capital income includes interest or dividends, rental or property earnings, private
pensions and annuities as well as royalties.
3. Remittances include value of food, clothing and housing received, alimony,
child maintenance and similar allowances and all other inter-household remit-
tances received.
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4. Government transfers include old age pensions, child grants (including foster
care and care dependency), disability grants, UIF income, as well as workman’s
compensation.
5. Other income includes all income not specified elsewhere.
3.7.3 Robustness tables
Table 3.7.1: ANOGI by ethnic group, 1993 and 2008
(a) 1993
pi µi si Gi Oi siGi siGi (Oi−1) F¯ui(y)
Ndebele & Swazi 0.037 814 0.021 0.527 0.861 0.011 -0.002 0.473
Xhosa 0.173 574 0.067 0.571 0.975 0.039 -0.001 0.368
Zulu 0.227 593 0.091 0.529 0.908 0.048 -0.004 0.397
Pedi 0.097 599 0.040 0.586 1.000 0.023 0.000 0.369
Sotho 0.078 755 0.040 0.538 0.898 0.021 -0.002 0.448
Tswana 0.091 910 0.056 0.504 0.819 0.028 -0.005 0.511
Venda &Tsonga 0.054 679 0.025 0.554 0.944 0.014 -0.001 0.413
Coloured 0.087 1435 0.084 0.499 0.701 0.042 -0.013 0.620
Indian 0.026 2773 0.048 0.469 0.499 0.023 -0.011 0.765
White 0.130 5952 0.527 0.425 0.294 0.224 -0.158 0.888
(b) 2008
pi µi si Gi Oi siGi siGi (Oi−1) F¯ui(y)
Ndebele & Swazi 0.037 992 0.020 0.622 0.961 0.013 0.000 0.452
Xhosa 0.170 816 0.077 0.614 1.002 0.048 0.000 0.409
Zulu 0.247 740 0.102 0.586 0.971 0.060 -0.002 0.403
Pedi 0.099 1198 0.066 0.677 1.028 0.045 0.001 0.447
Sotho 0.111 1241 0.077 0.635 0.977 0.049 -0.001 0.480
Tswana 0.073 1355 0.055 0.594 0.870 0.033 -0.004 0.535
Venda &Tsonga 0.042 1316 0.031 0.745 1.100 0.023 0.002 0.414
Coloured 0.095 1634 0.086 0.592 0.834 0.051 -0.008 0.574
Indian 0.027 4844 0.072 0.629 0.630 0.045 -0.017 0.735
White 0.099 7482 0.413 0.509 0.333 0.210 -0.140 0.868
Notes: ANOGI by ethnic group results.
Source: Own calculations from weighted PSLSD 1993, NIDS 2008, 2012 and 2014-2015
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Table 3.7.2: ANOGI by ethnic group, 2012 and 2014
(a) 2012
pi µi si Gi Oi siGi siGi (Oi−1) F¯ui(y)
Ndebele & Swazi 0.038 1047 0.019 0.511 0.913 0.010 -0.001 0.444
Xhosa 0.180 1055 0.092 0.602 1.051 0.055 0.003 0.392
Zulu 0.253 1137 0.139 0.578 0.987 0.081 -0.001 0.426
Pedi 0.108 1446 0.076 0.597 0.997 0.045 0.000 0.467
Sotho 0.098 1543 0.073 0.601 0.952 0.044 -0.002 0.488
Tswana 0.079 1664 0.064 0.572 0.921 0.036 -0.003 0.519
Venda &Tsonga 0.040 1413 0.027 0.658 1.069 0.018 0.001 0.421
Coloured 0.090 1975 0.086 0.565 0.827 0.048 -0.008 0.574
Indian 0.026 5274 0.066 0.599 0.537 0.039 -0.018 0.761
White 0.088 8373 0.358 0.487 0.309 0.175 -0.121 0.876
(b) 2014
pi µi si Gi Oi siGi siGi (Oi−1) F¯ui(y)
Ndebele & Swazi 0.038 1432 0.022 0.591 1.019 0.013 0.000 0.432
Xhosa 0.188 1323 0.102 0.597 1.057 0.061 0.003 0.407
Zulu 0.250 1316 0.135 0.570 1.004 0.077 0.000 0.424
Pedi 0.110 1953 0.088 0.599 1.000 0.053 0.000 0.496
Sotho 0.094 1777 0.068 0.542 0.899 0.037 -0.004 0.520
Tswana 0.082 2146 0.072 0.609 0.961 0.044 -0.002 0.518
Venda &Tsonga 0.043 1398 0.024 0.601 1.054 0.015 0.001 0.416
Coloured 0.090 2280 0.084 0.556 0.818 0.047 -0.009 0.579
Indian 0.024 6177 0.060 0.588 0.585 0.035 -0.015 0.757
White 0.083 10161 0.344 0.648 0.411 0.223 -0.131 0.824
Notes: ANOGI by ethnic group results.
Source: Own calculations from weighted PSLSD 1993, NIDS 2008, 2012 and 2014-2015
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Table 3.7.3: Overlapping matrix by ethnic groups, 1993 and 2008
(a) 1993
Nde. & Swa. Xhosa Zulu Pedi Sotho Tswana Ven. &Tso. Coloured Indian White
Ndebele & Swazi 1 0.819 0.893 0.786 0.954 1.056 0.873 1.146 0.952 0.472
Xhosa 1.130 1 1.051 0.960 1.092 1.135 1.032 1.108 0.881 0.499
Zulu 1.070 0.948 1 0.903 1.037 1.075 0.971 1.043 0.774 0.368
Pedi 1.168 1.042 1.095 1 1.134 1.174 1.070 1.143 0.874 0.430
Sotho 1.046 0.877 0.943 0.842 1 1.080 0.922 1.124 0.932 0.494
Tswana 0.942 0.771 0.843 0.743 0.903 1 0.819 1.090 0.916 0.484
Venda &Tsonga 1.113 0.963 1.026 0.923 1.076 1.142 1 1.142 0.875 0.384
Coloured 0.726 0.567 0.625 0.569 0.702 0.816 0.639 1 1.043 0.780
Indian 0.448 0.305 0.343 0.333 0.413 0.520 0.390 0.725 1 1.005
White 0.203 0.132 0.139 0.144 0.183 0.220 0.166 0.326 0.625 1
(b) 2008
Nde. & Swa. Xhosa Zulu Pedi Sotho Tswana Ven. &Tso. Coloured Indian White
Ndebele & Swazi 1 0.917 0.916 0.936 0.978 1.102 0.875 1.123 1.034 0.895
Xhosa 1.082 1 1.031 1.006 1.026 1.116 0.970 1.107 0.914 0.729
Zulu 1.068 0.968 1 0.976 0.997 1.097 0.936 1.087 0.880 0.667
Pedi 1.066 0.973 0.989 1 1.038 1.146 0.950 1.170 1.099 1.008
Sotho 1.027 0.941 0.954 0.967 1 1.107 0.907 1.126 1.008 0.845
Tswana 0.883 0.813 0.810 0.845 0.891 1 0.781 1.034 0.980 0.866
Venda &Tsonga 1.119 1.021 1.033 1.056 1.106 1.217 1 1.248 1.240 1.213
Coloured 0.824 0.766 0.756 0.802 0.853 0.957 0.737 1 0.984 0.913
Indian 0.520 0.490 0.464 0.560 0.613 0.672 0.505 0.745 1 1.231
White 0.223 0.197 0.182 0.252 0.302 0.326 0.227 0.390 0.689 1
Notes: ANOGI by ethnic group results.
Source: Own calculations from weighted PSLSD 1993, NIDS 2008, 2012 and 2014-2015
Table 3.7.4: Overlapping matrix by ethnic groups, 2012 and 2014
(a) 2012
Nde. & Swa. Xhosa Zulu Pedi Sotho Tswana Ven. &Tso. Coloured Indian White
Ndebele & Swazi 1 0.867 0.969 0.917 0.985 0.977 0.901 1.053 0.890 0.533
Xhosa 1.130 1 1.096 1.066 1.116 1.120 1.040 1.181 1.049 0.718
Zulu 1.040 0.902 1 0.988 1.049 1.060 0.937 1.145 1.075 0.797
Pedi 1.051 0.910 1.003 1 1.057 1.072 0.952 1.151 1.108 0.835
Sotho 0.981 0.845 0.928 0.946 1 1.024 0.877 1.117 1.145 0.927
Tswana 0.962 0.818 0.903 0.923 0.977 1 0.852 1.090 1.109 0.834
Venda &Tsonga 1.093 0.953 1.057 1.054 1.119 1.139 1 1.230 1.225 1.050
Coloured 0.826 0.694 0.758 0.819 0.862 0.905 0.724 1 1.105 0.983
Indian 0.420 0.364 0.377 0.497 0.497 0.571 0.405 0.630 1 1.286
White 0.185 0.183 0.188 0.259 0.257 0.309 0.207 0.343 0.620 1
(b) 2014
Nde. & Swa. Xhosa Zulu Pedi Sotho Tswana Ven. &Tso. Coloured Indian White
Ndebele & Swazi 1 0.941 0.999 1.016 1.118 1.046 0.957 1.177 1.045 0.978
Xhosa 1.059 1 1.058 1.060 1.157 1.081 1.017 1.205 1.024 0.906
Zulu 1.001 0.942 1 1.006 1.101 1.027 0.957 1.155 0.998 0.888
Pedi 0.967 0.903 0.962 1 1.105 1.042 0.919 1.182 1.084 1.007
Sotho 0.864 0.805 0.865 0.894 1 0.944 0.818 1.077 0.989 0.902
Tswana 0.916 0.861 0.912 0.961 1.045 1 0.876 1.121 1.101 1.048
Venda &Tsonga 1.046 0.984 1.045 1.054 1.155 1.081 1 1.217 1.062 0.949
Coloured 0.749 0.693 0.741 0.809 0.905 0.873 0.699 1 1.045 1.021
Indian 0.463 0.431 0.448 0.588 0.608 0.628 0.437 0.709 1 1.152
White 0.295 0.281 0.282 0.411 0.405 0.435 0.290 0.480 0.833 1
Notes: ANOGI by ethnic group results.
Source: Own calculations from weighted PSLSD 1993, NIDS 2008, 2012 and 2014-2015
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Table 3.7.5: Ranks matrix by ethnic groups, 1993 and 2008
(a) 1993
Nde. & Swa. Xhosa Zulu Pedi Sotho Tswana Ven. &Tso. Coloured Indian White
Ndebele & Swazi 0.5 0.624 0.588 0.624 0.529 0.452 0.574 0.317 0.163 0.057
Xhosa 0.376 0.5 0.464 0.503 0.406 0.335 0.450 0.223 0.104 0.037
Zulu 0.412 0.536 0.5 0.538 0.441 0.368 0.485 0.246 0.113 0.036
Pedi 0.376 0.497 0.462 0.5 0.406 0.340 0.447 0.236 0.117 0.040
Sotho 0.471 0.594 0.559 0.594 0.5 0.424 0.542 0.298 0.148 0.052
Tswana 0.548 0.665 0.632 0.660 0.576 0.5 0.614 0.363 0.188 0.062
Venda &Tsonga 0.426 0.550 0.515 0.553 0.458 0.386 0.5 0.273 0.138 0.045
Coloured 0.683 0.777 0.754 0.764 0.702 0.637 0.727 0.5 0.281 0.097
Indian 0.837 0.896 0.887 0.883 0.852 0.812 0.862 0.719 0.5 0.230
White 0.943 0.963 0.964 0.960 0.948 0.938 0.955 0.903 0.770 0.5
(b) 2008
Nde. & Swa. Xhosa Zulu Pedi Sotho Tswana Ven. &Tso. Coloured Indian White
Ndebele & Swazi 0.5 0.546 0.560 0.510 0.473 0.400 0.551 0.356 0.197 0.077
Xhosa 0.454 0.5 0.504 0.460 0.426 0.363 0.498 0.325 0.181 0.065
Zulu 0.440 0.496 0.5 0.458 0.421 0.352 0.495 0.312 0.169 0.059
Pedi 0.490 0.540 0.542 0.5 0.466 0.408 0.532 0.368 0.218 0.089
Sotho 0.527 0.574 0.579 0.534 0.5 0.445 0.569 0.406 0.240 0.103
Tswana 0.600 0.637 0.648 0.592 0.555 0.5 0.629 0.452 0.263 0.112
Venda &Tsonga 0.449 0.502 0.505 0.468 0.431 0.371 0.5 0.334 0.198 0.083
Coloured 0.644 0.675 0.688 0.632 0.594 0.548 0.666 0.5 0.299 0.138
Indian 0.803 0.819 0.831 0.782 0.760 0.737 0.802 0.701 0.5 0.322
White 0.923 0.935 0.941 0.911 0.897 0.888 0.917 0.862 0.678 0.5
Notes: ANOGI by ethnic group results.
Source: Own calculations from weighted PSLSD 1993, NIDS 2008, 2012 and 2014-2015
Table 3.7.6: Ranks matrix by ethnic groups, 2012 and 2014
(a) 2012
Nde. & Swa. Xhosa Zulu Pedi Sotho Tswana Ven. &Tso. Coloured Indian White
Ndebele & Swazi 0.5 0.562 0.521 0.475 0.455 0.420 0.529 0.360 0.162 0.058
Xhosa 0.438 0.5 0.457 0.422 0.398 0.368 0.466 0.311 0.147 0.062
Zulu 0.479 0.543 0.5 0.460 0.433 0.400 0.512 0.335 0.152 0.065
Pedi 0.525 0.578 0.540 0.5 0.479 0.446 0.545 0.393 0.207 0.092
Sotho 0.545 0.602 0.567 0.521 0.5 0.466 0.574 0.407 0.207 0.092
Tswana 0.580 0.632 0.600 0.554 0.534 0.5 0.603 0.444 0.241 0.110
Venda &Tsonga 0.471 0.534 0.488 0.455 0.426 0.397 0.5 0.338 0.169 0.077
Coloured 0.640 0.689 0.665 0.607 0.593 0.556 0.662 0.5 0.266 0.129
Indian 0.838 0.853 0.848 0.793 0.793 0.759 0.831 0.734 0.5 0.288
White 0.942 0.938 0.935 0.908 0.908 0.890 0.923 0.871 0.712 0.5
(b) 2014
Nde. & Swa. Xhosa Zulu Pedi Sotho Tswana Ven. &Tso. Coloured Indian White
Ndebele & Swazi 0.5 0.530 0.509 0.435 0.405 0.413 0.518 0.343 0.178 0.119
Xhosa 0.470 0.5 0.479 0.409 0.379 0.389 0.489 0.320 0.166 0.113
Zulu 0.491 0.521 0.5 0.427 0.397 0.404 0.511 0.333 0.169 0.111
Pedi 0.565 0.591 0.573 0.5 0.474 0.479 0.581 0.413 0.238 0.172
Sotho 0.595 0.621 0.603 0.526 0.5 0.497 0.612 0.436 0.237 0.163
Tswana 0.587 0.611 0.596 0.521 0.503 0.5 0.601 0.444 0.255 0.180
Venda &Tsonga 0.482 0.511 0.489 0.419 0.388 0.399 0.5 0.326 0.171 0.117
Coloured 0.657 0.680 0.667 0.587 0.564 0.556 0.674 0.5 0.283 0.197
Indian 0.822 0.834 0.831 0.762 0.763 0.745 0.829 0.717 0.5 0.409
White 0.881 0.887 0.889 0.828 0.837 0.820 0.883 0.803 0.591 0.5
Notes: ANOGI by ethnic group results.
Source: Own calculations from weighted PSLSD 1993, NIDS 2008, 2012 and 2014-2015
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Chapter 4
The Evolution of Social Polarization in
Post-Apartheid South Africa
4.1 Introduction
During the past two decades, there have been many studies on the understanding and
measurement of polarization. One of the reasons that motivate a study of polarization
as a separate dimension of welfare (or inequality) is its deleterious effect on a number
of social, economic, and political outcomes. Studying the evolution of polarization
and its correlates gives important insight into the prevailing state of cohesion and or
diversity in the society. Proponents of polarization believe that social conflict is more
probable in polarized (or heterogeneous) societies because people feel less alike and
less identified with each other. Therefore, patterns of polarization give important clues
to social unrest and the possible directions of social policy. This chapter explores the
patterns and evolution of social polarization in post-Apartheid South Africa.
Although much can be learned from the nascent literature on polarization, its focus is
largely on income polarization. That is, individuals identify with those belonging to
the same income group, and are alienated from those belonging to other income groups
(Esteban & Ray, 1994). However, income may not be the only relevant (or even be a
relevant) dimension of an individual’s sense of identity and alienation (Permanyer &
D’ambrosio, 2015). An individual’s identity is influenced by exogenously given social
factors like race, ethnicity, or religion. Similarly alienation (between- and within-
groups) can be measured by any indicator of well-being. This conceptualization is
known as social polarization. Social polarization therefore captures the formation of
and gaps between social groups in a population.
Most studies agree that identification is generally defined by social characteristics of
the individual. The measurement of alienation has, however, been viewed from differ-
ent perspectives. From one perspective, the distance between individuals is constant,
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implying that alienation levels are the same no matter which factors one uses to parti-
tion the population. This perspective is known as pure social polarization and is usu-
ally measured along ethnic lines (ethnicity broadly defined to include religion, race,
and language) (see Esteban and Ray (2011); Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005c)).
On the other hand, the distance between individuals is captured by any cardinal or
ordinal measure of well-being. The empirical literature on this second perspective,
known as hybrid or socio-economic polarization, lags behind theory though. To the
best of our knowledge, only a handful of papers attempt to offer information about
socio-economic polarization (Duclos et al., 2004; Fusco & Silber, 2014; Gradín, 2000;
Permanyer, 2012; Zhang & Kanbur, 2001). Besides the few studies that offer an il-
lustration of the proposed indicators of socio-economic polarization, it is generally
difficult to measure it. One reason for this is the absence of requisite data for opera-
tionalizing the proposed measures. This is particularly true for developing countries.
Another key factor is the lack of appropriate methods to effectively measure social
distances between groups. The present chapter therefore contributes to the literature
by providing new and detailed information about the evolution of social polarization
patterns in South Africa.
Since the end of Apartheid in the early 1990s, South Africa has undertaken a num-
ber of socio-economic reforms designed to accelerate economic and social integration.
There is, however, a lingering perception that these initiatives are yet to have a strong
mark on the extent of social cohesion in the country. Anecdotal evidence suggests low
and declining levels of social cohesion in the country in recent times. Social cohe-
sion is highly correlated with social polarization because social polarization weakens
the commonality of values and commitments among people, thereby affecting their
capacity to pursue collective goals (Esteban & Schneider, 2008). Therefore, the de-
velopment of measures of social polarization can be useful from a policy perspective,
by providing evidence for a comprehensive analysis of social cohesion in the country.
Apart from that, because of the history of Apartheid, people may still form coalitions
based on race to secure their interests. For instance, data from the South African So-
cial Attitudes Survey 2003-2012 shows that at least three in five South Africans believe
that different racial groups will never trust or like each other (see Figure 4.7.3). These
perceptions of mistrust and dislike warrant an investigation of convergence of social
distances between racial groups in post-Apartheid South Africa. Findings from this
research will deepen our understanding of this phenomena. Finally, using inter-race
and intra-race relations to measure alienation may provide a new perspective on the
gains achieved in inter-race relations in the country.
We expect to find results that are specific to South Africa, for two reasons. First, social
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identities, or factors that distinguish one group from another, tend to be context spe-
cific. For instance, caste is usually specific to India and “Hukou” is specific to China.
In this chapter, we use race or racial classifications from the Apartheid system. Though
race is usually replaced by ethnicity, in South Africa race differences are the most pro-
nounced. We need to use the racial classifications stemming from Apartheid in our
analysis, to evaluate to what extent apartheid’s damage has been undone (Posel, 2001).
Moreover, the availability of relevant measures of well-being often dictates the meas-
urement of alienation. Previous studies have used either health status or the degree of
religiosity. Each one of the measures is bound to give different results concerning ali-
enation. In this chapter, we use the degree to which an individual defends the interests
of their racial group (that is, their degree of racial radicalism).
The research discussed in this chapter makes its first contribution to the literature by
investigating the correlates of an indicator for distances between racial groups in the
country. We argue that the greater the integration of Blacks into the mainstream eco-
nomy, the lower the alienation between racial groups. We use data from the South
African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) for the period 2003 - 2012, and aggregate
data from six questions using Polychoric Principal Component Analysis to compute an
index of the degree of racial radicalism. The degree of radicalism captures the strength
with which the individual defends the interests of their racial group. Thus, alienation
is indicated by the force with which a person defends his racial group’s interests. We
find that an individual’s radicalism decreases with an increase in household wealth,
education attainment and, to some extent, with working either full-time or part-time
and with being relatively satisfied with life.
This chapter makes a further contribution to the literature by tracking trends in social
polarization using an index of Permanyer (2012). Having established a decline in
income polarization (see chapter 2), we assess how social polarization compares. We
use the distributions of the degree of racial radicalism to show that social polarization
declines from 2003 to 2012. Specifically, the results reveal a decline in between-group
polarization and a rise in within-group polarization. This implies that, as racial groups
become more alike in terms of social characteristics (that is, their distributions of the
degree of radicalism converge), they also become internally more heterogeneous (that
is, the disparity in the degree of radicalism within racial groups increases). This finding
supports the results in the previous chapters which show that between-race income
inequality and income polarization have declined, while within-race differences have
increased.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 discusses the social po-
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larization literature, including the Reynal-Querol (2002), Permanyer (2012) and Per-
manyer and D’ambrosio (2015) indices of social polarization. Section 4.3 describes
the SASAS datasets, and explains the calculation of the degree of radicalism. Section
4.4 discusses summary statistics of key variables and the determinants of the degree
of racial radicalism. The polarization results appear in section 4.5, while section 4.6
provides a summary and conclusion.
4.2 Social Polarization: Theory and Evidence
Duclos and Taptue (2015) list five different types of polarization, namely: multi-polar
income polarization, income bi-polarization, social polarization, socio-economic po-
larization, and multi-dimensional polarization. To measure the first two types, they par-
tition society into groups (identification), measure the distances between these groups
(i.e., alienation) by income or any other cardinal indicator of well-being (Fusco & Sil-
ber, 2014). Group membership (internal homogeneity) and distances across individu-
als (external heterogeneity) under multi-dimensional polarization are influenced by a
set of social and economic characteristics or multivariate distances (Duclos & Taptue,
2015; Gigliarano & Mosler, 2009). Similar to multi-polar income polarization, a stat-
istical examination of social polarization involves identifying the appearance of poles
in a population distribution. However, in the case of social polarization, the population
is categorised into social groups, which form the poles, and the distance between the
groups is measured by some measure of well-being. In this section, we briefly review
the literature on the concept of social polarization. There are two strands within the
social polarization literature; namely studies on pure social polarization and hybrid or
socio-economic polarization. We review both types of studies and highlight some of
the notable research in each. For more on the subject, Chakravarty (2015); Duclos and
Taptue (2015) provide a detailed review of social polarization measures.
In these two types of social polarization, alienation and identification are driven by so-
cial factors. That is, people are clustered into groups according to social characteristics.
The groups are internally homogeneous but different from each other. The implication
is that people feel alienated from others who do not share their social characteristics.
In this case, identification deals with qualitative and non-cardinal variables and does
not depend on the distribution of income. Examples of characteristics that may nour-
ish identity include religion, race, ethnicity, language, gender, education, occupation,
and political opinion. Alienation, on the other hand, captures the perception of differ-
ences and distance among members of the different social groups. Alienation is thus
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the cause of distinction between these two. These two types of social polarization are
related to the emergence or sharper definition of social groups in a society.
4.2.1 Measurement of Social Polarization
4.2.1.1 Reynal-Querol (2002) Index
Pure social polarization is concerned with the distribution of subgroup sizes and sets
the distances between the subgroups to a constant. This means that, as the number
of groups increase, the subgroups become weaker in terms of population share and
social polarization is likely to decrease. According to Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
(2005a) “what matters is not only how many groups there are but also if they view
other groups as a potential threat for their interests. For a given number of groups, the
threat is higher the larger the size of another group relative to the size of the reference
group”.
Reynal-Querol (2002) is among the first to develop an index of pure social polariza-
tion along religious and ethnic lines. This index, known as the RQ in the literature,
modifies the income polarization index of Esteban and Ray (1994) by replacing the
Euclidean distance/alienation function d(yi,yj) = |yi− yj| with the discrete distance
function δ (yi,yj) = 1 if i 6= j, and δ (yi,yj) = 0, otherwise. Thus, the index sets ali-
enation between individuals of the same group to zero, whereas alienation between
individuals belonging to different groups is set to unity. This means the feeling of an-
imosity between members of any two groups is similar. If the population is split into n
groups of sizes pii (i = 1, ... , n), then the RQ index can be given as follows:
RQ =
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j 6=i
pi1+αi pi j (4.2.1)
= 1−
n
∑
i=1
(0.5−pii)2pii/0.25
with α ∈ (0,∞). Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a) use axioms and properties to
show that α = 1. From equation 4.2.1, it can be seen that the RQ index achieves its
minimum value of zero if all individuals are concentrated in one group, and it takes its
maximum value of unity when the population is split evenly into two groups. There-
fore, this index measures how far a given population distribution is from a bi-modal
distribution.
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Despite the RQ index’s disregard for distances between individuals and groups, as well
as the differences in their economic status, it is widely used to examine the effects of
ethnicity (broadly defined to include religious, racial and linguistic identities) on nu-
merous social and economic outcomes like economic growth, conflict, trust, social
cohesion, trade, public infrastructure, human capital accumulation and government
transfers. In a seminal paper, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005c) construct a reli-
gious polarization index and show that religious polarization has negative effects on
development. Overall, ethnic polarization or ethnic diversity seems to be associated
with the probability of civil wars.
With hybrid or socio-economic polarization, one set of social variables is used to par-
tition the population into subgroups or define group identification. The same factors
that may nourish identity may be used to partition the population. A second set of
economic variables, or some other variable representing a standard of living, yields
distances, that is, alienation between the groups (Duclos & Taptue, 2015; Fusco & Sil-
ber, 2014). This means splitting the population along, say, racial lines (as is the case in
our study), and using the differences in any other indicator of well-being as the meas-
ure of alienation. Alienation or hostility between individuals can be due to differences
in income (Duclos et al., 2004), religiosity or religious radicalism degree (Permanyer,
2012) or health status (Fusco & Silber, 2014; Permanyer & D’ambrosio, 2015).
Despite its intuitive appeal as a predictive variable, the empirical literature on hy-
brid or socio-economic polarization is still sparse. A number of studies (see, among
others, Apouey (2007); Fusco and Silber (2014); Permanyer (2012); Permanyer and
D’ambrosio (2015)), which propose summary measures of socio-economic polariza-
tion have also offered an empirical illustration of their indices. Zhang and Kanbur
(2001) are among the first to quantify socio-economic polarization in China using the
ratio of between-group inequality to within-group inequality of the generalized entropy
indices. The presumption is that between-group inequality captures external hetero-
geneity while within-group equality captures internal homogeneity, such that incre-
ments in either increases polarization. Following a ground-breaking study by Allison
and Foster (2004) which examines inequality using ordinal variables, Apouey (2007)
proposes and axiomatizes a polarization measure that uses ordinal self-reported health
status. She uses median health status as the reference point to develop a bi-polarization
index which takes into account the distribution of self-reported health status. Like
Zhang and Kanbur (2001), she concludes that polarization and inequality are empiric-
ally different.
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4.2.1.2 Permanyer (2012) indices
Partly as a critique of and an improvement to the RQ index, Permanyer (2012) re-
lies on identification-alienation behavioural framework to argue that any measure of
social polarization must take into account role alienation. He develops two indices
that use the extent to which individuals feel involved and identified with their identity
group as a measure of alienation. This feeling of involvement with their group is re-
ferred to as “radicalism degree”, denoted by a non-negative real number, y. Duclos
and Taptue (2015) explain radicalism as the strength with which a person compares
himself with others in different groups. It can also fuel a person’s sense of identity or
difference within the same group. Radicalism is, thus, an indicator of the force with
which a person defends the interests, identity, and objectives of their group (Duclos
& Taptue, 2015) or their involvement when pursuing the interests of their racial group
(Permanyer, 2012). Alienation increases monotonically with the sum of the radicalism
felt by individuals of different groups, (x+ y). This implies that, given any two people
from two distinctive groups, the greater their involvement in pursuing the interests of
their group, the greater will be the animosity felt between these groups, and the greater
the extent of social polarization, and the risk of social tension among them. Identific-
ation, on the other hand, can depend on the size of one’s group and on the extent of
radicalism felt by individuals within that group.
Using the identification-alienation behavioural framework, and the radicalism degree
concept, Permanyer (2012) proposes two indices of social polarization. The first index
assumes no within-group alienation, meaning the focus is only on between-group ali-
enation. The second index incorporates between-group and within-group alienation.
Looking first at the between-group polarization index, he postulates that identity de-
pends on a group’s size ni, while alienation between any two groups with radicalism
degrees x and y is defined by an increasing function of the sum (x+ y). The greater the
force with which an individual defends their group’s advantages, the greater the hostil-
ity between the groups. Therefore, for each group i, there is an unnormalised density
fi which indicates how radicalism is distributed within the group. Defining effective
antagonism as the non-negative function T (ι ,a), such that T is continuous, increasing
in its second argument and T (ι ,0) = T (0, ι) = 0, and assuming social polarization to
be proportional to the sum of all effective antagonisms, then we have:
Per =
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j 6=i
ˆ ˆ
T (ni, x+ y) fi(x) f j(y)dydx (4.2.2)
where fi and f j are the distributions of radicalism in groups i and j. Following the
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axiomatic framework presented in Esteban and Ray (1994) and Duclos et al. (2004)
(see appendix 4.7.1), the following axioms are imposed on the equation 4.2.2 to derive
a more specific and estimable social polarization index.
Axiom 1: A slide of the basic densities within a group increases social polarization.
Assume a given sub-group is subdivided into two sub-groups, where the populous sub-
group is less radicalised, and the smaller subgroup has more radicalism. All other
things being equal, if the radicalism of these two subgroups is increased and decreased
by the same amount, then within-group radicalism and social polarization increase.
Axiom 2: A smaller group becoming less radical and a bigger group becoming more
radical does not decrease social polarization. This is the between-group axiom which
says that, given two unequal groups, if the smaller group becomes less radical and
the larger group becomes more radical, then social polarization should increase. This
means that the index must give more emphasis to the transformations of the bigger
group, such that the effect of the increase in the radicalism of the bigger group should
be more than that of the reduction in the radicalism of the smaller group.
Axiom 3: An equal movement of the population from a large group to two equally
sized smaller groups, with the same normalised density, should not decrease social
polarization. This means that the equalisation of population sizes across groups with
the same distribution of radicalism will generate more social polarization.
Permanyer (2012) shows a social polarization index of the form defined in equation
4.2.2 that satisfies these three axioms and is proportional to:
Per(α) =
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j 6=i
pi1+αi pi j(µi+µ j) (4.2.3)
where α ∈ (0.71,1). Similar to Esteban and Ray (1994) and Duclos et al. (2004), α is
a polarization sensitivity parameter such that the larger the value of α , the greater the
departure from inequality.
The previous index, equation 4.2.3, ignores within-group alienation. Alienation may
exist within a group if the members of the group have different levels of radicalism.
More radical members may alienate less radical members and vice-versa. Permanyer
(2012) incorporates this by letting within-group alienation be measured by an increas-
ing function of radicalism distance |y− x|, while, as before, between-group alienation
is related to the sum (y+ x). In this setting, the social polarization index becomes:
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Per =
n
∑
i=1
ˆ ˆ
T ( fi(xi), |x− y|) f j(x) fi(y)dydx (4.2.4)
+
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j 6=i
ˆ ˆ
T (ni,x+ y) fi(x) f j(y)dydx
The first component is the contribution of within-group polarization and the second
component is the contribution of between-group polarization. Invoking axioms similar
to DER 2 and DER 3 (see Appendix A1) and a new axiom which says that population
transfer across two identical groups should lower polarization, the index becomes:
Per =
n
∑
i=1
ˆ ˆ
f 1+αi (x) f j(y)|x− y|dydx︸ ︷︷ ︸
Within-group polarization
+
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
i6= j
ˆ ˆ
f 1+αi (x) f j(y)(x+ y)dydx︸ ︷︷ ︸
Between-group polarization
(4.2.5)
where α ∈ (0.5,1). The first component represents the contribution of within - group
polarization and the second component is the contribution of between- group polariz-
ation.
4.2.1.3 Permanyer and D’Ambrosio (2013) Index
Based on the same identification-alienation framework, but using a variable defined
on an ordinal scale, Permanyer and D’ambrosio (2015) develop two indices that take
into account the extent to which different groups are clustered around privileged or
unprivileged regions of an ordinal variable. To illustrate their contribution, consider a
population divided into two racial groups (say Black and White) with five self-reported
health status categories: Very Poor, Poor, Fair/Neutral, Good and Very Good. Fig-
ure 4.2.2a presents a situation where all Blacks (represented by Dark rectangles) have
Very Poor health and all Whites (the white rectangles) have Very Good health. This
should exhibit more tension and more polarization than the situation in Figure 4.2.2b,
where neither Blacks nor Whites are privileged. In the traditional social and income
polarization settings, the situation in these two figures leads to the same degree of
polarization.
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Figure 4.2.1: A hypothetical distribution of self-reported health status in two groups
(Blacks and Whites).
(a) (b)
Notes: This figure presents a hypothetical distribution of self-reported health in two different groups
(Blacks and Whites). The initials stand for: Very Poor (VP), Poor (P), Fair (F), Good (G) and Very
Good (VG).
Under this setting, identification is still a function of group sizes (ni), while between-
group alienation is captured by an overlap coefficient (θi j) between groups i and j.
The greater the extent of overlap between groups, the more similar the groups, and
the smaller the alienation between them (Permanyer & D’ambrosio, 2015). Following
Duclos and Taptue (2015), the overlap coefficient (θi j) between groups i and j of an
ordinal variable with C categories, where pii(yc) is the population share of group i with
health status equal to yc, can be written as
θi j =
C
∑
i
min
{
pii(yc), pi j(yc)
}
(4.2.6)
where 0 ≤ θi j ≥ 1 such that θi j = 1 when the groups are disjoint and θi j = 1 when
groups perfectly overlap. Alienation is thus defined as 1−θi j, such that it is one when
groups are completely distinct and zero in the case of perfectly overlapping groups.
The overlap coefficient assumes that the alienation between groups is symmetric (θi j =
θ ji). However, we might expect alienation between groups to be different, depending
on their representation in the different categories of the ordinal variable. (Permanyer &
D’ambrosio, 2015) define asymmetric alienation between group i and j as a function
of the following coefficient:
Ai j =
∑Nis=1∑
N j
t=1 δst
NiN j
(4.2.7)
where δst equals 1 if individual ′s′ from group i is ranked below individual ′t ′ from
group j and 0 otherwise. Ai j is an asymmetric function (Ai j 6= A ji) which measures
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the extent to which group i is underprivileged with respect to group j. For instance,
when Ai j = 1, all of the members of group i are ranked below any member of group j
with respect to health status, and alienation is maximized. Alternatively, when Ai j = 0
then no member of group i is ranked below any member of group j, and this refers
to minimal alienation. When there is absolutely no overlap between groups i, j, then
Ai j+A ji = 1, and if some members of group i and j belong to the same health category
then Ai j +A ji < 1.
Following the identification-alienation framework, and imposing axioms similar to
those in Duclos et al. (2004) (see Appendix 4.7.1) but adapted to the socio-economic
setting with multiple groups, the indices Permanyer and D’ambrosio (2015) can be
given as;
in the case of symmetric alienation:
PDS =
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j 6=i
pi1+αi pi j(1+θi j) (4.2.8)
and in the case of asymmetric alienation:
PDA =
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j 6=i
pi1+αi pi jAi j (4.2.9)
where the degree of polarization sensitivity lies within [α = 0.71,1]. These indices
(PDs and PDA) are multiplied by 4 and 274 so that they take values between [0,1]
In their empirical illustration, Permanyer and D’ambrosio (2015) use ethnicity as the
partitioning variable and ordinal self-reported health data from Chile in 2008/2009, to
show that polarization and inequality result in substantially different rankings.
Fusco and Silber (2014) extend the work of Permanyer and D’ambrosio (2015) by pro-
posing two other measures of the degree of social polarization of an ordinal variable.
Their first index, which is borrowed from the measurement of segregation, examines
the degree of non-overlapping of distributions of the ordinal variable. The second
measure, which is borrowed from the equality of opportunity literature, emphasises
bi-polarization and considers that social polarization will be maximal if individuals
belonging to one group are clustered in either the lowest or the highest ordinal status.
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Partitioning by immigrant status and using self-reported health information, they find
different patterns of social polarization across the European Union.
Taken together, these studies on pure social polarization and hybrid social polarization
can be grouped into two categories. The first category, which appears to be common
in the pure social polarization literature, attempts to evidence the deleterious effects
of social polarization on economic outcomes. The second category, which is common
in the hybrid or socio-economic polarization literature provides information on social
polarization in comparison to inequality. These studies concur on the negative effects
of social polarization, and similar to income polarization studies, they also confirm the
empirical difference between polarization and inequality. In this chapter, we follow the
hybrid or socio-economic literature to investigate the evolution of social polarization
in South Africa.
Studies in the socio-economic literature use different factors to partition the popula-
tion. The choice of which social identities to use is rarely obvious, even in divided
societies such as South Africa. This is because identities are fluid and often are polit-
ically constructed. Thus one has to ensure the chosen identities reflect the distinctive
groups in the society. The second choice is the indicator used to measure the difference
between individuals or groups. That is, there has to be a clear interaction between the
chosen indicator and group identities which is influenced by socio economic charac-
teristics. These are likely to limit the generalisability of the studies in this literature.
In this study, we use racial groups to partition the population and measure alienation
by racial radicalism degree, which is the extent to which one defends the interests of
one’s racial group. We expect to find results that are specific to South Africa.
4.3 Data and Description of variables
4.3.1 Data
The paper uses data sourced from the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS)
for each year over the period 2003 - 2012. The SASAS consists of repeated cross-
sectional surveys administered annually since 2003 by the Human Sciences Research
Council (HSRC). Each round of SASAS is designed to yield a nationally representative
sample of adults aged 16 and older living in private residences. The survey normally
has two or three questionnaires which are administered concurrently. The first ques-
tionnaire collects data on individuals and core modules, and is administered to about
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7000 respondents for the years 2003 - 2006 and to 3500 respondents thereafter. The
second (and third in some years) questionnaire includes rotating modules directed at
measuring a range of policy concerns at a specific time and is administered to a sample
of approximately 3500 respondents. We use data from the first questionnaire except
for 2005 and 2006, where the second questionnaire had more relevant information.
Each round of SASAS uses a two-stage stratified sampling method. In the first stage,
a sub-sample of 500 primary sampling units (PSUs) is drawn from the HSRC’s Master
Sample of PSUs. These PSUs are drawn with probability proportional to size from
a sampling frame that is updated annually to coincide with Statistics South Africa’s
(StatsSA) mid-year population estimates. The population is divided into three explicit
strata, namely province, geographic type (rural/urban/tribal), and majority population
group. Within each stratum, the allocated number of PSUs are drawn using probability
proportional to size sampling with the number of dwelling units as the measure of size.
In each PSU selected, 21 or 14 dwelling units or visiting points are selected as second-
ary sampling units (SSUs). The SSUs are then systematically grouped into two or three
sub-samples for each SASAS questionnaire used. The PSUs in the Northern Cape and
other provinces like KwaZulu Natal are over-sampled to ensure representativeness of
some population groups like Indians/Asians.
Owing to these sampling fluctuations and other non-coverage biases, the design weights
(inverse selection probability weights) are adjusted to the most recent population totals
from StatsSA. As the benchmark or control variables when adjusting the weights, SA-
SAS uses province, gender, population group (or race), and 5-year age group. One
issue with these sampling weights is that they do not consider temporal consistency.
Their main focus is on producing best estimates of the population, given the informa-
tion available at the time. This is usually because the auxiliary data (StatsSA’s mid-year
population projections) are inconsistent as a series over time (Branson & Wittenberg,
2014). It is therefore imperative to improve the provided weights by further calibrating
them to the recent (2015) StatsSA mid-year population projections.
The identification component of social polarization indicators relies heavily on pop-
ulation weights of the racial groups. We therefore needed to calibrate the sampling
weights to improve the representativeness of each sample point and provide marginal
totals (or subpopulation shares) that are somewhat consistent as a time series. The
reason behind calibration is because StatsSA revises its mid-year population projec-
tions annually to reflect the true structure of the population, thus we wanted to use this
new series as the benchmark.
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We apply an iterative proportional fitting known as raking to calibrate the weights (see
Battaglia, Hoaglin and Frankel (2013), Wittenberg (2010) and Kolenikov et al. (2014)
for details on raking). The raking is done in two stages. The first calibration is done
before the Polychoric Principal Component Analysis (PPCA), an approach we use to
compute the index of the degree of racial radicalism. This is so that we can use the
resulting new weights when calculating this index. The second stage of calibration is
done after the PPCA approach. This is mainly because we dropped all observations
with missing values for the radicalism index, and this resulted in an underestimation
and overestimation of populations and racial group shares in some years. It is, however,
vital to note that the calibrated weights are only as good as the auxiliary data used
(Branson & Wittenberg, 2014). For details about calibrating the sampling weights, see
section 4.7.2 in the appendix.
4.3.2 Description of variables
The variable we use to measure social distance or alienation across racial groups is
the racial radicalism degree. In this section, we elaborate on questions used, and the
aggregation of the questions to compute the radicalism index.
4.3.2.1 The measure of radicalism
The conceptual definition of the degree of racial radicalism or “racism”, is the interest
that an individual shows in and their identification with their racial group. This group
identification (or ingroup bias) can be viewed as “an awareness of similarity, ingroup
identity, and shared fate with others who belong to the same category. . . ” (Klander-
mans, 2014). According to group conflict theory, ingroup bias exists because of con-
flict of interests between groups that are competing for scarce resources (like land,
jobs, etc). Social identity theory, on other hand, maintains that people may discrim-
inate in favour of their group for psychological reasons than because of self-interest.
Therefore, our concept of racial radicalism borrows from these two theories. In other
words, the degree of radicalism is an indicator of the force with which a person defends
the interests, identity, and objectives of their group (Duclos & Taptue, 2015) or their
involvement when pursuing the interests of their racial group (Permanyer, 2012).
Radicalism is therefore operationalized by selecting and aggregating the following
questions that represent trust among race groups, a sense of identity with others in
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one’s racial group, and those that are symbolic of the interests of the race groups.
To ensure that these questions are oriented in the same direction, we rescaled their cat-
egories such that larger values mean more radicalism. That is, we recode the categories
from 1 to 10 such that 1 denotes the least amount of racial radicalism and 10 the most
radicalism. For example, if there were only two possible responses, then the values
were assigned 1 and 10 accordingly, if there were four possible ordinal responses, we
assigned them the scores 1, 4, 7 and 10, and so on.
The six questions, which elicit the data we use, with their new codes in brackets, are
listed below:
1. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? People
of different racial groups do not really trust or like each other? 1.Strongly
agree (10) 2.Agree (7.75) 3.Neither agree nor disagree (5.5) 4.Disagree (3.25)
5.Strongly disagree (1)
2. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? People
of different racial groups will never really trust or like each other? 1.Strongly
agree (10) 2.Agree (7.75) 3.Neither agree nor disagree (5.5) 4.Disagree (3.25)
5.Strongly disagree (1)
3. To what extent do you agree or disagree that government should. . . Redistribute
land to black South Africans. 1.Strongly agree (10) 2.Agree (7.75) 3.Neither
agree nor disagree (5.5) 4.Disagree (3.25) 5.Strongly disagree (1)
4. To what extent do you agree or disagree that there should be. . . ? Racial quotas
in national sports teams. 1.Strongly agree (10) 2.Agree (7.75) 3.Neither agree
nor disagree (5.5) 4.Disagree (3.25) 5.Strongly disagree (1)
5. To what extent do you feel attached to the following types of people? Those
who speak the same language as you? 1.Very attached (10) 2.Slightly attached
(7) 3.Not very attached (4) 4.Not at all attached (1)
6. To what extent do you feel attached to the following types of people? Those who
belong to the same race group as you? 1.Very attached (10) 2.Slightly attached
(7) 3.Not very attached (4) 4.Not at all attached (1)
As a guiding principle when choosing these questions, we assumed a clear correspond-
ence between the radicalism degree and the categories of these ordinal variables. That
129
Un
ive
rsi
ty
of
Ca
pe
To
wn
is, people with higher degrees of radicalism are supposed to, on average, agree that
people of different racial groups do not and will never really trust or like each other.
They are also expected to feel attached to those who speak the same language and be-
long to the same race group, agree to land redistribution, and prefer racial quotas. A
White individual, however, is coded 10 (i.e., assumed to have more racial radicalism)
if he does not prefer land redistribution. Similarly, a Coloured individual who strongly
disagrees with land redistribution is coded 10. The same reverse coding was used for
the question (four) on racial quotas in sports. That is, White individuals who strongly
disagree with racial quotas in sports, are coded 10. Coloured individuals who strongly
disagree with racial quotas are also coded 10. In the robustness checks, we investigate
further the effects of the reverse coding of White and Coloured individuals’ responses.
That is, we compute the index using data from only four questions, excluding these
two questions on land redistribution and racial quotas.
It is, however, important to note that the operational radicalism degree, due to data
limitations, may not adequately capture the degree of radicalism. Nevertheless, all the
variables have a positive effect on Cronbach’s alpha or Scale variability coefficient,
which could signal validity of the operational radicalism degree measure1. Moreover,
these variables provide data on aspects of racial tolerance in the country, and can there-
fore be used to explain some dimensions of social cohesion.
Another issue of concern is that some of the questions which we select to give us
variables relevant for the operationalization of the degree of racial radicalism were
rephrased or dropped from the survey rounds over the years. As a result, we had to
omit potentially useful data from these questions to have consistent variables across the
years. For survey years 2010 to 2012, the questionnaire also includes more questions
on race relations. We combine the data from these extra sets of questions with the
data from the six original questions to compute another index of the degree of racial
radicalism. We then use the second racial radicalism degree distributions for years
2010 - 2012 to examine the robustness of the first distribution based on the original six
variables. The extra set of questions are in Appendix 4.7.3.
Before combining the variables, we screen the data to get an overall idea of its quality
and make the following restrictions: First, we restrict the sample to individuals who
answered at least 75% of the six questions. This is to ensure that only respondents with
enough data are included. Second, we drop all individuals without data on race, age,
1Initially, we had included eight variables matched across all the years, but questions on discrimination
frequency and race relations were dropped due to their negative effect on the Cronbach’s alpha.
In the sensitivity analysis, we investigate the robustness of the findings to the inclusion of these
variables.
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gender, and self-reported health. The restriction on the non-missing values of the first
three variables is to ensure that the raking (see section 4.7.2) runs without errors. The
restriction on valid self-reported health status is to ensure similarity of samples for the
two variables used to measure alienation. This restriction also ensures that the results
from the two sets of Polarization indices are comparable.
We aggregate these variables into a single indicator of the degree of racial radicalism.
To do this, we use a variant of Principal Component Analysis (PCA) known as Poly-
choric PCA. It is important to call to mind that PCA, which was popularised by Filmer
and Pritchett (2001) in the development economics literature, is a multivariate stat-
istical technique which orthogonally transforms a set of originally correlated variables
into a new set of linearly uncorrelated variables called principal components. The prin-
cipal components, which are a linear weighted combination of the original variables,
are orthogonal because they are the eigenvectors of the symmetric covariance matrix.
The first principal component has the largest proportion of the total variance, and each
succeeding component has the maximal remaining variance.
The standard PCA works best with multivariate normal, continuous data (Kolenikov
& Angeles, 2009). Cognizant of this, Filmer and Pritchett (2001) when construct-
ing socio-economic indices, incorporate categorical variables into PCA by breaking
them into a set of dummy variables. Kolenikov and Angeles (2009) show that the use
of dummy ordinal variables, in general, tends to produce spurious correlations and
lowers the proportion of explained variance. Therefore, in order to incorporate the cat-
egorical variables into PCA, Kolenikov and Angeles (2009) propose using Polychoric
PCA. In Polychoric PCA, weights are obtained by estimating a Polychoric correlation
matrix (see Appendix 4.7.4). Confirming this limitation of standard PCA, Wittenberg
and Leibbrandt (2017) provide a convincing argument that the standard PCA tends to
give negative scores for assets that are owned only (or mostly) in rural areas. That
is, it gives information about the degree of urbanness in the data. Using an approach
by A. K. Banerjee (2010) for dealing with multidimensional inequality, they propose
using an Uncentered PCA. Under the Uncentered PCA, the weights are still given by
the elements of an eigenvector of a cross-product matrix, but the variables are not de-
meaned, rather they are divided by their mean to form a matrix A. The non-negative
square matrix A′A is then used to construct the weights (Wittenberg & Leibbrandt,
2017).
Based on the limitations of the standard PCA, and recommendations for aggregat-
ing ordinal variables into a single index, we use the Polychoric PCA (Kolenikov &
Angeles, 2009). To ensure that the computed radicalism degree is robust to different
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aggregations, we also compute the index based on both Uncentered PCA and stand-
ard PCA. To ensure inter-temporal comparability of the indices, we pool all the years
before running the Polychoric PCA. The 2006 index is, however, computed separately
because two variables on the identity between racial groups are not available for this
year. Given that 2006 has only four variables, results from this year are likely to be
biased, and these have therefore been excluded from most of the analysis in the tables.
Nevertheless, we compute the index using only four variables for the years to check
how different the radicalism distributions would be if only four variables are used.
Given the small proportion of the Indian race group in the population, we also check
whether their inclusion affects the PCA results.
Table 4.7.2a provides the explained variance by the first three components from the
Polychoric PCA2. The first component has an eigenvalue of 2.203 and accounts for
37% of the variance. There is an eigenvalue difference of 0.67 between the first and
second component. Therefore, we retain the first Polychoric principal component (with
the largest eigenvalue) as the measure of racial radicalism. We use the other two com-
ponents (second and third) to assess the robustness of our results, given the small vari-
ation accounted for by the first component, 37%. The predicted values are rescaled to a
[0,10] scale using the following normalisation formula: 10(xobs− xmin)/(xmax− xmin).
The predicted values from both the Polychoric PCA and Uncentered PCA are already
non-negative, so there is no need to rescale them. Nevertheless, we rescale them for
completeness and comparability with those from the Standard PCA which had neg-
ative values. While the normalisation preserves the order of the numbers, we also
re-estimate the main regression using the original or untransformed values, to assess
the robustness of the results. The normalised and the original predicted values are
positively correlated with the ordinal variables (see Table 4.7.2b). This positive asso-
ciation means more radical individuals have high scores and less radical members have
low scores.
Based on the above discussion, one can argue that racial radicalism is driven by, and
leads to ingroup bias. In other words, those having a high degree of racial radicalism
are “racist” or have “racist attitudes”.
2The Polychoric correlation matrix is estimated in Stata using the Polychoric programme developed by
Kolenikov and Angeles (2009), and Uncentered PCA is estimated using a Stata ado file developed
by Martin Wittenberg.
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4.4 Descriptive Statistics
Given the importance of racial radicalism in the measurement of social polarization,
it is imperative to first examine its profile. Table 4.4.1 provides summary statistics
of some individual characteristics across the years. Table 4.4.2 shows patterns of the
degree of radicalism across some groups in the selected years.
The main findings, as seen from these tables, are that the degree of radicalism remains
relatively constant at an average value of 7.29 over the study period. Although Blacks
have higher average values (mean and median), they also have lower inequality (or
coefficient of variation) in their degree of radicalism. Lastly, we find that individuals
from more wealthy households and more educated people are less radical.
Starting with Table 4.4.1, which provides the summary statistics of individual char-
acteristics, we note that general state of health, as captured by the mean self-reported
health, remains relatively unchanged, whereas satisfaction with life increases slightly
from 2004 to 2007, then drops between 2009 and 2011. Average years of schooling,
which we derive from completed levels of education, appear to increase steadily until
2010. The increase in the education levels seems to be driven by a drop in the share
of those with no education and an increase, though modest, in High school comple-
tion and Tertiary qualifications. It is important to note that higher levels of educational
attainment may negatively affect the extent to which an individual feels involved and
identified with their group (Glaeser, 2005), which may in turn lead to lower levels of
social polarization.
The Wealth indices show only a slight increase during the period 2005 to 2009, and
then a slight fall in 2011. The wealth indices are calculated by Uncentered PCA (see
Wittenberg and Leibbrandt (2017)) using household ownership or access to electri-
city or household goods. The limited wealth index excludes some household goods
and whether the dwelling is formal. We expect higher wealth to be associated with
lower levels of radicalism, and less social polarization. This hypothesis is based on the
predictions of Akerlof and Kranton (2005), who postulate that, as their income rises,
people tend to deviate from their identity category.
Looking at race relations, which is derived from responses to the question: “South
Africa used to have apartheid by law between white, black, coloured and Indian/Asian.
Since 1994, do you think that race relations in the country have improved, remained
the same, or deteriorated?” We see that, for the entire period, almost 7 out of 10
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Table 4.4.1: Summary Statistics, 2003 - 2012
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Black/Africa 0.771 0.763 0.760 0.757 0.761 0.761 0.758 0.759 0.772 0.778
Coloured 0.076 0.093 0.090 0.095 0.091 0.095 0.095 0.094 0.089 0.090
Indian/Asian 0.028 0.029 0.030 0.029 0.029 0.030 0.029 0.030 0.030 0.028
White 0.124 0.116 0.120 0.120 0.119 0.114 0.118 0.118 0.110 0.104
Self-Reported Health 3.69 3.69 3.72 3.66 3.63 3.63 3.62 3.76 3.78 3.88
Life satisfaction . 2.91 3.15 3.20 3.26 3.08 3.24 2.75 2.65 2.83
Partnered 0.349 0.390 0.358 0.344 0.386 0.360 0.343 0.343 0.340 0.309
Female dummy 0.516 0.519 0.527 0.528 0.522 0.510 0.516 0.521 0.514 0.519
Age 36.20 36.80 36.95 36.80 36.91 36.69 36.59 37.07 37.17 36.92
Years of Schooling 9.22 9.33 9.43 9.57 9.66 9.86 10.11 10.12 9.90 9.74
No Education 0.067 0.051 0.053 0.046 0.043 0.046 0.039 0.030 0.039 0.026
Primary 0.163 0.184 0.180 0.156 0.154 0.141 0.145 0.139 0.147 0.184
High School 0.671 0.676 0.661 0.702 0.709 0.709 0.681 0.718 0.715 0.675
Tertiary 0.099 0.089 0.106 0.097 0.094 0.104 0.135 0.113 0.099 0.115
Wealth Index (limited) 3.03 3.10 2.93 3.15 3.28 3.39 3.53 3.53 3.29 3.42
Wealth index 3.08 3.34 3.30 3.55 3.73 3.61 3.29 3.19
Employed 0.339 0.340 0.288 0.327 0.423 0.344 0.344 0.331 0.324 0.302
Household size 4.69 4.98 5.02 5.08 5.09 5.15 5.04 4.95 4.89 4.96
Household size 16+ 3.42 3.61 3.53 3.65 3.72 3.78 3.82 3.71 3.73 3.61
Race relations
Improved 0.561 0.765 0.717 0.668 0.691 0.648 0.680 0.737 0.645 0.712
Stayed the same 0.305 0.163 0.182 0.217 0.195 0.234 0.243 0.186 0.226 0.179
Got worse 0.134 0.072 0.101 0.115 0.113 0.118 0.077 0.077 0.129 0.109
Radicalism degree
Mean 7.59 7.28 7.33 . 7.46 7.23 7.22 7.09 7.11 7.33
Median 7.72 7.33 7.41 . 7.72 7.33 7.30 7.18 7.32 7.67
Standard Deviation 1.513 1.528 1.576 . 1.523 1.545 1.543 1.556 1.531 1.490
Coefficient of variation 0.199 0.210 0.215 . 0.204 0.214 0.214 0.220 0.215 0.203
Notes: Self-reported health status and life satisfaction are reported on a five-point ordered scale where
1 means very poor and very dissatisfied and 5 means excellent and very satisfied. Life satisfaction
variables for 2011 and 2012 were transformed from a 10-point scale into a five-point scale to make
them comparable with the other years. Partnered is a dummy variable for living with a partner, whether
married or not. No education is a dummy variable for those with zero years of schooling, Primary for
those with between 1 to 7 years, High school those with 8 to 12 years and Tertiary with more than 12
years of education. The wealth index is calculated using Uncentered PCA (Wittenberg & Leibbrandt,
2017) from household ownership or access to things like (piped water, flush-toilet, landline, computer,
fridge/freezer, vacuum cleaner, television, Hi-fi/VCR/DVD, radio, microwave, washing machine, and
electricity. The limited wealth index does not include the household owning the following; electric
stove, dishwasher, tumble dryer, motor car and whether the dwelling is formal. Employed is a dummy
for those with any type of employment, either full-time or part-time. Radicalism is the first Polychoric
principal component calculated from the six ordinal variables. The index is normalised using the fol-
lowing formula: 10(xobs− xmin)/(xmax− xmin). Higher values of the index indicate a greater degree of
radicalism.
Source: Own calculations using weighted SASAS datasets from 2003 to 2012.
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respondents think inter-race relations have improved, and only one in ten thinks they
have become worse. This improvement in perceptions about inter-race relations sug-
gests declining social distance between racial groups. The average and median degrees
of radicalism show some interesting patterns. For example, from 2007 to 2012, they
decrease by an amount equivalent to 4.96% and 6.99%, then increase thereafter by
about 3.39 and 6.82, respectively. Social polarization or effective antagonism in the
Permanyer (2012) index is an increasing function of both population share (identifica-
tion) and radicalism degree distribution (alienation), and identification has fallen over
the study period. We therefore expect social polarization trends to mimic the radical-
ism degree patterns. That is, a spike in 2007, a decline until 2010 and then an increase
in 2011 and 2012.
Table 4.4.2: Racial Radicalism degrees for South Africa, 2003, 2008 and 2012
Race
2003 2008 2012
Mean Median C.V Mean Median C.V Mean Median C.V
African/Black 7.99 8.09 0.159 7.54 7.72 0.193 7.64 7.83 0.169
Coloured 6.35 6.49 0.248 6.58 6.56 0.222 6.75 6.87 0.239
Indian/Asian 6.81 6.93 0.182 6.75 6.93 0.194 6.4 6.38 0.23
White 6.07 6.2 0.237 5.88 5.79 0.223 5.74 5.79 0.266
Education
No Education 7.95 7.81 0.152 7.95 8.46 0.161 7.38 7.72 0.167
Primary 7.86 8.05 0.166 7.57 7.72 0.201 7.53 7.72 0.188
High School 7.58 7.72 0.204 7.22 7.32 0.209 7.37 7.69 0.199
Tertiary 6.93 7.09 0.230 6.54 6.56 0.253 6.66 6.70 0.239
Wealth Quantiles
1 7.93 7.83 0.169 7.58 7.72 0.198 7.80 7.86 0.160
2 7.76 7.72 0.179 7.47 7.70 0.192 7.42 7.70 0.185
3 6.68 6.68 0.238 6.58 6.59 0.224 6.82 6.93 0.246
Notes: Summary statistics of the first Polychoric principal component from the six ordinal variables.
The index is normalised using the following formula: 10(xobs− xmin)/(xmax− xmin). Higher values of
the index suggest a higher degree of radicalism. C.V is the coefficient of variation, which I use an
indicator of radicalism degree inequality.
Source: Own calculations using weighted SASAS datasets from 2003 to 2012.
Table 4.4.2 provides more information about the patterns of racial radicalism by race,
education, and wealth quantile group in 2003, 2008, and 2012. Blacks show more
racial radicalism while Whites have greater radicalism degree inequality (as meas-
ured by the coefficient of variation). In other words, the strength with which Blacks
identify with their group, and the extent to which they defend the interest of their
group is greater and has less variation. Whites have more variation in their “degree
of involvement” with their race group. Coloureds’ degree of racial radicalism falls
midway between that of Blacks and Whites.
As we expected and consistent with the predictions of Glaeser (2005), we see that those
with more education attainment are situated at the lower end of the racial radicalism
degree distribution. That is, if we define racial radicalism as hate against other races
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which depends on misinformation, then access to more information through education
should reduce the extent of radicalism. Table 4.4.2 further shows that individuals in
relatively wealthy households have lower degrees of radicalism. This is also not sur-
prising given Akerlof and Kranton (2005)’s predictions in the extended Economics of
Identity model. They show that income and identity are substitutes, such that higher in-
come can lead to deviations from the behavioural prescriptions of the social category.
That is, if they accept that behaviour within the Black racial group is defending the
interest of Blacks, then as income or household wealth rises, we are likely to see a
deviation from that behaviour.
In conclusion, these average statistics suggest that an individual’s degree of racial rad-
icalism is correlated with race, wealth quantiles, and education. The next step is there-
fore to use these racial radicalism distributions to spell out the extent of social polar-
ization in the country. Given the above results and the fact that the racial radicalism
index is pivotal in the social polarization indices, we further investigate the association
between the degree of racial radicalism and a number of key variables through a series
of regressions. The objective of these regressions is not to provide an exhaustive ana-
lysis of racial radicalism, but rather to gain an insight into potential drivers of racial
radicalism.
4.4.1 Determinants of Radicalism
To get a clear picture of the correlates of racial radicalism, we regress the individual
degree of radicalism on race and other individual characteristics. The main purpose of
these regressions is to ascertain the importance of race. Thus, the aim is not to provide
a robust account of the causal effects of radicalism. Rather, it is to highlight some of the
potential correlates of radicalism. These regressions may also serve as a backdrop for
further understanding of racial tolerance and racist attitudes in the country. We follow
approaches by Mocan and Raschke (2014) and Dima and Dima (2016) and estimate a
pooled regressions of the following form:
Rit = β0+β1Racei+β2Xit +λt + εit (4.4.1)
where Rit represents the radicalism of individual i at year t, Race includes racial dum-
mies with Black as the reference category, and Xit includes other controls, like educa-
tion, age, wealth, employment, life satisfaction, gender, and having a partner. We ex-
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clude household income brackets from all the regressions because this variable might
be endogenous to racist attitudes (Mocan & Raschke, 2014).
Table 4.4.3 presents the results from the estimation of equation 4.4.1. Column 1
presents the OLS results, Column 2 presents the Logit results with the median as
the cut-off point, and columns 3, 4 and 5 report the unconditional quantile effects
estimated by Recentered Influence Function (RIF) regressions (see Firpo, Fortin and
Lemieux (2007)). All specifications include province-year fixed effects, to account for
the fact that we pool datasets from different years and racist attitudes, or that radical-
ism degrees may be similar for people from the same province. The latter two models
(Logit and RIF) are meant to lend force to the findings from the OLS model.
Looking at the OLS results, we note significant effects of race, education, life satis-
faction, wealth quantile, and employment on the degree of radicalism. For instance,
relative to Blacks, Whites have about 1.51 lower levels of average radicalism. All the
race effects are significant at one percent (1%). In line with the literature, we also find
that those with no education exhibit, on average, more radicalism. One way to look at
these monotonic education effects is to assume that, all things being equal, those with
no education suddenly have either primary or high school education or tertiary educa-
tion. If this occurred, then their average degree of radicalism would fall by 0.17, 0.19,
and 0.23, respectively. The education effects are statistically significant at five percent
(5%) for both primary and high school and at one percent (1%) for tertiary education.
The education effects are consistent with Mocan and Raschke (2014) who report that
more educated Germans have weaker xenophobic, anti-semitic and racist feelings. But
this could also mean that more educated individuals are, on average, better at hiding
their feelings (Glaeser, 2005). It is important to note that education is only significant
in the regressions that do not include household income quantiles, which could mean
the findings are picking up the income effects. This could be the reason for income
being correlated with the degree of radicalism.
Given the general findings in the literature that life satisfaction increases with income,
up to a certain point at least (Kahneman & Deaton, 2010), it should also be true
that perceptions of personal economic conditions are positively correlated with self-
reported life satisfaction. We use the “very satisfied” category as the reference group
in our regressions. We find that those who are satisfied with or neutral about their life
are, on average, less radical. However, the average degree of radicalism of those who
report being either dissatisfied and very dissatisfied with life is not statistically differ-
ent from the radicalism of those who are very satisfied with life. In line with studies
that use perceptions of personal economic circumstances as a predictor of racist at-
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titudes, we include a self-reported life satisfaction variable as a proxy for economic
circumstances. If satisfaction with life is indeed a good proxy for perceptions of per-
sonal economic conditions, we see that those who are not satisfied with their personal
economic conditions are as “racist” as those who are very satisfied. The average de-
gree of radicalism is less for people in mid to high wealth quantiles, compared to that
of people in the lower quantiles. These wealth effects are monotonic and stronger in
statistical significance. That is, compared to those in poorer households (the reference
category), people in rich households have lower average degrees of radicalism, and
the effect decreases as wealth increases. A possible explanation for this result is that
greater wealth can allow some mobility (e.g migrating to more heterogeneous com-
munities) which in turn can foster interaction with people from different racial groups.
This finding supports that of Mocan and Raschke (2014) who find that an improvement
in an individual’s economic well-being tends to mitigate prejudiced feelings.
Age, as a continuous variable, has no impact on the degree to which individuals defend
the interests of their racial group. To investigate the age effects further, we re-estimate
all regressions by including age dummies for 10-year age intervals, with the group
aged 16-24 as the reference category. We find that all the point estimates are positive,
and this increases with age. The results are Table 4.7.6 in the Appendix. However,
only coefficients for age groups 24 -35 and 75 and older are statistically significant.
This suggests that youths and older people, on average, have stronger racist attitudes
in comparison to those aged 16-24. We pool together data from various years between
2003 and 2012, and those aged 50 and above would have experienced the apartheid
regime. The point estimates for the older group are therefore in line with expecta-
tions. These findings are consistent with results from Mocan and Raschke (2016), who
report that people who grew up in Nazi Germany are more racist, anti-semitic, and
xenophobic.
Having either full-time or part-time employment lowers one’s average degree of radic-
alism, in comparison to those who are not working. An obvious explanation is a com-
petition for resources, in which the unemployed feel they are competing with people
from different groups. Another possible explanation for this could be increased contact
in the workplace with people from different identity categories, which could reduce any
racist feelings (Glaeser, 2005). Having a partner, and being female, have no influence
on racial radicalism.
Column 2 presents the results where the dependent variable measures whether the re-
spondent is radical or not. The dependent variable is 1 if the respondent’s degree of
radicalism is greater than the median degree of radicalism of the pooled sample, and
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zero otherwise. We see that race, education, life satisfaction, and wealth tell the same
story as in the OLS model. That is, more educated people have a reduced propensity
for radicalism, relative to those without education. Those who are neutral about their
life satisfaction and those who are satisfied with life have lower average degrees of
radicalism than those who are dissatisfied. The average degree of radicalism is no dif-
ferent from the OLS results for those in the middle wealth category, while it is less for
those in the high wealth category. The other explanatory variables like age, gender, and
marital status are similar to OLS, are not statistically significant. Only the magnitudes
of the coefficients change slightly in the Logit model, while the sign and significance
of the coefficients remain unchanged. We therefore conclude that the Logit results
validate the OLS results.
Column 3 to 5 present the results of the unconditional quantile regressions. The effect
of covariates differs across the radicalism distribution, and therefore, compared, to the
conditional quantile regressions, it is easier to interpret the estimated coefficients with
the RIF regressions (see Fortin et al. (2011b); Porter (2015) for a detailed account of
the benefits of RIF regressions). The dependent variable is the RIF which is defined3
as
RIF (R; qτ ,FR) = qτ +
τ−1{R≤ qτ}
fy (qτ)
(4.4.2)
where τ indicates a specific quantile (say the 25th, or 0.25), qτ is the value of the
dependent variable, radicalism degree, R, at that specific quantile. FR is the cumulative
distribution function of R , and fy(qτ) is the density of R at qτ . The indicator function,
1{R≤qτ}, identifies whether the value of the radicalism degree, R , for the individual
is below qτ .
For example, consider the 75th quantile (τ = 0.75), the RIF for this quantile is obtained
by first estimating the value of the radicalism degree at the 75th quantile. Then estim-
ating the kernel density at the 75th quantile fy(q0.75), and then generating a dummy
variable 1{R≤q0.75} which indicates whether the value of the radicalism degree is at
or below the value of the radicalism degree at the 75th quantile. Thus, the resulting RIF
is a dummy variable with value q0.75+{0.75/fy(q0.75)} for those above the 75th quantile
and the values q0.75−{0.25/fy(q0.75)} for those at or below the 75th quantile. Once the
RIF has been calculated for each individual, it becomes our dependent variable in the
OLS model. The RIF- regressions for any quantile is therefore equivalent to running
3This RIF discussion follows Borgen (2016) and Porter (2015)
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a linear probability model of the probability of the degree of racial radicalism degree
exceeding that quantile on race and other explanatory variables (Fortin et al., 2011b).
Table 4.4.3: Determinants of Degree of Radicalism, pooled sample
VARIABLES
RIF regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS Logit Quantile_25 Quantile_50 Quantile_75
Coloured -0.992*** -1.194*** -1.264*** -1.130*** -0.379***
(0.0600) (0.0851) (0.0694) (0.0530) (0.0231)
Indian -1.049*** -1.174*** -1.336*** -1.158*** -0.430***
(0.0647) (0.0941) (0.0897) (0.0677) (0.0290)
White -1.514*** -1.743*** -1.809*** -1.418*** -0.464***
(0.0656) (0.105) (0.0895) (0.0625) (0.0264)
Primary -0.166** -0.348** -0.166** -0.165* -0.0550
(0.0796) (0.141) (0.0805) (0.0948) (0.0506)
High School -0.187** -0.365*** -0.127* -0.161* -0.0591
(0.0758) (0.136) (0.0767) (0.0908) (0.0484)
Tertiary -0.233*** -0.473*** -0.191 -0.280** -0.113**
(0.0887) (0.157) (0.118) (0.112) (0.0556)
Satisfied -0.161** -0.260** -0.137** -0.224*** -0.155***
(0.0690) (0.102) (0.0697) (0.0702) (0.0372)
Neutral -0.240*** -0.259** -0.203*** -0.224*** -0.208***
(0.0754) (0.110) (0.0738) (0.0764) (0.0401)
Dissatisfied -0.0108 -0.0646 -0.0893 -0.142** -0.126***
(0.0670) (0.0988) (0.0655) (0.0688) (0.0369)
Very Dissatisfied -0.0221 0.0377 -0.108 0.0871 -0.0901*
(0.0913) (0.137) (0.0965) (0.0911) (0.0477)
Age 0.00191 0.00110 0.000156 0.00156 0.000566
(0.00118) (0.00193) (0.00143) (0.00137) (0.000690)
Middle Wealth -0.0949** -0.0628 -0.0212 -0.0293 -0.0484*
(0.0440) (0.0668) (0.0478) (0.0506) (0.0266)
High Wealth -0.300*** -0.390*** -0.312*** -0.332*** -0.149***
(0.0555) (0.0801) (0.0770) (0.0679) (0.0320)
Continued on next page:
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Table 4.4.4: Continued from previous page
VARIABLES
RIF regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS Logit Quantile_25 Quantile_50 Quantile_75
Employed -0.0914** -0.0565 -0.0705 -0.0406 -0.0366*
(0.0370) (0.0564) (0.0438) (0.0415) (0.0204)
Female -0.0202 0.00411 0.0412 0.0138 -0.0213
(0.0330) (0.0523) (0.0414) (0.0396) (0.0198)
Partnered -0.0182 -0.0586 -0.0191 -0.0497 -0.00113
(0.0366) (0.0575) (0.0440) (0.0426) (0.0212)
Constant 7.918*** 1.156*** 6.935*** 8.071*** 8.861***
(0.108) (0.182) (0.114) (0.122) (0.0662)
Observations 14,815 14,815 19,308 19,308 19,308
R-squared 0.174 0.153 0.133 0.076
Notes: Dependent variable is the normalised first Polychoric principal component from the six ordinal
variables. For the Logit model (column 2), the dependent variable is 1 if an individual’s radicalism
degree is higher than the pooled sample median and 0 otherwise. For the quantile regressions, the
dependent variable is the RIF defined in equation 4.4.2. Black is the base category for racial groups
while No education (those with zero years of schooling) is the reference category for the education
category. Primary is those with from 1 to 7 years of schooling, High school those with 8 to 12 years
of education and Tertiary those with more than 12 years of education. Wealth is the limited wealth
index calculated using Uncentered PCA (Wittenberg & Leibbrandt, 2017) from household ownership
or access to number of assets. Employed is a dummy for those with any type of employment, either
full-time or part-time. Partnered is marital status indicator which is 1 if an individual has a partner.
All regressions exclude 2006 because the data for this year does not have two of the ordinal variables.
Linearised standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * are 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels.
Source: Own calculations from weighted SASAS datasets, 2003 - 2012.
One way of looking at the adicalism degree distribution is to think of it as showing the
strength with which an individual safeguards the interests of his racial group. Those
at the lower end of the distribution, say at or below q0.25, are not overly involved in
defending their racial group’s interests, while those situated at the top end, say above
or at q0.75, are deeply involved or identified with their racial group. Similar to the logit
results, we see that more educated people tend to exhibit less radicalism compared to
those without education. However, at the lower end of the radicalism distribution, q0.25,
those with primary or high school education have lower levels of radicalism compared
to those with no education. At the median or middle of the radicalism distribution,
all education dummies are negative and significant at 10%, showing that the more
educated have lower levels of radicalism. At the upper percentile, q0.75, those with
tertiary education are significantly less radical compared to those with no education.
This is suggestive of limited education (primary and high school) being a predictor of
low or moderate levels of radicalism or racist attitudes.
The same regularity of race effects emerges in all but the upper quantile, q0.75. At
141
Un
ive
rsi
ty
of
Ca
pe
To
wn
the top end, q0.75, the point estimates have dropped considerably, compared with the
low and middle percentile. For instance, for those at the lower end and middle of
the distribution, the Black-White radicalism degree differential is about 1.8, and 1.4,
which decreases to 0.46 in the 75th percentile. The same pattern is true for the Black-
Coloured differential. To put these differentials into perspective, membership of a
racial group does not necessarily lead to a higher degree of involvement in that group.
Therefore, the decline of the Black-White differential as one move into or above the
75th percentile suggests that being Black does not guarantee that one will overly de-
fend the interests of Blacks. Rather race is only relevant for lower degrees of racial
radicalism. Put differently, the effect of race falls as the degree to which an individual
identifies with his racial group rises. Interestingly, the wealth effect tends to decrease
as we move from both low and middle percentiles to higher percentiles. This suggests
that wealth is more relevant for people who are less radical.
Another noteworthy result is the effect of life satisfaction at the higher percentiles. As
we can see, at the lower end of the radicalism distribution, people who are neutral or
satisfied with life have significantly lower degrees of radicalism. Moving to the middle
of the distribution, those who are dissatisfied with life also have lower degree of rad-
icalism, compared to the very satisfied. At the top end of the radicalism distribution,
those who are very dissatisfied with life also have a lower degrees of radicalism. This
means that as we move upward along the radicalism distribution (i.e from less racist
attitudes to more racist attitudes) dissatisfaction with life becomes relevant. That is,
being very dissatisfied with life is a key factor for those who are deeply involved in
defending the interests of their racial group. We can also see that being employed is
significant at 10% at the top end of the distribution. Thus, if these working people
suddenly become unemployed their radicalism distribution would shift to the left (in a
negative direction), with a smaller and significant shift for those at the top end, com-
pared to a much larger but insignificant shift for situates at the low end. The effects of
other explanatory variables are consistent with both the OLS and logit results. That is,
radicalism degree does not vary by age, gender, or marital status (having a partner).
To sum up, in this section we examine the profile and correlates of the degree of rad-
icalism in South Africa. We find that the extent of racial radicalism varies with race,
household wealth, level of education, employment status, and to some extent, life sat-
isfaction. However, these variables only explain about 17% of the variation in the
radicalism distribution. This could be because of omitted variable bias or the fact that
the radicalism degree index does not effectively capture the extent to which people
identify with and defend the interest of their racial groups.
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Nevertheless, the results appear to be in support of previous studies on the determin-
ants of racist attitudes and social tolerance (Dima & Dima, 2016; Mocan & Raschke,
2016). We also find that poorer people, the less educated and, to a large extent, youths
and older people are more likely to have radical racist attitudes. These findings are
somewhat consistent with the predictions of Glaeser (2005). In his model of supply of
hate by politicians, Glaeser (2005) predicts that education and having contact with the
hated groups reduces the costs of acquiring information about the hate-stories propag-
ated by politicians. Therefore, racist attitudes should be mitigated with education and
contact with members of other groups. The results are also consistent with Akerlof and
Kranton (2005)’s extended model of economics of identity. In their model, income and
individual identity are substitutes, meaning relatively wealthy people may deviate from
the partisan behaviour of their group. The loss in utility due to this “decline in iden-
tity” is compensated for by higher income. In the current context, this suggests more
wealthy people are less likely to be radical, while poorer households are likely have
greater degrees of radicalism. One notable difference between our results and those of
studies like that of Dima and Dima (2016) is that our racial radicalism scores (extent
of racist attitudes) do not vary by gender.
4.4.1.1 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we investigate the robustness of these findings to the different calcu-
lations of the degree of radicalism. Firstly, we use the first four ordinal variables to
construct the radicalism degree. That is, we omit the last two questions (i.e., questions
5 and 6 on the attached to people of same race or speaking same language) because they
were not available in 2006. Second, we use an extended list of 13 ordinal variables,
but from only three years, 2010, 2011, and 2012, in the construction of our measure of
radicalism. Third, we use the Uncentered PCA and the Standard PCA to calculate the
extent of radicalism from the preferred list of 6 ordinal variables. Lastly, we the data
from the two questions on land redistribution and racial quotas.
Table 4.7.3 on page 161 presents the OLS results from these sensitivity checks. Column
1 replicates the column 1 in Table 4.4.3 for ease of comparison. Column 2 presents res-
ults from the radicalism degree calculation on the first four ordinal variables. Columns
3 and 4 provide results from the three years, with information on the extended list of
variables (see Appendix 4.7.3). Column 3 re-estimates the degree of radicalism based
on the preferred six variables, to ensure comparability with Column 4 which shows
our extended list of 13 variables. Column 5 and 6 show the use of the six variables
to calculate the index of the degree of radicalism, but using the Uncentered PCA and
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Standard PCA4. The last column provides results from the radicalism computed by
omitting data on questions with reversed codes for White and Coloured individuals.
The main findings from these regressions are that the results presented in Table 4.7.3
are, by and large, qualitatively similar to the main findings. Therefore, we conclude
that the wealth and race effects are somewhat robust to the different calculations of our
index of the extent of radicalism.
Looking closely at the Table 4.7.3, the following issues emerge. There is slight in-
crease in the differentials of radicalism across race groups when we use the first four
ordinal variables (column 2). Furthermore, relative to those with no education, indi-
viduals with education still have a lower average degree of racism. The coefficients
of the education dummies continue to fall, as the level of education increases. There
is, however, no statistical difference in the average levels of radicalism between the
reference category (those reported to be very satisfied with life) and those in the other
categories of life satisfaction. Interestingly, being older appears to also positively affect
radicalism. This is expected in South Africa, given that older people have experienced
the apartheid regime. Those in the upper wealth quantile have lower mean levels of
radicalism than those in the lower wealth quantile. This result reinforces earlier find-
ings that an improvement in the economic condition compels people to be less racist.
Lastly, we see that having a partner tends to lessen the degree of radicalism.
When we use the extended list of variables (columns 3 and 4), there is a sizeable drop
in the race differentials. The Black-White differential falls by an amount equivalent
to 70%, from 1.62 to 0.48, while the Black-Coloured differential falls by almost 76%,
from 0.906 to 0.218. The other covariates keep the same qualitative effects as the
main results. When we use Uncentered PCA and Standard PCA (columns5 and 6),
we note that Uncentered PCA and Polychoric PCA results have similar qualitative and
quantitative effects across all explanatory variables. The only difference is the positive
and significant age effect in the Uncentered PCA results. The Standard PCA results,
however, tell a slightly different story. That is, the education coefficients, although
not significant, are all positive, which suggests that educated people are more radical.
Lastly, in column 7, we examine the sensitivity of the results to omitting questions on
land redistribution and racial quotas. The differences of radicalism across race groups
declined, though they still keep the same sign. All the other variables remain somewhat
unchanged.
4For both approaches, we also calculate the radicalism index using the dummy variables based on the
original ordinal variables. The results, available upon request, are no different from ones reported in
Table 4.4.3 columns 5 and 6.
144
Un
ive
rsi
ty
of
Ca
pe
To
wn
Apart from the above, the choice of the first component as an indicator of radicalism
might also be an issue. While the first component is the natural selection due to its
larger eigenvalue, it only explains about 37% of the total variation. The three compon-
ents, however, account for at least 81% of the total variation. In columns 2 and 3 of
Table 4.7.4 in the Appendix, we record our re-estimation of the OLS regressions using
the second and the third components. We further check for differences in the results if
we use the original untransformed first component derived from the preferred six vari-
ables. Column 4 provides an answer to this statement by running the OLS regression
with the dependent variable as the untransformed first component.
Despite the minor differences in the quantitative effects of education dummies in the
Standard PCA results, we find that the results presented in Tables 4.7.3 and 4.7.4 are,
on balance, qualitatively like to the main findings. It is therefore conceivable to con-
clude that using any of the radicalism degree indices to measure the extent of social
polarization would not significantly alter the conclusions. Based on these sensitivity
findings, we use the preferred analysis based on the six variables.
4.5 Results
This section gives a general picture of the evolution of social polarization in South
Africa from 2003 to 2013. Section 4.5.1 presents the trends for social polarization.
We use the radicalism degree distributions to compute the Permanyer (2012) indices
of social polarization, and conclude that social distances/gaps between (within) racial
groups declined (increased) during the study period.
4.5.1 Racial Radicalism Polarization results
Figure 4.5.1 reports the evolution of indices Permanyer (2012) and Reynal-Querol
(2002) showing social polarization in South Africa over the period 2003 - 2012. Figure
4.5.2 presents the decomposition of the Permanyer (2012) index by racial group. That
is, it reports the patterns of polarization by each racial group. The lower the polar-
ization score (closer to zero), the narrower the gap between individuals in the racial
groups, or the further the society is from a bi-modal distribution in the case of the RQ
index.
The main findings from these figures are that, besides the spike in 2007, there is an
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overall decrease in social gaps between racial groups or individuals in different groups
during the period 2003 to 2010, and there is a slight increase from 2010 to 2012.
The distance between individuals in the same group tends to increase from 2003 to
2010 and falls from 2010 to 2012. While the change from one year to the next is
not significant, the social polarization values for the individual years are statistically
significant.
We take a closer look at these figures, starting with figure 4.5.1. The left y-axis meas-
ures the RQ, Permanyer (2012) and between-race polarization, while the second y-axis
on the right measures the within-racial group polarization (first component of equation
4.2.5). The following four features emerge from this figure: First, the Reynal-Querol
(2002) index score, which only uses racial distributions, declines by a value equivalent
to 5.67% during the period. As figure 4.7.1 shows, this is not surprising, given that the
population share of Blacks increases, whereas that of Whites and Coloureds decreases,
and remains fairly stable, respectively. Second, the Permanyer (2012) index score de-
creases in totality between 2003 and 2012, but with some notable dynamics across the
years. This is because Permanyer (2012) uses the degree of radicalism distributions
which can vary from one year to another. For instance, the Permanyer (2012) index
score increases in 2007, and decreases thereafter until 2011, and increases again in
2012. This suggests the narrowing of gaps and a reduction in hostility, as a measure
of the degree of radicalism, between racial groups during the period. However, there
appears to be a reversal of this trend in 2012.
The third thing to note from the figure is that the Permanyer (2012) index score is
always above the RQ index, while the RQ figures are everywhere above the between-
group polarization score. Given that between-group polarization (equation 4.2.3) arises
only when there is alienation between groups, we might expect that it will be higher
or somewhat closer to the RQ index. Surprisingly, this is not the case. Nonetheless,
the gap between the Permanyer and RQ index figures narrows after 2007, until 2011,
which is further evidence of the narrowing of gaps between racial groups.
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Figure 4.5.1: Social Polarization trends in South Africa, 2003 - 2012
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Notes: This figure provides the evolution of social polarization in South Africa during the period from
2003 to 2012. The Permanyer (2012) index score is the sum of between-group and within-group polar-
ization. The Permanyer (2012) index assumes alienation between and within groups, while between-
group polarization ignores the within-group alienation and within-group polarization deals with aliena-
tion between individuals of the same group. RQ is the Reynal-Querol (2002) index, which is an index of
pure social polarization. All the estimates are weighted at the national level using the calibrated survey
weights, and the standard errors for the years 2007 to 2012 are adjusted for the sample design used. The
Permanyer (2012) index scores are estimated by Distributive Analysis Stata Package (DASP), and the
Reynal-Querol (2002) index scores are estimated with the rq Stata code developed by Carlos Gradin.
Source: Own calculations using weighted SASAS 2003 to 2012
The fourth notable feature is the overall closing of the gap between racial groups un-
til 2010, after which they start to widen. This suggests that animosity between the
races has somehow become worse after 2010. Since the identification effect or sub-
population shares are somewhat consistent over the period, this sudden reversal may
be due to an increase in radicalism. As expected, we see that alienation between in-
dividuals in different groups ( between-group polarization) is the main driver of total
polarization. That is, between-group polarization accounts for approximately 79% of
the variation in total polarization. Lastly, within-group polarization, which focuses on
alienation between individuals within a group, has been on the rise. There is a some-
what divergent pattern for between-group polarization and within-group polarization.
That is, an increase (decrease) in the distance between individuals from different racial
groups happens in tandem with reduced (increased) distance between individuals in the
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same racial group. For example, as Black and White groups become more internally
homogeneous, the groups become more distant from each other.
We now turn to Figure 4.5.2 which presents between-group polarization, (panel (a)),
and within-group polarization, (panel (b)), across the four race groups. Similarly, the
figures have two y-axes, where the first y-axis on the left, in both panels (a) and (b),
reports the polarization levels of Blacks and South Africa as a whole. The second y-
axis (on the right), with much lower scores, shows the polarization levels for Whites
and Coloureds. The main contribution of the data shown in this figure is to highlight
the differential impact of each racial group on total polarization.
It is clear from the figures that Blacks have the largest share or contribution to the dis-
tance between individuals in the different groups (between-group polarization), and the
distance between individuals in the same group (within-group polarization). The na-
tional patterns of between-group and within-group polarization mimics that of Blacks.
Whites’ alienation or animosity towards other groups (between-group polarization)
and towards other Whites (within-group polarization) decreases during the study period.
The results seem to be consistent with the literature on health polarization and social
polarization in general (Fusco & Silber, 2014; Permanyer, 2012; ?).
Figure 4.5.2: Between-race and Within-race Polarization trends in South Africa,
2003-2012
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Notes: Panel (a) shows the evolution of between-race polarization. Between-group polarization deals
with alienation between groups and assumes no alienation or radicalism within groups (see equation ??).
Panel (b) is the within-race polarization, and focuses on alienation or radicalism between individuals of
the same group. The estimates are weighted at a national level using the calibrated survey weights, and
the standard errors for the years 2007 to 2012 are adjusted for the sample design used.
Source: Own calculations using weighted SASAS datasets from 2003 to 2012.
We conclude this discussion by checking the sensitivity of the above findings to us-
ing a different measure of social polarization. That is, we apply the Permanyer and
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D’ambrosio (2015) indices to measure social polarization, and check if we reach dif-
ferent conclusions. Figure 4.7.4 (in the appendix) shows that the scores of the Symmet-
ric and Asymmetric indices indicate the narrowing of gaps between the racial groups.
This is similar to the scores of Reynal-Querol (2002) and Permanyer (2012) indices,
the scores of the Permanyer and D’ambrosio (2015) indices decrease during the study
period. While the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the scores of the Symmet-
ric, the Reynal-Querol (2002) and Permanyer (2012) indices is about 0.3, the correla-
tion between Asymmetric, the Reynal-Querol (2002) and Permanyer (2012) indices is
about 0.5. This means that the Asymmetric index of Permanyer and D’ambrosio (2015)
is similar to the Reynal-Querol (2002) and Permanyer (2012) indices. The results seem
to be consistent with the literature on health polarization and social polarization in gen-
eral (Fusco & Silber, 2014; Permanyer, 2012; ?).
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we provide a descriptive examination of the extent of social polarization
in South Africa. First, we show that the strength with which an individual defends the
interest of their racial group (racial radicalism degree) falls with increases in household
wealth and education attainment. We also find less radicalism among employed people
and those who are satisfied with life. The racism results, on the whole, are consistent
with theoretical predictions of both Glaeser (2005) and Akerlof and Kranton (2005).
Second, we compute the Permanyer (2012) index of social polarization by using the
racial radicalism distribution to measure alienation across racial groups. We find that
social polarization declines during the study period. This decline is largely due to a
decrease in polarization between racial groups. Interestingly, as between-racial group
polarization reduces, within-racial group polarization tends to increase. This suggests
that, as distances between racial groups are fading away, distances within the races
are increasing, or there is an emergence of other social identities within the racial
groups. This finding is suggestive of the country being polarized along more than one
dimension. It therefore signals a need to also examine the extent of multidimensional
polarization.
Higher education, increased household wealth, being employed, and better health
status are associated with less animosity between racial groups, and less social po-
larization in turn. Public policy should therefore target an improvement in education
attainment, particularly for those in previously disadvantaged groups. This will in-
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crease the probability of employment, better earnings, and improved health status, and
reduce alienation levels, which will promote racial integration. Racial integration will
most likely increase cohesive tendencies in terms of both economic (for example in-
come) and social characteristics (for example radicalism), which will in turn reduce
polarization. De-racialisation policies that abrogate segregation or tracking of students
by race within schools, as well as Affirmative Action policies in the workplace need to
be implemented in conjunction with education improvement policies.
4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 Axiomatic Characterisations of ER and DER
The axioms used to characterize the discrete polarization measure in
Esteban and Ray (1994) are the following:
Condition H If P(pi,y)≥P(pi,y) for two distributions (pi,y) and (pi,y), then for all
λ > 0, P(pi,y)≥ P(pi,y).
Axiom 1 Assume there are three income groups with income levels 0, x, y and popu-
lation masses p, q, q. Assume that p > q > 0 and 0 < x < y. There exists ε > 0 and
µ > 0 (possibly depending on p and x) such that if |x− y| < ε and q < µ p, then the
joining of the two q masses at their mid-point (x+ y)/2, increases polarization.
Axiom 2 Assume there are three income groups with income levels 0,x,y and popula-
tion masses p,q,r. Assume that p > r > 0 and x > |y− x|. There exists ε > 0 such that
if the population mass qis moved to the right (towards) r by an amount not exceeding
ε , polarization goes up.
Axiom 3 Assume there are three income groups with income levels 0,x,2x and popu-
lation masses p,q, p. Any new distribution formed by shifting population mass from
the central mass q equally to the two lateral masses p, must increase polarization.
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The axioms used to characterize the continuous polarization measure in
Duclos et al. (2004) are the following:
Axiom 1 If a distribution is composed of a single basic density, then a squeeze of that
density cannot increase polarization.
Axiom 2 If a symmetric distribution is composed of three basic densities with the same
root and mutually disjoint supports, then a symmetric squeeze of the side densities
cannot reduce polarization.
Axiom 3 Consider a symmetric distribution composed of four basic densities with the
same root and mutually disjoint supports. Slide the two middle densities to the sides
keeping all supports disjoint. Then polarization must go up.
Axiom 4 If P(F)≥ P(G) and p> 0, then P(pF)≥ P(pG), where pF and pG represent
identical population scalings of F and G respectively.
4.7.2 Calibrating the sampling weights
In this section, we explain the procedure of calibrating the sampling weights. But, first
we highlight the advantages of the new weights we create over the previous weights
supplied with the data. The advantage of these new weights we calibrate is that they
are benchmarked against the most recent population estimates. That is, StatsSA revises
its mid-year population projections annually to reflect the true structure of the popu-
lation5, thus our weights will improve the representativeness of each sample. More
importantly, the new calibrated weights will provide marginal totals (or subpopulation
shares) that are somewhat consistent as a time series. Given that the identification
component in the social polarization indicators relies heavily on population weights of
the racial groups, the new weights will surely end up with relatively robust polarization
trends over time.
We apply an iterative proportional fitting known as raking to calibrate the weights (see
Battaglia et al. (2013), Wittenberg (2010) and Kolenikov et al. (2014) for details about
raking). The procedure is similar to post-stratification in that we divide the samples
by province and into 88 race-gender-age groups. The aim is to ensure that weights
5A better option would be to benchmark using somewhat consistent population totals from the latest
edition of the demographic and epidemiological model developed and maintained by the Actuarial
Society of South Africa (ASSA) (Branson & Wittenberg, 2014).
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within cells correspond to the recent 2015 mid-year population totals6. In the absence
of design weights to correct for non-response, for ex-ante weights when raking, we use
the benchmarked SASAS weights because they contain information about the sample
design and structure of the population. One limitation of using the SASAS weights is
that our weights will take on their biases, for example their large range (see table 4.7.8).
In the basic raking algorithm, the “margins are adjusted one at the time, with variables
repeatedly cycled, until the desired degree of convergence is achieved” (Kolenikov et
al., 2014).
For example, consider a hypothetical survey with two strata (urban and rural) from
which males and females are selected7. In Table 4.7.1 we show that the same numbers
of individuals are selected from each stratum. However, males are selected at a rate
of 1:4 females in the urban sample and 3:2 females in the rural sample. Assuming
that the external population distribution of males to females is actually 3:2, and 80%
of the population live in urban areas. If no information is available about the gender
distribution within stratum at the population level, calibration can be used to improve
the accuracy of estimates. If the sample is 1,000 with marginal distributions 1:1 on
stratum and 2:3 on gender, and we need it to represent a population of 2,000, with
marginal distributions of 4:1 on stratum and 3:2 on gender. We can calibrate as follows:
First, rescale the weights on the one margin, say gender, to those in the population. In
this case, males are given a weight of 3 and females 4/3. This then offsets the sample
stratum’s marginal totals to about 1:1.3. We then rescale this new stratum marginal
totals to the population stratum distribution. We continue iterating in this way until
each margin converges to the population marginal totals.
Table 4.7.1: Calibration Example
Gender Marginal total
Strata Male Female In sample Required
Urban 100 400 500 1600
Rural 300 200 500 400
Marginal total In sample 400 600 1000
Required 1200 800 2000
Source: Adapted from Branson and Wittenberg (2014)
A limitation of our weights is that they are calibrated at an individual level, meaning
it is possible for people within the same household to have different weights. Con-
6One issue we encounter is that, the SASAS is administered only to people aged 16 and above, thus
we needed population total for people age 16 - 19, the first age group. But StatsSA only releases
population totals in the age group 15 - 19. Therefore, we use Sprague multipliers released with the
mid-year projections to calculate and subtract those aged 15 years to end up with the required aged
group, 16 - 19.
7This example is adapted from Branson and Wittenberg (2014) and followed closely.
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straining the weights to be equal within a household could be solved by using a cross-
entropy approach developed by Wittenberg (2010). The cross-entropy approach re-
quires households to have unique identifiers, and the SASAS data does not have unique
household identifiers. Even though the raking or weight calibrations bring some effi-
ciency gains, it leads to an increase in the variation of these weights, which in turn
leads to greater design effects. This could be due to very small counts in some cells
(e.g Indians/Asians 65 years and above in our data). Another limitation of this ba-
sic raking algorithm is that it does not place limits on the lowest and highest values
of the weights. Raked or calibrated weights are likely, as is the case here, to exhibit
considerable variability. One solution is weight trimming such that the largest (smal-
lest) weights are reduced (increased) to reduce their impact on the variance (Izrael,
Battaglia & Frankel, 2009; Kolenikov et al., 2014). However, trimmed weights may
not add up to intended populations totals, and weight trimming may also introduce a
bias, meaning there is a trade-off between latent bias and lower variance (Izrael et al.,
2009).
The raking was done in two stages. The first calibration is done before the Polychoric
Principal Component Analysis (PPCA), an approach we use to compute the index of
the degree of racial radicalism. This is so that we can use the resulting new weights
when calculating this index. The second stage of calibration is done after the PPCA
approach. This is mainly because we dropped all observations with missing values
for the radicalism index, and this resulted in an underestimation and overestimation of
populations and racial group shares in some years. It is, however, vital to note that the
calibrated weights are only as good as the auxiliary data used (Branson & Wittenberg,
2014).
4.7.2.1 Assessing the calibrated weights
In this section, we highlight the differences between the original SASAS weights and
the new calibrated weights. As can be seen from table 4.4.1 in the Appendix, which re-
ports summary statistics of these weights, the mean and the spread ( standard deviation
or coefficient of variation) of the new weights is larger for all the years. This means
the original SASAS weights are raised, but they now have a larger variance. Another
noteworthy feature is that both the original and the new calibrated weights have a large
spread. For instance, for all the years except 2008 and 2011, the ratio of the largest to
smallest is above 100 000. This can be worrying as many estimates are overly affected
by observations with large weights (Kolenikov et al., 2014). As already noted, weights
are often trimmed, but this needs to be done concurrently with calibration to minimize
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the latent bias of trimming (Izrael et al., 2009).
We use the untrimmed weights because we are concerned with social polarization
which depends on sub-population shares. Social polarization is a function of increas-
ing group identification, which increases with subgroup shares. Therefore, as long as
the weights give a true picture of the population shares of racial groups, their variabil-
ity should not be a problem. A complication arises in the measurement of alienation,
that is, we are likely to give ordinal responses from these observations more weight
and therefore our estimate of alienation will be biased upwards.
Figure 4.7.1: Comparison of the calibrated weights and the original SASAS weights
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Notes: This figure presents a comparison of population estimates using the original SASAS weights
and the new calibrated weights. SAS wgts are estimates based on the original weights supplied with
the SASAS datasets, Rake wgts are calibrated using survwgt Stata code from Winter et al. (2015), and
Actual are Statistics South Africa mid-year estimates. Panel (a) shows the total population count for the
whole of South Africa. Panel (b) to (c) shows the racial population share. The SASAS totals are not
consistent, whereas the calibrated (raked) totals form a smooth series over time.
In Figure 4.7.1, we present a population count based on these weights. As expected,
the calibrated weights produce a smooth series which are similar to Statistics South
Africa’s estimates. The only difference is possibly due to converting the new weights
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to integers. The original SASAS weights, however, make implausible jumps and dips
in some years. For instance, between 2003 and 2012, the population increases steadily,
but, according to the SASAS estimates, it increases only up to 2005, then declines in
2006, rises again 2007, and then declines thereafter until 2009.
Looking the racial proportions in Figure 4.7.1 (b) to (c), we note that the proportions
of Blacks increases during the study period, while the proportion of Coloureds and
of Whites decreases, according to the new calibrated weights and StatsSA’s estimates.
However, using the SASAS weights, the proportions of Blacks seems to be decreasing
and that of Coloureds and of Whites appears to be somewhat constant. Finally, in
Figure 4.7.2, we plot the values for the Reynal-Querol (2002) (RQ) index of pure social
polarization calculated using both the SASAS weights and the new calibrated weights.
As we can see the new calibrated weights produce a smooth downward sloping series,
while the series based on the SASAS weights is somewhat constant but with some
jumps. Therefore, we conclude that the new calibrated weights are a better option, at
least for the present analysis.
Figure 4.7.2: Reynal-Querol (2002) index of pure social polarization
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Notes: This figure presents a comparison of population estimates using the original SASAS weights
and the new calibrated weights. SAS wgts are estimates based on original weights supplied with the
SASAS datasets, and Rake wgts are calibrated using survwgt Stata code of Winter et al. (2015)..
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4.7.3 List of questions used to construct radicalism degrees
In parenthesis are the re-coding of the categories to a 1-10 scale such that 1 denotes
the lowest racism level and 10 the highest.
Limited list of six questions, 2003 - 2012
1. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? People
of different racial groups do not really trust or like each other? 1.Strongly
agree (10) 2.Agree (7.75) 3.Neither agree nor disagree (5.5) 4.Disagree (3.25)
5.Strongly disagree (1)
2. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? People
of different racial groups will never really trust or like each other? 1.Strongly
agree (10) 2.Agree (7.75) 3.Neither agree nor disagree (5.5) 4.Disagree (3.25)
5.Strongly disagree (1)
3. To what extent do you agree or disagree that government should. . . Redistribute
land to black South Africans. 1.Strongly agree (10) 2.Agree (7.75) 3.Neither
agree nor disagree (5.5) 4.Disagree (3.25) 5.Strongly disagree (1)
4. To what extent do you agree or disagree that there should be. . . ? Racial quotas
in national sports teams. 1.Strongly agree (10) 2.Agree (7.75) 3.Neither agree
nor disagree (5.5) 4.Disagree (3.25) 5.Strongly disagree (1)
5. To what extent do you feel attached to the following types of people? Those
who speak the same language as you? 1.Very attached (10) 2.Slightly attached
(7) 3.Not very attached (4) 4.Not at all attached (1)
6. To what extent do you feel attached to the following types of people? Those who
belong to the same race group as you? 1.Very attached (10) 2.Slightly attached
(7) 3.Not very attached (4) 4. Not at all attached (1)
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Extended list of questions, 2010 - 2012
1. South Africa used to have apartheid by law between white, black, coloured and
Indian/Asian. Since 1994, do you think that race relations in the country have
improved, stayed the same, or gotten worse? 1.Improved (1) 2.Stayed the same
(5.5) 3.Got worse (10)
2. How often do you feel racially discriminated against? 1.Always (10) 2.Often (7)
3.Sometimes (4) 5.Not at all (1)
3. And how much do you agree or disagree with the following? Being a member
of my race group is an important part of who I am as a person? 1.Strongly
agree (10) 2.Agree (7.75) 3.Neither agree nor disagree (5.5) 4.Disagree (3.25)
5.Strongly disagree (1)
4. And how much do you agree or disagree with the following? People of other race
groups in South Africa tend to exclude members of my group from positions of
power and responsibility? 1.Strongly agree (10) 2.Agree (7.75) 3.Neither agree
nor disagree (5.5) 4.Disagree (3.25) 5.Strongly disagree (1)
5. And how much do you agree or disagree with the following? The traditions and
values that are important to people of my race are under threat because of the
influence of other races in this country? 1.Strongly agree (10) 2.Agree (7.75)
3.Neither agree nor disagree (5.5) 4.Disagree (3.25) 5.Strongly disagree (1)
6. And how much do you agree or disagree with the following? Other race groups
in South Africa will never understand what members of my group are like.
1.Strongly agree (10) 2.Agree (7.75) 3.Neither agree nor disagree (5.5) 4.Dis-
agree (3.25) 5.Strongly disagree (1)
4.7.4 Polychoric Correlation
Polychoric correlation between two observed ordinal variables Z1 and Z2 with c1 and
c2 categories is the maximum likelihood estimation of the probabilities that categories
c1 and c2 are given jointly, weighted by the number of observations (Holgado-Tello,
Chacón-Moscoso, Barbero-García & Vila-Abad, 2010; Jöreskog, 2005; Olsson, 1979).
Suppose Z∗1 and Z
∗
2 are bivariate normally distributed latent variables with a correla-
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tion ρ that are underlying Z1 and Z2. Further, Z1 and Z2 are obtained by descretiz-
ing these underlying variables according to a set of thresholds ai, i = 0, . . . ,−∞ and
b j, j = 0, . . . ,−∞; such that a0 = b0 =−∞ and ac1 = bc2 =+∞. Then Polychoric cor-
relation ρ can be estimated by maximising the maximum likelihood function of the
multinomial distribution:
ln L =
c1
∑
i=1
c2
∑
j=1
ni jlog pi j (4.7.1)
where ni j is the number of cases in category i of Z1 and in category j of Z2; and pi j is
the probability that an observation falls in cell (i, j):
pi j = P [Z1 = i, Z2 = j] =
aiˆ
−∞
b jˆ
−∞
1
2pi
√
1−ρ2 exp
− 1
2(−ρ2)
(x2−2ρxy+y2)
(4.7.2)
Maximising the likelihood function (Eq. 4.7.1) with parameters ρ, aiand b j gives the
Polychoric correlation between Z1and Z2. Having estimated the Polychoric correlation,
then PCA is applied in the standard manner by solving the Eigen problem.
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4.7.5 Additional Tables and Figures
Figure 4.7.3: People of different racial groups will never really trust or like each
other?
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Notes: This figure provides percentage distribution of responses to the statement: People of different
racial groups will never really trust or like each other? The possible answers were 1.Strongly agree
2.Agree 3.Neither agree nor disagree 4.Disagree 5.Strongly disagree. We combine the first and last two
categories to end with just three categories. All estimates are estimated to 2015 population totals using
calibrated weights. .
Source: Own calculations using weighted SASAS datasets from 2003 to 2012.
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Table 4.7.2: Polychoric Principal Component Analysis Results
(a) Explained variance by the first three components
Components Eigenvalue Difference Proportion
Cumulative
proportion
Component 1 2.203 0.672 0.367 0.367
Component 2 1.531 0.385 0.255 0.622
Component 3 1.146 0.599 0.191 0.813
(b) Polychoric correlation matrix, pooled sample
Radicalism Radicalism not_trust never_trust same_lang same_race redis_land race_qouta
Radicalism 1
Radicalism_std 1 1
not_trust 0.598 0.598 1
never_trust 0.571 0.571 0.696 1
same_lang 0.663 0.663 0.133 0.065 1
same_race 0.638 0.638 0.114 0.072 0.728 1
redis_land 0.621 0.621 0.141 0.113 0.232 0.217 1
race_qouta 0.592 0.592 0.134 0.128 0.193 0.156 0.451 1
Notes: Panel (a) shows the Polychoric principal components analysis results. We retain the first com-
ponent as the measure of distance between racial groups. Panel (b) provides the weighted Polychoric
correlations between the original ordinal variables and the index of radicalism degree ( first compon-
ent). Radicalism is the untransformed first Polychoric principal component, while Radicalism_std is the
first component normalised using the following formula: 10(xobs− xmin)/(xmax− xmin). The positive
correlations (column 1 and 2) in Panel (b) between each of the ordinal variables and the degree of rad-
icalism index confirms, to some extent, the validity of our measure. The ordinal variables are rescaled
them from 1 to 10 such that 1 denotes the lowest racial radicalism degree and 10 the highest radicalism
degree. The ordinal variables are defined in Appendix 4.7.3.
Source: Own calculations using weighted SASAS datasets from 2003 to 2012.
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Table 4.7.3: Sensitivity analysis of the Radicalism degree results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES Original 4vars 6vars_lim 13vars Upca Spca 4vars_rev
Coloured -0.992*** -1.167*** -0.906*** -0.218** -1.140*** 1.201*** -0.444***
(0.0600) (0.0752) (0.0921) (0.0849) (0.0642) (0.106) (0.0598)
Indian -1.049*** -1.283*** -1.096*** -0.305*** -1.218*** 0.668*** -0.450***
(0.0647) (0.0891) (0.0994) (0.103) (0.0684) (0.117) (0.0790)
White -1.514*** -1.627*** -1.662*** -0.480*** -1.722*** 1.545*** -0.597***
(0.0656) (0.0786) (0.101) (0.115) (0.0670) (0.116) (0.0786)
Primary -0.166** -0.182* -0.207 -0.120 -0.179** 0.195 -0.131
(0.0796) (0.109) (0.136) (0.155) (0.0836) (0.163) (0.0918)
High School -0.187** -0.214** -0.170 -0.124 -0.195** 0.226 -0.191**
(0.0758) (0.106) (0.126) (0.148) (0.0800) (0.155) (0.0892)
Tertiary -0.233*** -0.287** -0.157 -0.185 -0.255*** 0.202 -0.238**
(0.0887) (0.122) (0.145) (0.174) (0.0931) (0.177) (0.106)
Satisfied -0.161** -0.109 -0.0875 0.0584 -0.167** 0.678*** -0.0934
(0.0690) (0.0974) (0.0914) (0.104) (0.0740) (0.116) (0.0789)
Neutral -0.240*** -0.126 -0.102 0.0576 -0.224*** 0.956*** -0.206**
(0.0754) (0.101) (0.107) (0.118) (0.0796) (0.130) (0.0866)
Dissatisfied -0.0108 0.0864 0.0757 0.239** 0.00716 0.523*** 0.00214
(0.0670) (0.0937) (0.101) (0.111) (0.0716) (0.115) (0.0770)
Very Dissatisfied -0.0221 0.00213 0.365*** 0.635*** -0.0133 0.0378 -0.0652
(0.0913) (0.124) (0.129) (0.153) (0.0958) (0.148) (0.107)
Age 0.00191 0.00288* 0.00197 0.00391* 0.00227* 0.000737 0.00141
(0.00118) (0.00159) (0.00178) (0.00203) (0.00124) (0.00214) (0.00136)
Middle Wealth -0.0949** -0.0906 -0.132** -0.199*** -0.0950** 0.0632 -0.0867*
(0.0440) (0.0594) (0.0647) (0.0689) (0.0464) (0.0812) (0.0495)
High Wealth -0.300*** -0.263*** -0.251*** -0.194** -0.301*** 0.451*** -0.240***
(0.0555) (0.0698) (0.0852) (0.0867) (0.0575) (0.102) (0.0620)
Employed -0.0914** -0.0542 -0.0428 -0.0517 -0.0852** 0.223*** -0.0867**
(0.0370) (0.0479) (0.0577) (0.0611) (0.0386) (0.0623) (0.0416)
Female -0.0202 -0.00493 -0.00299 -0.0167 -0.0140 0.134** -0.0388
(0.0330) (0.0435) (0.0535) (0.0570) (0.0343) (0.0605) (0.0385)
Partnered -0.0182 -0.0832* -0.00694 -0.0359 -0.0367 -0.0561 -0.00666
(0.0366) (0.0473) (0.0555) (0.0592) (0.0380) (0.0664) (0.0432)
Constant 7.918*** 7.042*** 7.635*** 6.131*** 7.672*** 3.717*** 8.006***
(0.108) (0.152) (0.176) (0.197) (0.115) (0.208) (0.126)
Observations 14,815 14,815 6,639 6,235 14,815 14,815 14,815
R-squared 0.174 0.125 0.169 0.038 0.197 0.085 0.036
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions is the normalised first principal component. In column
1 it is calculated from the six ordinal variables, in column 2 it is from the four ordinal variables, while
results columns 3 and 4 it is from the extended list of variables in 2010, 2011 and 2012. In columns 5
and 6 the dependent variable is from the Uncentered PCA and Standard PCA and in column 7, it is from
the four variables which exclude the data from questions 3 and 4. Black is the base category for racial
group while No education (zero years of schooling) is the reference category for the education category.
Primary is between 1 to 7 years of schooling, High school 8 to 12 years, and Tertiary more than 12
years of education. Wealth is the limited wealth index calculated using Uncentered PCA (Wittenberg
& Leibbrandt, 2017) from household ownership of or access to assets. Employed is a dummy for those
with any type of employment. Partnered is the marital status indicator, which is 1 if an individual has a
partner. All regressions exclude 2006 because the data from that year does not have two of the ordinal
variables. Linearised standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * are at 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels.
Source: Own calculations from weighted SASAS datasets, 2003 - 2012.
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Table 4.7.4: Sensitivity analysis of the Radicalism degree results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES 1st comp 2nd comp 3rd comp Unnormalised
Coloured -0.992*** 0.0514 -0.988*** -2.172***
(0.0600) (0.0577) (0.0601) (0.131)
Indian -1.049*** -0.000614 -1.077*** -2.298***
(0.0647) (0.0755) (0.0715) (0.142)
White -1.514*** 0.340*** -1.591*** -3.317***
(0.0656) (0.0652) (0.0722) (0.144)
Primary -0.166** -0.0126 -0.0763 -0.363**
(0.0796) (0.0899) (0.0707) (0.174)
High School -0.187** -0.0551 -0.0200 -0.410**
(0.0758) (0.0882) (0.0715) (0.166)
Tertiary -0.233*** -0.0937 -0.0381 -0.511***
(0.0887) (0.106) (0.0889) (0.194)
Satisfied -0.161** 0.102 -0.109* -0.354**
(0.0690) (0.0748) (0.0619) (0.151)
Neutral -0.240*** 0.152* -0.0399 -0.526***
(0.0754) (0.0779) (0.0708) (0.165)
Dissatisfied -0.0108 0.136* 0.00948 -0.0236
(0.0670) (0.0745) (0.0621) (0.147)
Very Dissatisfied -0.0221 -0.000366 0.0766 -0.0483
(0.0913) (0.101) (0.0813) (0.200)
Age 0.00191 0.00110 0.00123 0.00418
(0.00118) (0.00130) (0.00119) (0.00258)
Middle Wealth -0.0949** 0.00150 -0.0171 -0.208**
(0.0440) (0.0481) (0.0388) (0.0965)
High Wealth -0.300*** 0.0614 -0.107** -0.657***
(0.0555) (0.0555) (0.0513) (0.121)
Continued on next page
162
Un
ive
rsi
ty
of
Ca
pe
To
wn
Table 4.7.5: Continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES 1st comp 2nd comp 3rd comp Unnormalised
Employed -0.0914** 0.0424 -0.00169 -0.200**
(0.0370) (0.0377) (0.0339) (0.0810)
Female -0.0202 0.00586 0.0315 -0.0442
(0.0330) (0.0358) (0.0318) (0.0723)
Partnered -0.0182 -0.0790** -0.0415 -0.0399
(0.0366) (0.0386) (0.0348) (0.0803)
Constant 7.918*** 4.189*** 4.785*** 19.78***
(0.108) (0.125) (0.106) (0.237)
Observations 14,815 14,815 14,815 14,815
R-squared 0.174 0.007 0.167 0.174
Notes: The dependent variable is the Polychoric principal component calculated from six ordinal vari-
ables. For column 1 the dependent variable is the normalised first component, and in columns 2 and 3
it is the normalised second and third components, while in column 4 it is the unnormalised first com-
ponent. Black is the base category for racial group, while No education (zero years of schooling) is
the reference category for the education category. Primary is between 1 to 7 years of schooling, High
school 8 to 12 years and Tertiary more than 12 years of education. Wealth is the limited wealth index
calculated using Uncentered PCA (Wittenberg & Leibbrandt, 2017) from household ownership of or
access to assets. Employed is a dummy for those with any type of employment. Partnered is the marital
status indicator, which is 1 if an individual has a partner. All regressions exclude 2006 because because
the data from this does not have two of the ordinal variables. Linearised standard errors in parenthesis.
***, **, * are 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels.
Source: Own calculations from weighted SASAS datasets, 2003 - 2012.
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Table 4.7.6: Sensitivity analysis of the Radicalism degree results
RIF regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES OLS Logit Quantile0.25 Quantile0.5 Quantile0.75
Coloured -0.992*** -1.195*** -1.264*** -1.129*** -0.380***
(0.0599) (0.0850) (0.0694) (0.0530) (0.0231)
Indian -1.049*** -1.172*** -1.334*** -1.155*** -0.431***
(0.0647) (0.0941) (0.0895) (0.0677) (0.0289)
White -1.509*** -1.733*** -1.806*** -1.409*** -0.466***
(0.0658) (0.104) (0.0890) (0.0624) (0.0265)
Primary -0.167** -0.350** -0.167** -0.172* -0.0510
(0.0794) (0.141) (0.0811) (0.0952) (0.0506)
High School -0.194** -0.380*** -0.128* -0.172* -0.0565
(0.0760) (0.136) (0.0769) (0.0907) (0.0483)
Tertiary -0.244*** -0.499*** -0.192 -0.294*** -0.110**
(0.0891) (0.157) (0.119) (0.112) (0.0558)
Satisfied -0.160** -0.258** -0.137** -0.223*** -0.154***
(0.0690) (0.102) (0.0698) (0.0703) (0.0372)
Neutral -0.239*** -0.258** -0.204*** -0.222*** -0.207***
(0.0754) (0.110) (0.0737) (0.0764) (0.0401)
Dissatisfied -0.00969 -0.0631 -0.0893 -0.141** -0.125***
(0.0670) (0.0983) (0.0654) (0.0689) (0.0369)
Very Dissatisfied -0.0210 0.0403 -0.107 0.0873 -0.0899*
(0.0912) (0.137) (0.0965) (0.0912) (0.0477)
2.Aged 25-34 0.0904* 0.117 -0.0144 0.0448 0.0181
(0.0488) (0.0746) (0.0660) (0.0610) (0.0305)
3.Aged 35-44 0.0859 0.127 0.0884 0.0986 -0.00927
(0.0541) (0.0853) (0.0638) (0.0655) (0.0329)
4.Aged 45-54 0.0433 0.0243 -0.0713 0.0453 0.0150
(0.0592) (0.0945) (0.0768) (0.0737) (0.0364)
5.Aged 55-64 0.104 -0.0124 0.0329 0.0795 0.0319
(0.0638) (0.110) (0.0763) (0.0749) (0.0381)
6.Aged 65-74 0.0790 0.0675 -0.0259 -0.000636 0.0150
(0.0803) (0.127) (0.0936) (0.0922) (0.0446)
7.Aged 75-99 0.234** 0.318* 0.112 0.214* 0.0847
(0.117) (0.191) (0.163) (0.124) (0.0659)
Continued on next page
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Table 4.7.7: Continued from previous page
RIF regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES OLS Logit Quantile0.25 Quantile0.5 Quantile0.75
Middle Wealth -0.0937** -0.0597 -0.0239 -0.0295 -0.0482*
(0.0439) (0.0666) (0.0479) (0.0506) (0.0267)
High Wealth -0.293*** -0.377*** -0.313*** -0.328*** -0.149***
(0.0555) (0.0803) (0.0789) (0.0686) (0.0323)
Employed -0.102*** -0.0757 -0.0725 -0.0529 -0.0349
(0.0387) (0.0597) (0.0465) (0.0438) (0.0213)
Female -0.0220 5.05e-05 0.0407 0.0123 -0.0212
(0.0330) (0.0525) (0.0412) (0.0396) (0.0197)
Partnered -0.0195 -0.0602 -0.0234 -0.0569 0.00247
(0.0380) (0.0593) (0.0450) (0.0443) (0.0221)
Constant 7.933*** 1.148*** 6.937*** 8.095*** 8.867***
(0.0991) (0.168) (0.101) (0.111) (0.0604)
Observations 14,815 14,815 19,308 19,308 19,308
R-squared 0.175 0.154 0.134 0.076
Notes: The dependent variable is the Polychoric principal component, calculated from six ordinal
variables. For column 1 the dependent variable is the normalised first component, and in columns 2
and 3 it the normalised second and third components, while in column 4 it is the unnormalised first
component. Black is the base category for racial group while No education (zero years of schooling) is
the reference category for the education category. Primary is between 1 to 7 years of schooling, High
school 8 to 12 years and Tertiary more than 12 years of education. Wealth is the limited wealth index
calculated using Uncentered PCA (Wittenberg & Leibbrandt, 2017) from household ownership of or
access to assets. Employed is a dummy for those with any type of employment. Partnered is the marital
status indicator, which is 1 if an individual has a partner. All regressions exclude 2006 because the data
from this year does not have two of the ordinal variables. Linearised standard errors in parenthesis. ***,
**, * are 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels.
Source: Own calculations from weighted SASAS datasets, 2003 - 2012.
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Table 4.7.8: Summary Statistics of sampling weights
Mean Std. Dev. C.V. Minimum Maximum
SAS wgts Rake wgts SAS wgts Rake wgts SAS wgts Rake wgts SAS wgts Rake wgts SAS wgts Rake wgts
2003 12402 12975 21440 22727 1.729 1.752 131 140 301552 384075
2004 10523 11062 14557 15597 1.383 1.410 125 144 178543 215142
2005 11006 11140 18745 19972 1.703 1.793 53 65 406623 374276
2006 10687 12712 15058 19756 1.409 1.554 195 118 223984 270248
2007 10101 10272 10802 10834 1.069 1.055 276 290 214846 181523
2008 9567 9844 9325 9969 0.975 1.013 359 266 86761 90167
2009 9833 10146 10919 11455 1.111 1.129 127 149 115293 112462
2010 10484 10758 10181 11050 0.971 1.027 145 103 79015 112563
2011 11146 11757 9613 10399 0.862 0.885 210 199 107262 75068
2012 14244 14444 13609 14298 0.955 0.990 309 248 128506 142690
Notes: The table presents summary statistics of the original SASAS weights and the new calibrated
weights. SAS wgts are original weights supplied with the SASAS datasets, and Rake wgts are weights
calibrated using the survwgt Stata code of Winter et al. (2015).
Figure 4.7.4: Health polarization in South Africa, 2003 - 2012
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Notes: The figure presents the patterns of social polarization in South Africa. RQ is the Reynal-Querol
(2002) index of pure social polarization. The Permanyer (2012) index uses radicalism degree to meas-
ure alienation. Asymmetric and Symmetric are Permanyer and D’ambrosio (2015) indices of health
polarization. Asymmetric means that the alienation felt by the unprivileged towards the privileged is not
reciprocated, while symmetric indicates symmetric alienation. All estimates are weighted at a national
level using the calibrated weights
Source: Own calculations from weighted SASAS datasets, 2003 - 2012
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Chapter 5
Summary and Concluding Remarks
This thesis investigates the extent of clustering of incomes in the South Africa income
distribution. More specifically, we investigate the extent to which incomes cluster at
specific ranges of the income distribution. We further examine the impact of differ-
ent income sources on the clustering of incomes. We conclude with a measurement
of social distances across racial groups in the post apartheid era. The thesis is there-
fore at the intersection of different strands of literature addressing income polarization,
bi-polarization, stratification and social polarization. Our main goal is therefore to un-
derstand the evolution of (economic and social) distances and relative fortunes across
groups in post-apartheid South Africa. We use data from a survey conducted at the end
of Apartheid, and data from two post-Apartheid surveys.
Since the dawn of democracy in early 1990s, South African government made a public
commitment to overcome the economic legacies of apartheid. The government enacted
an ambitious suite of reforms to redress the injustice of centuries of colonialism and
apartheid. Over the two decades into democracy, the country has been successful on
a number of outcomes. For instance, the country achieved a steady GDP growth rate,
improved access to social grants and basic services, and has seen an improvement in
the Human Development Index. Despite these gradual improvements, the data reveals
that, unemployment hovers around 25%, poverty, though it has declined, is still en-
trenched among Blacks, and the country remains one of the most unequal societies
in the world. This suggests that the long term roots of the inequities have not been
adequately understood and addressed. There is therefore a need to investigate how the
different dimensions of welfare (that is, polarization and stratification) compare in the
post-Apartheid period, and further evaluate how the distribution of different income
sources have impacted the level of polarization and stratification.
These investigations are undertaken in three distinct, but related, analytical chapters.
Using data collected by surveys between 1993 and 2014-2015, we find that, while there
was a movement from the bottom income classes to the middles classes, there was also
an increase in the extent of clustering of incomes. This movement of people from lower
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to middle income classes, which happened between 1993 and 2008, created poles in
the income distribution. That is, there is higher income polarization and income bi-
polarization in 2008. We actually find near perfect bi-polarity between the rich and the
poor in the South Africa distribution of income in 2008. Previous studies have found
that income inequality also increased during this period. The simultaneous increase
in polarization and inequality suggests that the government’s de-racialisation policies
designed to accelerate the economic integration have favoured a select few.
From 2008 to 2014-2015 income polarization declined, partly, due to a significant
movement of people from the bottom income class to the middle classes. On the whole,
income polarization and bi-polarization declined in the post apartheid era. These find-
ing suggest that the distances between groups have declined during the period between
1993 and 2015. We confirm this by showing that income disparities between groups
defined by region (urban-rural) and race have declined. Meanwhile, the income dis-
parities within the groups increased. In line with the income inequality literature, we
also find that social grants are central to reducing income differences. More gener-
ally, our decompositions reveal that the distribution of government transfers contrib-
utes negatively to income polarization, while the distribution of labour earnings tend
to increase polarization. These findings are consistent with those from Bonnefond
and Clément (2012) and Deutsch et al. (2013) who investigated the effects of different
income sources on income polarizati n, and inequality.
One of the limitations of the above analysis is that we could not identify where the
poles are located and what the characteristics are of the poles (or the characteristics of
people at the poles). In an effort to gain a deeper understanding of the poles, we invest-
igated the relative fortunes of different racial groups, and the hierarchical ordering of
race along the income distribution. Given the high, though declining, contribution of
the between racial groups polarization to the overall degree of income polarization, we
conjecture that the local poles may be the mean or median incomes of the racial groups.
Therefore, the lower (higher) the degree of overlapping (stratification) of incomes of
the different races suggests higher income polarization.
Using the same datasets, we first show that the incomes of Blacks, particularly those
at lower income percentiles, are catching up to those of their White counterparts. The
incomes of Coloureds have, however, been slow to keep up. Convergence of incomes
(or lack of it) across groups is a clear signal of overlapping (stratification) of income
distributions across the groups. Therefore, the growth of income convergence sug-
gests a decline in the stratification of incomes across the racial groups. We confirm
this reduction in stratification by showing that, even though the incomes of Whites are
168
Un
ive
rsi
ty
of
Ca
pe
To
wn
stratified (that is, their incomes overlap less with incomes of other races), the degree
of stratification lessened in the post-apartheid era. Despite the growth in the overlap-
ping of income distribution, the incomes of Whites continue to rank above the 90th
percentile in the income distributions of other races.
During the six years from 2008 to 2014, the income distribution of Blacks is charac-
terised by two strata, one rich and one poor. This distributional characteristic increases
the Blacks overlapping of income distributions of other racial groups, thereby increas-
ing their assimilation into the economy. To figure out the effect of the different income
sources on stratification, we use rank-preserving income exchange simulations. The
simulations show that the the distribution of government transfers has a positive effect
on overlapping of incomes of Blacks with those of Whites. This implies the expansion
of state transfers contributed to reduction of economic distances. The distributions
of labour income, of capital income, and of remittances tend to increase stratification
of the incomes of Whites. The implication is that policies such as the Employment
Equity and Black Economic Empowerment have not had the desired effect. We also
find evidence is support of the view that these policies only benefited a select few.
All things considered, our evidence suggests clustering of incomes around local means
of the racial groups incomes. Further, the pace of economic assimilation of the previ-
ously disadvantaged racial groups int the mainstream economy is slow. Additionally,
our results confirm that race is still the defining stratum even two decades after the
end of apartheid. Cognizant of these results, we shift focus to examining the distance
across racial groups in terms of social characteristics. More precisely, we use data from
10 waves (from 2003 to 2012) of the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS)
to investigate the evolution of social polarization in the country. To measure alienation
among the racial groups, we use the extent of an individual’s interest in and identifica-
tion with his subgroup. We call this involvement with one’s group the degree of racial
radicalism.
Owing to the importance of racial radicalism in our indicators of social polarization,
first we examine how the scores of the index of radicalism correlate with a number of
variables. The regression results reveal that the degree of racial radicalism decreases
with more household wealth, higher education attainment and employment. These res-
ults are robust to different calculations of the scores of the radicalism degree index, and
are also consistent with predictions of the economics of identity models. With regard
to social polarization, we find that social polarization declines during the study period.
Most importantly, as between-group polarization declines, we find that within-group
polarization tends to rise, which indicates an inverse relationship between internal ho-
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mogeneity and external heterogeneity.
The three essays in this thesis address the normatively undesirable issue of distance
between groups in South Africa. From a positive economics analysis, the social and
economic distances between relevant and salient groups have negative effects on other
social objectives. Therefore, one limitation of our analysis is that we do not provide
a discussion on how polarization and stratification correlate with outcomes like unem-
ployment, poverty, economic freedom and political inclusion. Nevertheless, the thesis
finds that distances between the incomes of different groups mimic distances between
individuals. That is, patterns of polarization and stratification are similar to those of
vertical inequality.
These insights have several implications for policy. First, there is a need to increase
education attainment of previously disadvantaged groups. This stems from our finding
that labour market earnings do not only increase income disparities, they also tend to
create local poles in the distribution. Since education is the surest way to improve la-
bour market earning, then public policy should equalise education opportunities across
groups.
We further show that government transfers tend to lower the stratification of income of
White individuals and increase the overlapping of the income distribution of Blacks.
This suggests scaling up the initial policy which expanded the government transfers.
While government transfers are an immediate option to move people out of poverty,
they may also reduce the likelihood of labour force participation, thereby slowing
the pace of labour market integration. Thus, a preferred long-term policy is to em-
power individuals from the disadvantaged groups. For instance, a targeted policy that
provides tertiary education bursaries together with paid internships and placements is
more likely to improve school-to-work transition.
Moreover, the results point to the existence of two strata in the national distribution,
one poor and the other rich. This is particularly true among the incomes of Blacks. This
observation is seen by some as an indication that democracy only benefits a select few.
From a political economy perspective, this suggests a factional state that redistributes
income and wealth from one faction to the other.
Another important finding from the thesis is that the three dimensions studied appear
to evolve in tandem with one another. For instance, the higher polarization of incomes,
the greater the stratification of incomes, especially those of White individuals, and
the greater the degree social polarization. Thus, the country appears to divided along
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racial lines. From a policy perspective, it means the underlying root causes of the three
concepts are similar. Therefore, a policy that addresses the economic advantage of
Whites, also provides a platform for other racial groups to integrate into the labour
market. At the same, it improves social cohesion in the country.
Further research is still needed to better understand the mechanisms by which polariz-
ation and stratification impact the degree to which an individual’s partisan and social
identities converge. The thesis has not dealt with polarization and stratification of as-
sets and wealth. Therefore, one issue worthy of investigation is how the distribution of
capital incomes (like dividends, property earnings, and private pensions) might affect
the degree of polarization or stratification of incomes among the race groups.
171
Un
ive
rsi
ty
of
Ca
pe
To
wn
Biblography
Acemoglu, D. & Autor, D. (2011). Skills, Tasks and Technologies: Implications for
Employment and Earnings. Handbook of Labor Economics, 4, 1043–1171.
Adato, M., Carter, M. R. & May, J. (2006). Exploring Poverty Traps and Social
Exclusion in South Africa using Qualitative and Quantitative data. The Journal
of Development Studies, 42(2), 226–247.
Akerlof, G. A. & Kranton, R. E. (2000). Economics and Identity. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 115(3), 715–753.
Akerlof, G. A. & Kranton, R. E. (2005). Identity and the Economics of Organizations.
The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(1), 9–32.
Allanson, P. (2014). Income stratification and between-group inequality. Economics
letters, 124(2), 227–230.
Allison, R. A. & Foster, J. E. (2004). Measuring Health Inequality using Qualitative
Data. Journal of Health Economics, 23(3), 505–524.
Amiel, Y., Cowell, F. & Ramos, X. (2010). Poles Apart? An analysis of the meaning
of Polarization. Review of Income and Wealth, 56(1), 23–46.
Apouey, B. (2007). Measuring Health Polarization with Self-assessed Health Data.
Health Economics, 16(9), 875–894.
Araar, A. (2008). On the Decomposition of Polarization Indices: Illustrations with
Chinese and Nigerian Household Surveys. Cahier de recherche/Working Paper,
8, 06.
Awoyemi, T. & Araar, A. (2009). Explaining Polarization and its dimensions in Ni-
geria: A DER Decomposition Approach. In 14th annual conference on econo-
metric modelling for africa, abuja, nigeria (pp. 8–10).
Azzimonti, M. (2011). Barriers to Investment in Polarized Societies. The American
Economic Review, 101(5), 2182–2204.
Banerjee & Duflo, E. (2008). What is middle class about the middle classes around
the world? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22(2), 3–28.
Banerjee, A. K. (2010). A Multidimensional Gini Index. Mathematical Social Sci-
ences, 60(2), 87–93.
Battaglia, M. P., Hoaglin, D. C. & Frankel, M. R. (2013). Practical considerations in
raking survey data. Survey Practice, 2(5), 1-10.
Bianchi, M. (1997). Testing for Convergence: Evidence from Non-Parametric Mul-
timodality Tests. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 12(4), 393–409.
172
Un
ive
rsi
ty
of
Ca
pe
To
wn
Birdsall, N. (2007). Reflections on the Macro Foundations of the Middle Class in the
Developing World. Reflections.
Bonnefond, C. & Clément, M. (2012). An Analysis of Income Polarisation in Rural
and Urban China. Post-Communist Economies, 24(1), 15–37.
Borgen, N. T. (2016). Fixed effects in unconditional quantile regression. Stata Journal,
16(2), 403-415(13).
Borraz, F., González, N. & Rossi, M. (2013). Polarization and the Middle Class in
Uruguay. Latin American Journal of Economics, 50(2), 289–326.
Bourguignon, F., Ferreira, F. H. & Lusting, N. (2005). The Microeconomics of In-
come Distribution Dynamics in East Asia and Latin America. World Bank Pub-
lications.
Branson, N. & Wittenberg, M. (2014). Reweighting South African National House-
hold Survey Data to Create a Consistent Series over Time: A Cross-Entropy
Estimation Approach. South African Journal of Economics, 82(1), 19–38.
Brzezinski, M. (2013). Income Polarization and Economic growth. National Bank of
Poland Working Paper(147).
Burger, R. & McAravey, C. (2014). What does the Middle Class mean in a Polarised,
Developing Country such as South Africa?
Burger, R., Steenekamp, C., Van der Berg, S. & Zoch, A. (2014). The middle class in
post-Apartheid South Africa: Examining and comparing rival approaches (Tech.
Rep.). Mimeo, Department of Economics, Stellenbosch University.
Burtless, G. (1999). Effects of Growing Wage Disparities and Changing Family Com-
position on the US Income Distribution. European Economic Review, 43(4),
853–865.
Ceccarelli, C., Giorgi, G. M. & Guandalini, A. (2014, July-Dece). Is Italy a melting
pot? RIEDS - Rivista Italiana di Economia, Demografia e Statistica - Italian
Review of Economics, Demography and Statistics, 0(3-4), 23-30.
Chakravarty, S. R. (2010). Inequality, Polarization and Poverty: Advances in Distri-
butional Analysis (Vol. 6). Springer.
Chakravarty, S. R. (2015). Inequality, Polarization and Conflict: An Analytical Study.
Springer.
Chakravarty, S. R. & D’Ambrosio, C. (2010). Polarization Orderings of Income Dis-
tributions. Review of Income and Wealth, 56(1), 47–64.
Chakravarty, S. R. & Majumder, A. (2001). Inequality, Polarisation, and Welfare:
Theory and Applications. Australian Economic Papers, 40(1), 1–13.
Clementi, F., Dabalen, A. L., Molini, V. & Schettino, F. (2014). Economic Polariza-
tion: The Dark Side of Nigeria. In IfW Centenary Conference Fair and Sustain-
able Prosperity in the Global Economy, Kiel, Germany (pp. 13–14).
Clementi, F., Dabalen, A. L., Molini, V. & Schettino, F. (2017). When the Centre
173
Un
ive
rsi
ty
of
Ca
pe
To
wn
Cannot Hold: Patterns of Polarization in Nigeria. Review of Income and Wealth,
63(4), 608–632.
Clementi, F. & Schettino, F. (2013). Income Polarization in Brazil, 2001-2011: A
Distributional Analysis using PNAD Data. Economics Bulletin, 33(3), 1796–
1815.
D’Agostino, A., Regoli, A., Cornelio, G. & Berti, F. (2016). Studying Income In-
equality of Immigrant Communities in Italy. Social Indicators Research, 127(1),
83–100.
Dagum, C. (1987). Measuring the Economic Affluence between populations of Income
Receivers. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 5(1), 5–12.
Dagum, C. (1998). A New Approach to the Decomposition of the Gini Income In-
equality Ratio. In Income Inequality, Poverty, and Economic Welfare (pp. 47–
63). Springer.
Daly, M. C. & Valletta, R. G. (2006). Inequality and Poverty in United States: The
Effects of Rising Dispersion of Men’s Earnings and Changing Family Behaviour.
Economica, 73(289), 75–98.
Deutsch, J., Fusco, A. & Silber, J. (2013). The BIP trilogy (Bipolarization, Inequality
and Polarization): One saga but three different stories. Economics: The Open-
Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, 7(2013-22), 1–33.
Deutsch, J. & Silber, J. (1997). Gini’s Transvariazione and the measurement of dis-
tance between distributions. Empirical Economics, 22(4).
Deutsch, J. & Silber, J. (1999). Inequality Decomposition by Population Subgroups
and The Analysis of Interdistributional Inequality. In Handbook of income in-
equality measurement (pp. 363–403). Springer.
Deutsch, J., Silber, J. & Yalonetzky, G. (2014). On Bi-Polarization and The Middle
Class in Latin America: A Look At the First Decade of the Twenty-First Century.
Review of Income and Wealth, 60, S332–S352.
Dima, B. & Dima, S¸. (2016). Income Distribution and Social Tolerance. Social
Indicators Research, 128(1), 439–466.
DiNardo, J., Fortin, N. M. & Lemieux, T. (1996). Labor Market Institutions and the
Distribution of Wages, 1973-1992: A Semiparametric Approach. Econometrica:
Journal of the Econometric Society, 1001–1044.
Duclos, J.-Y. & Échevin, D. (2005). Bi-polarization Comparisons. Economics Letters,
87(2), 249–258.
Duclos, J.-Y., Esteban, J. & Ray, D. (2004). Polarization: Concepts, Measurement,
Estimation. Econometrica, 72(6), 1737–1772.
Duclos, J.-Y. & Taptue, A.-M. (2015). Chapter 5 - Polarization. In A. B. Atkinson &
F. Bourguignon (Eds.), Handbook of income distribution (Vol. 2, p. 301 - 358).
Elsevier.
174
Un
ive
rsi
ty
of
Ca
pe
To
wn
Easterly, W. (2001). The Middle-Class Consensus and Economic Development.
Journal of Economic Growth, 6(4), 317–335.
Elbers, C., Lanjouw, P., Mistiaen, J. A. & Özler, B. (2008). Re-interpreting between-
group inequality. The Journal of Economic Inequality, 6(3), 231–245.
Esteban, J., Gradin, C. & Ray, D. (2007). An Eextension of a Measure of Polarization,
with an Application to the Income Distribution of five OECD Countries. The
Journal of Economic Inequality, 5(1), 1–19.
Esteban, J. & Ray, D. (1994). On the Measurement of Polarization. Econometrica:
Journal of the Econometric Society, 819–851.
Esteban, J. & Ray, D. (2011). Linking Conflict to Inequality and Polarization. The
American Economic Review, 101(4), 1345–1374.
Esteban, J. & Schneider, G. (2008). Polarization and Conflict: Theoretical and Empir-
ical Issues. Journal of Peace Research, 45(2), 131–141.
Ezcurra, R., Pascual, P. & Rapún, M. (2006). Regional Polarization in the European
Union. European Planning Studies, 14(4), 459–484.
Filmer, D. & Pritchett, L. H. (2001). Estimating Wealth Effects Without Expenditure
Data or Tears: An Application to Educational Enrollments in states of India.
Demography, 38(1), 115–132.
Finn, A. & Leibbrandt, M. (2013). The Dynamics of Poverty in the First Three Waves
of NIDS (Tech. Rep. No. No.119). Southern Africa Labour and Employment
Research Unit, University of Cape Town.
Finn, A. & Ranchhod, V. (2013). Genuine Fakes: The Prevalence and Implications
of Fieldworker Fraud in a Large South African Survey (Tech. Rep.). Southern
Africa Labour and Employment Research Unit, University of Cape Town.
Firpo, S., Fortin, N. & Lemieux, T. (2007). Unconditional Quantile Regressions (Tech.
Rep.). National Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge, Mass., USA.
Firpo, S., Fortin, N. & Lemieux, T. (2009). Unconditional Quantile Regressions.
Econometrica, 77(3), 953–973.
Flachaire, E. & Nunez, O. (2007). Estimation of the Income Distribution and Detection
of Subpopulations: An Explanatory Model. Computational Statistics and Data
Analysis, 51(7), 3368–3380.
Fortin, N., Lemieux, T. & Firpo, S. (2011a). Decomposition Methods in Economics.
Handbook of Labor Economics, 4, 1–102.
Fortin, N., Lemieux, T. & Firpo, S. (2011b). Decomposition Methods in Economics
(Vol. 4; Tech. Rep. No. No. w16045). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Foster, J. E. & Wolfson, M. C. (2010/1992). Polarization and The Decline of the
Middle class: Canada and the US. The Journal of Economic Inequality, 8(2),
247–273.
Frick, J. R. & Goebel, J. (2008). Regional income stratification in unified Germany
175
Un
ive
rsi
ty
of
Ca
pe
To
wn
using a Gini decomposition approach. Regional Studies, 42(4), 555–577.
Frick, J. R., Goebel, J., Schechtman, E., Wagner, G. G. & Yitzhaki, S. (2006). Using
Analysis of Gini (ANOGI) for detecting whether two subsamples represent the
same universe in the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP). Sociological
Methods and Research, 34(4), 427–468.
Fusco, A. & Silber, J. (2014). On Social Polarization and Ordinal Variables: The Case
of Self-assessed Health. The European Journal of Health Economics, 15(8),
841–851.
García-Fernández, R. M., Gottlieb, D. & Palacios-González, F. (2013). Polarization,
Growth and Social policy in the case of Israel, 1997-2008. Economics: The
Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, 7(2013-15), 1–40.
Gigliarano, C. & Mosler, K. (2009). Constructing Indices of Multivariate Polarization.
The Journal of Economic Inequality, 7(4), 435–460.
Glaeser, E. L. (2005). The Political Economy of Hatred. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 120(1), 45-86.
Gochoco-Bautista, M. S., Bautista, C. C., Maligalig, D. S. & Sotocinal, N. R. (2013).
Income Polarization in Asia. Asian Economic Papers, 12(2), 101–136.
Gradín, C. (2000). Polarization by Sub-population in Spain. Review of Income and
Wealth, 46(4), 457–474.
Gradín, C. (2013). Race, Poverty and Deprivation in South Africa. Journal of African
Economies, 22(2), 187–238.
Gradin, C. (2015). Poverty and Ethnicity among Black South Africans. European
Journal of Development Research, 25(5), 921–942.
Handcock, M. S. & Morris, M. (1998). Relative Distribution Methods. Sociological
Methodology, 28(1), 53–97.
Heller, J. & Yitzhaki, S. (2006). Fossil Specimens to a given Recent Classification
when the Distribution of Character Variation is not Normal. Systematics and
Biodiversity, 4(2), 161–172.
Hnatkovska, V., Lahiri, A. & Paul, S. (2012). Castes and Labor mobility. American
Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 4(2), 274–307.
Holgado-Tello, F. P., Chacón-Moscoso, S., Barbero-García, I. & Vila-Abad, E. (2010).
Polychoric versus Pearson Correlations in Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor
Analysis of Ordinal Variables. Quality and Quantity, 44(1), 153–166.
Izrael, D., Battaglia, M. P. & Frankel, M. R. (2009). Extreme Survey weight adjust-
ment as a component of sample balancing (aka raking). In Proceedings from the
Thirty-Fourth Annual SAS Users Group International Conference.
Jenkins, S. P. (1995). Did the Middle Class Shrink during the 1980s? UK Evidence
from Kernel Density Estimates. Economics letters, 49(4), 407–413.
Jenkins, S. P. (1996). Recent Trends in the UK Income Distribution: What Happened
176
Un
ive
rsi
ty
of
Ca
pe
To
wn
and Why? Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 29–46.
Jöreskog, K. G. (2005). Structural Equation Modeling with ordinal variables using
LISREL (Tech. Rep.). Technical report, Scientific Software International, Inc.,
Lincolnwood, IL.
Kahneman, D. & Deaton, A. (2010). High Income improves Evaluation of life but
not emotional well-being. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
107(38), 16489–16493.
Klandermans, P. (2014). Identity Politics and Politicized Identities: Identity Processes
and the Dynamics of Protest. Political Psychology, 35(1), 1–22.
Kolenikov, S. & Angeles, G. (2009). Socioeconomic Status Measurement with Dis-
crete Proxy Variables: Is Principal Component Analysis a reliable answer? Re-
view of Income and Wealth, 55(1), 128–165.
Kolenikov, S. et al. (2014). Calibrating Survey Data using Iterative Proportional fitting
(raking). The Stata Journal, 14(1), 22–59.
Krüger, L. (2011). The Impact of Black Economic Empowerment on South African
Businesses: Focusing on Ten Dimensions of Business Performance. Southern
African Business Review, 15(3), 207–233.
Krüger, L. (2014). South African Managers Perceptions of Black Economic Empower-
ment: A Sunset Clause may be necessary to ensure Future Sustainable Growth.
Southern African Business Review, 18(1), 80–99.
Larrimore, J. (2014). Accounting for United States Household Income Inequality
Trends: The Changing Importance of Household Structure and Male and Female
Labor Earnings Inequality. Review of Income and Wealth, 60(4), 683–701.
Larrimore, J., Burkhauser, R. V. & Armour, P. (2015). Account for Income Changes
over the Great Recession Relative to previous Recessions: The impact of Taxes
and Transfers. National Tax Journal, 68(2), 281–318.
Leibbrandt, M., Finn, A. & Woolard, I. (2012). Describing and Decomposing post-
Apartheid Income Inequality in South Africa. Development Southern Africa,
29(1), 19–34.
Leibbrandt, M. & Levinsohn, J. (2011). Fifteen years on: Household incomes in South
Africa (Tech. Rep.). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Leibbrandt, M. & Levinsohn, J. (2014). Fifteen Years On: Household Incomes in
South Africa. In African Successes: Government and Institutions. National
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Leibbrandt, M., Wegner, E. & Finn, A. (2011). The policies for reducing income
inequality and poverty in South Africa (Tech. Rep. No. 64). Southern Africa
Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town.
Leibbrandt, M., Woolard, I., Finn, A. & Argent, J. (2010). Trends in South African
Income Distribution and Poverty since the fall of Apartheid. OECD Social,
177
Un
ive
rsi
ty
of
Ca
pe
To
wn
Employment, and Migration Working Papers(101).
Lerman, R. I. & Yitzhaki, S. (1984). A Note on the Calculation and Interpretation of
the Gini Index. Economics Letters, 15(3), 363–368.
Liberati, P. (2015). The World Distribution of Income and Its Inequality, 1970-2009.
Review of Income and Wealth, 61(2), 248-273.
Liberati, P. & Yitzhaki, S. (2012). Welfare Rankings of The Distribution of Earnings
in Italy. Journal of Income Distribution, 21(2), 38–76.
Massari, R., Pittau, M. G. & Zelli, R. (2009). A dwindling Middle Class? Italian
Evidence in the 2000s. The Journal of Economic Inequality, 7(4), 333–350.
Mehran, F. (1975). A Statistical Analysis of Income Inequality based on a Decom-
position of the Gini index. In Proceedings of the 40th session of i.s.i. (warsaw,
1975).
Milanovic, B. & Yitzhaki, S. (2002). Decomposing World Income Distribution: Does
the World have a Middle Class? Review of Income and Wealth, 48(2), 155–178.
Mocan, N. H. & Raschke, C. (2014). Economic Well-being and Anti-Semitic, Xeno-
phobic, and Racist Attitudes in Germany (Tech. Rep.). National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research.
Mocan, N. H. & Raschke, C. (2016). Economic well-being and anti-Semitic, Xeno-
phobic, and Racist attitudes in Germany. European Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics, 41(1), 1–63.
Montalvo, J. G. & Reynal-Querol, M. (2005a). Ethnic Diversity and Economic Devel-
opment. Journal of Development Economics, 76(2), 293–323.
Montalvo, J. G. & Reynal-Querol, M. (2005b). Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict,
and Civil Wars. American Economic Eeview, 796–816.
Montalvo, J. G. & Reynal-Querol, M. (2005c). Ethnic polarization, potential conflict,
and civil wars. American Economic Review, 796–816.
Monti, M. & Santoro, A. (2009). A Note on Between-Group Inequality with an
Application to Households. Journal of Income Distribution, 18(3-4), 49–62.
Monti, M. & Santoro, A. (2011). Stratification And Between-Group Inequality: A
New Interpretation. Review of Income and Wealth, 57(3), 412–427.
Motiram, S. & Sarma, N. (2012). Polarization, Inequality, and Growth: The In-
dian experience (Tech. Rep.). Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research,
Mumbai, India.
Motiram, S. & Sarma, N. (2014). Polarization, Inequality, and Growth: The Indian
experience. Oxford Development Studies, 42(3), 297–318.
Mussard, S. & Richard, P. (2012). Linking Yitzhaki’s and Dagum’s Gini Decomposi-
tions. Applied Economics, 44(23), 2997–3010.
Mussini, M. (2013). A Matrix Approach to the Gini Index Decomposition by Subgroup
and by Income Source. Applied Economics, 45(17), 2457–2468.
178
Un
ive
rsi
ty
of
Ca
pe
To
wn
Naidoo, K., Stanwix, B. & Yu, D. (2014). Reflecting on Racial Discrimination in the
Post-Apartheid South African Labour Market.
Nattrass, N. & Seekings, J. (2001). Two Nations? Race and Economic Inequality in
South Africa today. Daedalus, 130(1), 45–70.
Ogwang, T. (2014). A Convenient Method of Decomposing the Gini Index by popu-
lation subgroups. Journal of Official Statistics, 30(1), 91–105.
Olsson, U. (1979). Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the Polychoric Correlation
Coefficient. Psychometrika, 44(4), 443–460.
Pellicer, M., Ranchhod, V., Sarr, M. & Wegner, E. (2011). Inequality Traps in South
Africa: An overview and research agenda (Tech. Rep.). Southern Africa Labour
and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town.
Perez, C. B. & Ramos, X. (2010). Polarization and Health. Review of Income and
Wealth, 56(1), 171–185.
Permanyer, I. (2012). The Conceptualization and Measurement of Social Polarization.
The Journal of Economic Inequality, 10(1), 45–74.
Permanyer, I. & D’ambrosio, C. (2015). Measuring Social Polarization with Ordinal
and Categorical Data. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 17(3), 311–327.
Pittau, M. G. & Zelli, R. (2001). Income Distribution in Italy: A Nonparametric
Analysis. Statistical Methods and Applications, 10(1-3), 175–189.
Pittau, M. G. & Zelli, R. (2006). Trends in Income Distribution in Italy: A non-
parametric and a semi-parametric analysis. Journal of Income Distribution, 15,
90–118.
Pittau, M. G., Zelli, R. & Johnson, P. A. (2010). Mixture Models, Convergence clubs,
and Polarization. Review of Income and Wealth, 56(1), 102–122.
Porter, S. R. (2015). Quantile Regression: Analyzing Changes in Distributions Instead
of Means. In Higher education: Handbook of theory and research (pp. 335–
381). Springer.
Posel, D. (2001). What’s in a name? Racial categorisations under Apartheid and their
afterlife. Transformation-Durban, 50–74.
Pressman, S. (2007). The Decline of the Middle Class: An International Perspective.
Journal of Economic Issues, 41(1), 181–200.
Prieto-Rodríguez, J., Salas, R. & Rodríguez, J. G. (2003). Polarization Characteriza-
tion Of Inequality-Neutral Tax Reforms. Economics Bulletin, 4(19), 1-7.
Pyatt, G. (1976). On the Interpretation and Disaggregation of Gini Coefficients. The
Economic Journal, 243–255.
Rao, V. M. (1969). Two Decompositions of Concentration Ratio. Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society. Series A (General), 132(3), 418–425.
Reynal-Querol, M. (2002). Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars. Journal of
Conflict Resolution, 46(1), 29–54.
179
Un
ive
rsi
ty
of
Ca
pe
To
wn
Rodríguez, J. G. & Salas, R. (2000). Bi-polarization: Endogenous cut-off value separ-
ating subgroups.
Schiel, R., Leibbrandt, M. & Lam, D. (2014). Assessing the Impact of Social Grants
on Inequality: A South African case study (Tech. Rep.).
Schiel, R., Leibbrandt, M., Lam, D. et al. (2016). Assessing the Impact of Social
Grants on Inequality: A South African case study. In Contemporary issues in
development economics (pp. 112–135). Springer.
Seekings, J. (2008). The Continuing Salience of Race: Discrimination and Diversity
in South Africa. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 26(1), 1–25.
Seekings, J. & Nattrass, N. (2008). Class, Race, and Inequality in South Africa. Yale
University Press.
Sherer, G. (2000). Intergroup Economic Inequality in South Africa: The Post-
Apartheid era. The American Economic Review, 90(2), 317–321.
Shorrocks, A. F. (2013). Decomposition procedures for Distributional Analysis: A
Unified Framework based on the Shapley value. Journal of Economic Inequality,
11(1), 99–126.
Silber, J. (1989). Factor Components, Population Subgroups and The Computation
of the Gini index of inequality. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 71(1),
107–115.
Silber, J., Deutsch, J. & Hanoka, M. (2007). On the Link between the Concepts of
Kurtosis and Bipolarization. Economics Bulletin, 4(36), 1–5.
Stewart, F., Brown, G. & Mancini, L. (2010). Monitoring and Measuring Horizontal
inequalities. Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity,
CRISE Working Paper, 4.
Viollaz, M., Olivieri, S. & Alejo, J. (2009). Labor Income Polarization in Greater
Buenos Aires. Documentos de Trabajo del CEDLAS.
Visagie, J. & Posel, D. (2013). A Reconsideration of What and Who is Middle Class
in South Africa. Development Southern Africa, 30(2), 149–167.
Wan, G. & Wang, C. (2015, July). Income Polarization in the People’s Republic of
China: Trends and Changes. ADBI Working Paper Series(538).
Wang, Y.-Q. & Tsui, K.-Y. (2000). Polarization Orderings and New Classes of Polar-
ization Indices. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2(3), 349–363.
Winter, N. et al. (2015). SURVWGT: Stata module to create and manipulate survey
weights. Statistical Software Components.
Wittenberg, M. (2010). An Introduction to Maximum Entropy and Minimum cross-
entropy estimation using Stata. Stata Journal, 10(3), 315.
Wittenberg, M. & Leibbrandt, M. (2017). Measuring Inequality by Asset Indices:
A General Approach with Application to South Africa. Review of Income and
Wealth, 63(4), 706–730.
180
Un
ive
rsi
ty
of
Ca
pe
To
wn
Wodon, Q. T. (1999, March). Between Group Inequality and Targeted Transfers.
Review of Income and Wealth, 45(1), 21-39.
Wolfson, M. C. (1994). When Inequalities Diverge. American Economic Review,
84(2), 353–358.
Wolfson, M. C. (1997). Divergent Inequalities: Theory and Empirical Results. Review
of Income and Wealth, 43(4), 401–421.
Woolard, I. & Klasen, S. (2005). Determinants of Income Mobility and Household
Poverty Dynamics in South Africa. Journal of Development Studies, 41(5), 865–
897.
Yitzhaki, S. (1994). Economic distance and overlapping of distributions. Journal of
Econometrics, 61(1), 147–159.
Yitzhaki, S. (2010). Is there room for polarization? Review of Income and Wealth,
56(1), 7–22.
Yitzhaki, S. & Lerman, R. I. (1991). Income Stratification and Income Inequality.
Review of Income and Wealth, 37(3), 313–329.
Zacharias, A. & Vakulabharanam, V. (2011). Caste Stratification and Wealth Inequality
in India. World Development, 39(10), 1820–1833.
Zhang, X. & Kanbur, R. (2001). What Difference do Polarisation Measures make? An
Application to China. Journal of Development Studies, 37(3), 85–98.
Zhou, X. (2012). A Nonparametric Index of Stratification. Sociological Methodology,
42(1), 365–389.
Zizzamia, R., Schotte, S., Leibbrandt, M. & Ranchhod, V. (2016). Vulnerability and
the Middle Class in South Africa (Tech. Rep.). Southern Africa Labour and
Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town.
181
